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Within social psychology, little attention is given to group processes occurring outside of 
adult populations. The development of these group processes is rarely discussed or otherwise 
is assumed to be identical to that of the adult processes observed in the literature. 
'HYHORSPHQWDOOLWHUDWXUHLQSV\FKRORJ\RQFKLOGUHQ¶VJURXSSURFHVVHVLVDOVRVSDUVHDQGWKH
systematLFWHVWLQJRIFKLOGUHQ¶VLQWUDJURXSSURFHVVHVLVUDUH7KLVWKHVLVDLPVWRDGGUHVVWKHVH
issues, firstly arguing for the benefit of research that brings together developmental and social 
literature. A review of intragroup process research with children is given, citing major 
publications in this area to date, along with important considerations from intergroup, peer 
relation and identity research. The thesis then moves on to discuss distributive justice and 
resource allocation in children to introduce the experimental paradigms that will be used. 
Two studies examine at how intra- DQGLQWHUJURXSSURFHVVHVLPSDFWRQFKLOGUHQ¶VGHFLVLRQ
making on resource allocation, with a third study focussing on intragroup processes in a 
cumulative estimation paradigm. The second part of the thesis considers productivity in 
FKLOGUHQ¶VJURXSVDFURVVWZRVWXGLHVXVLQJDEUDLQVWRUPLQJSDUDGLJP)LQGLQJVIURPDOORI
WKHVHVWXGLHVKDYHVKRZQDGLYHUJHQFHLQFKLOGUHQ¶VLQWUDJURXSEHKDYLRXUIURPWKDWW\SLFDOO\
found with adults. The FRQWLQXHGUHVHDUFKRIFKLOGUHQ¶VLQWUDJURXSSURFHVVHVLVDGYRFDWHGDV
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6RFLDOSV\FKRORJ\LVµDQDWWHPSWWRXQGHUVWDQG«how thoughts, feeling and behaviour 
RIWKHLQGLYLGXDODUHLQIOXHQFHGE\WKHDFWXDOLPDJLQHGRULPSOLHGSUHVHQFHRIRWKHUV¶
(Allport, 1968, p.3). Research into this area also considers how different groups interact with 
one another and how belonging to a certain group can affect the individual (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979). There is at present, a wealth of such research in social psychology ranging from social 
identity (Rubin &  Hewstone, 1998) to group decision making (Kerr & Tindale, 2004), to 
collective action (Gamson, 1992), intergroup behaviour (Brewer & Kramer, 1985) and group 
performance and productivity (Kerr & Tindale, 2004; Lamm & Trommsdorff, 1973). From 
this research we have gained a detailed account of group behaviour in a variety of contexts 
and the factors that can affect it however little attention has been given in this domain to the 
developmental trajectory of behaviours seen in adult populations. 
 Social developmental psychologists have criticised social psychology research for the 
apparent assumption that group behaviour starts at University age and for the general 
ignorance of any developmental considerations as to where the group behaviour they observe 
may stem from (Durkin, 1995; Bennett & Sani, 2004). To assume that children do not form 
or work in groups and that this experience would not shape the way they function in groups 
as an adult seems improbable and at the very least assumptions worth researching further. 
Current research on social development has focussed mostly on intergroup scenarios, 
demonstrating that children have quite a complex understanding of their social world (for a 
full discussion see Chapter 2). However, OHVVLVNQRZQDERXWFKLOGUHQ¶s intragroup behaviour. 
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 $OWKRXJKOHVVREYLRXVO\DSSOLFDEOHFKLOGUHQ¶VLntragroup behaviour is important to 
understand. For example, learning the basics of how children make decisions and how these 
decisions can be influenced by others can help to explain group ostracism and bullying, 
raising questions such as: do individual attitudes in a group become polarised, do children 
side with the majority or can a minority position have influence? The development of 
intragroup behaviour can also have important theoretical ramifications. Looking at 
productivity loss in groups, Steiner (1972) argued that process loss, which ultimately causes 
lower productivity levels, is an inherent part of being in a group. If that is the case, then 
productivity loss should be seen in children¶V groups and if it is not, it implies that process 
loss is something we learn as we get older. If the latter is the case, then further questions need 
to be answered; at what age does process loss start and are there any developmental variables 
at that age that can explain where it may come from? 
 By looking at the development of intragroup processes, we can learn more about 
group behaviour and some argue that we can never fully understand group psychology 
without first looking at where this behaviour comes from (Durkin, 1995). Additionally 
developmental psychologists can use social psychological research to answer questions in 
their own work such as the social psychological processes that are present in children that 
help them to understand their social world. Recent research presented both in this thesis and 
in peer review journals have also demonstrated the applicability and value of using social 
psychological measures and statistical methodology when working with child populations 
(Gummerum, Keller, Takezawa, & Mata, 2008; Keller & Canz, 2007).  
 Despite the potential for new research areas, there remains a gap in the literature in 
both social and social-developmental literature on intragroup processes in children that needs 




become a permanent feature of classrooms in the UK. Coupled with the fact that children 
often play together in groups and join after school clubs, groups and how to behave in a 
group are salient issues for children of school age. The purpose of this thesis is to address the 
JDSLQOLWHUDWXUHRQFKLOGUHQ¶VLQWUDJURXSSURFHVVHVWRIXUWKHURXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIKRZ
children work in a group and how they benefit from group work, when the adult literature 
suggests that being part of a group impairs performance (Diehl & Stroebe, 1991; Steiner, 
1972). In order to do this thoroughly, two things must be defined: what is meant by group and 
group processes.  
Definition of group 
Although a seemingly obvious idea, the definition of a group still has no consensus in 
the social psychology literature. Groups are comprised of a wide variety of people, ranging 
from fans at a football match, to the social category of women and to more salient groups 
such as family and profession. To try to encompass all these different types of groups into 
one overarching definition has proven difficult.  
McGrath (1984) IHOWLWEHWWHUWRWDNHWKHYLHZRIµJURXSLQHVV¶WKXVFUHDWLQJD
dimension along which different people and groups can vary. McGrath believed that 
groupiness could be considered as the extent to which small numbers of people interact freely 
and repeatedly with one another on a wide range of tasks and who have a history of 
interaction and a strong expectation of future interaction (1984). Whilst this serves the 
purposes of incorporating as many groups into one comparable and superordinate category, in 
terms of laboratory based testing in social psychology, the groups used would attain low 
scores for groupiness. Additionally the focus of this thesis is on small group dynamics so the 
ability to incorporate larger and varying group types is less relevant here although focussing 
only on small groups is a limitation of the work presented. 
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As the groups used throughout this thesis are temporary groups, made up of three or 
more people, arbitrarily formed for the purposes of completing certain tasks, the definition of 
JURXSVJLYHQE\)RUV\WKZLOOEHXVHG)RUV\WKGHILQHGJURXSVDVµWZRRUPRUH
LQWHUGHSHQGHQWLQGLYLGXDOVZKRLQIOXHQFHHDFKRWKHUWKURXJKVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQ¶S 
Definition of group processes 
Group behaviour can be approached in two distinct ways; behaviour between two 
different groups (intergroup behaviour) and behaviour occurring within the group (intragroup 
behaviour). Whilst both are equally important, this thesis will be focussing predominately on 
intragroup behaviour and in particular on small group dynamics. Small group dynamics 
research primarily concerns itself with the relationship between group structure and 
cohesiveness and the overall efficiency/effectiveness of the group (Hogg & Abrams, 1998).  
Thesis Overview  
In Chapter 2 I will be diVFXVVLQJWKHFXUUHQWOLWHUDWXUHDYDLODEOHRQFKLOGUHQ¶VLQWHUDQG
intragroup behaviour with the aim of providing a context for this thesis. I will briefly discuss 
intergroup behaviour, social competence, peer relations, categorisation ability and social 
identity literature before moving on to discuss the current literature available on intragroup 
processes. The chapter highlights the benefits of this research and highlights how this thesis 
adds to the current literature available on this topic.  
 In Chapter ,GLVFXVVWKHOLWHUDWXUHRQFKLOGUHQ¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJRQUHVRXUFH
allocation and the impact of groups on these decisions. The aim of this chapter is to provide 
background on the methodology and theories behind the decision tasks used in Studies 1 and 
2. The chapter ends with a discussion of group decision making models typically used in 




 In Chapter 4, two studies are presented which aim to investigate the intragroup and 
LQWHUJURXSLQIOXHQFHVRQFKLOGUHQ¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJDQGDQ\FKDQJHVLQLQIOXHQFHRFFXUULQJ
with age. In the first study children are asked to make an individual and then group decision 
on resource allocation amongst three fictional children. Their individual answers are 
FRPSDUHGWRWKHILQDOJURXSGHFLVLRQWRVHHKRZWKHJURXSKDVLQIOXHQFHGLQGLYLGXDO¶VLQLWLDO
preferences. The second study asks children to share sweets out between themselves and 
another pupil in different scenarios. An intergroup context is presented for some children and 
the target who they are sharing sweets with also changes from another pupil in their own 
school to an outgroup member. The findings are presented and conclusions drawn using 
literature presented in Chapter 3.  
 In CKDSWHUDQRWKHUHPSLULFDOVWXG\RQFKLOGUHQ¶VJURXSGHFLVLRQPDNLQJLV
introduced using a different methodology in an attempt to address some limitations of the 
previous two studies in Chapter 4. The type of decision children are asked to make is a 
cumulative estimation judgement rather than a resource allocation task. The children are 
asked to estimate individually and then in groups, the number of times they hear a certain 
word when a vignette is read aloud to them. Using decision models typically found in the 
adult literature, the results are analysed and decision rules children use to make their final 
group decision are discussed.  
 In Chapter 6, literature on brainstorming in adult populations is introduced and an 
argument put forward as to why children in similar groups would behave differently from 
adult groups. These arguments are based on empirical evidence including topics such as 
collaborative learning, social comparison and conformity. In Chapter 7, two empirical studies 
are presented testing the theoretical arguments made in the literature chapter. The first study 
focuses on individual performance and nominal group performance (the sum of individuals¶ 




interacted with one another).  
 Chapter 8 consists of a general discussion on the key findings of the thesis. It 
reiterates the main aims of the thesis, the implications of the findings for current literature, 
the strengths and limitations of the thesis and ideas for future research. The aim of this 


















Children and Groups 
 
Overview 
As previously stated in the introduction, research into intragroup processes in children 
could give researchers insights into social psychological phenomena, as well as an additional 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIFKLOGUHQ¶VVRFLDOZRUOGV7KLVFKDSWHUwill give a brief overview of the 
OLWHUDWXUHRQFKLOGUHQDQGLQWHUJURXSSURFHVVHVVRFLDOLGHQWLW\DQGFKLOGUHQ¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of group membership and peer relations. $OORIWKHVHDVSHFWVUHODWHWRFKLOGUHQ¶V
understanding and knowledge of groups which will help to inform this thesis in terms of what 
might be expected when children are placed in intragroup situations.  Next the chapter will 
focus on research that has examined intragroup relations such as conformity, collaborative 
learning, information sharing and decision making. $V\HWWKHUHLVQRWKHRU\RIFKLOGUHQ¶V
intragroup processes, but previous research can give insight into the ways children handle 
different intragroup scenarios. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight theory and research 
on intergroup behaviour, explain how this may aid our understanding of intragroup behaviour 
and review all the research currently available on children¶VLQWUDJURXSSURFesses as these 
areas were used as the premise for the research presented in this thesis. .  
ChLOGUHQ¶V8QGHUVWDQGLQJRI*URXS0HPEHUVKLSDQG6RFLDO,GHQWLW\ 
Before discussing the effects of intergroup and intragroup contexts on children, it is 
important to establish what children understand about what it means to belong to a group. 
Their understanding about what is involved in group membership and what it means to be a 
µJRRG¶JURXSPHPEHULVOLNHO\WRKDYHDQLPSDFWRQKRZWKH\EHKDYHRQFHLQDJURXS)LUVW
it needs to be highlighted that children can categorise themselves and others as belonging to 
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certain groups at a very young age. Gender and ethnicity groups can be distinguished by both 
3-month-olds and 6-month-olds respectively (Katz & Kofkin, 1997; Quinn, Yahr, Kuhn, 
Slater, & Pascalis, 2002). This ability to categorise gender and ethnicity based group 
PHPEHUVKLSDWVXFKDQHDUO\DJHPD\QRWEHUHIOHFWLYHRIFKLOGUHQ¶VDELOLW\WRFDWHJRULVH
others in more ambiguous group memberships (nationality for example) but it does suggest 
that children seem to be prone to organising their social world in this way.  
 It cannot be assumed that simply because a child can identify and categorise 
themselves using appropriate gender terms for example, that they fully understand the 
expectations of attitude and behaviour associated with that group. Kohlberg (1966) found 
that, ZKHQORRNLQJDWFKLOGUHQ¶VJHQGHUGHYHORSPHQW it is not until age 4.5-7-years that 
children understand gender is biologically based and remains constant over time and context 
(such as cross dressing). Despite this lack of knowledge about gender, studies have shown 
that children as young as 3- and 4-years both reinforce gender appropriate behaviour and 
punish gender inappropriate behaviour (Lamb, Easterbrooks, & Holden, 1980). Children 
being treated in this way respond accordingly reducing inappropriate behaviour and 
continuing with appropriate behaviour.  
 It could be argued WKDWFKLOGUHQGRVHHPWRKDYHDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIZKDWµVKRXOG¶EH
done when you belong to a certain group which suggests then that not fully understanding 
gender and its constancy does not matter. However, others have argued that anyone can 
respond to positive and negative reinforcement, leading them to change behaviour, without 
really understanding the reason behind the reinforcement (Martin & Little, 1990). In their 
VWXG\RQFKLOGUHQ¶VJHQGHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGJHQGHUW\SHGSUHIHUHQFHNQRZOHGJH0DUWLQ
and Little (1990) found that children needed only a basic understanding of the concept of 




gender group behaviour without really understanding the concept of gender itself. 
Quintana (1998) theorised that FKLOGUHQ¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIHWKQLFLW\RFFXUVLQIRXU
levels. First, between 3- and 5-years racial differences are viewed mostly as physical 
(differences in skin colour for example) therefore making racial status changeable (for 
example if you get a tan you are now Spanish). Between 6- and 10-years racial differences 
are viewed as differences in culture such as food and language. Between 10- and 14-years 
children understand racial differences in terms of social class and allocation of resources 
meaning they are aware of the differences in social standing of different races and stereotypes 
associated with them. During adolescence, the fourth stage occurs whereby children develop 
a sense of belonging to their own racial group which results in pride in belonging to said 
group.  
1RWHYHU\RQHDJUHHVZLWK4XLQWDQD¶VSURSRVDODUJXLQJWKDWFKLOGUHQXQGHUWKH
age of 10 have an understanding of race that goes beyond simple physical differences. 
Hirschfeld (1995) found 3-year-old children were able to recognise that race is derived from 
family background and is fixed at birth and unchangeable. However these findings are not 
mutually exclusive to QuiQWDQD¶VSURSRVHGVWDJHV- children could recognise the biological 
basis of skin colour and hair type and not understand the cultural and social attributes that 
come with these differences.  
Being able to recognise that you belong to a particular group, especially groups with 
such obvious and observable differences as gender or ethnicity does not mean you identify 
that group within your self-concept however. By identifying with the group, you are taking 
on their norms, attributes and behaviours. Bennett and Sani (2008a) attempted to address this 
LVVXHE\ORRNLQJDWFKLOGUHQ¶VVHOI-stereotyping with five, seven and ten-year-olds. They made 
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gender salient, and observed that in these situations, children judged themselves as more 
similar to same-sex classmates aQGDVVLJQHGWRWKHPVHOYHVPRUHµVH[-DSSURSULDWH¶DWWULEXWHV
This behaviour was observed in all age groups. The fact that children are able to recognise 
these stereotypes and identify with them, suggests an understanding of group membership 
and what group members should be like.  
 Bennett and Sani (2008b) demonstrated similar findings using an additional 
technique: self-referencing. They gave children a list of words and asked them whether the 
word described themselves, an in-group (gender, family or age), the semantic connections of 
WKHZRUGDQGZKHWKHUWKHZRUGGHVFULEHGDµQRQ-VHOI¶FDWHJRU\GRJV7KHLGHDEHKLQGVHOI-
referencing is that children will better remember the list of words when applied to themselves 
and their in-groups. Children as young as 5-years-old did have a better recall on words when 
applied to themselves and in-groups, particularly the family, suggesting that the 
internalisation of the in-group within the self does occur in children as young as 5-years.  
 Using a third method to demonstrate the internalisation of group membership in the 
self, Sani and Bennett (2009) used the self-ingroup confusion paradigm with children at ages 
5-, 7-, and 10-years. In this paradigm participants are asked to rate the extent to which 
different traits apply to themselves, an in-group, and an out-group. They were then asked to 
recall who they rated each trait as belonging to. What the authors found was that children 
were more likely to confuse words rated for the ingroup with words rated to themselves 
suggesting again that ingroups are reflected in children as part of the self. Taken together 
these three papers, each using different methodology, demonstrate that from the age of 5-
years, children not only identify with an ingroup but that the ingroup forms a part of their 
own self-concept.  
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 All of the groups considered in typical identity studies are groups that have obvious 
physical determinants. Gender, age, ethnicity and family are all groups that are easy to tell 
apart either by distinct physical characteristics or through familiarity. Not all groups that we 
belong to have such obvious prerequisites. National identity for example has been shown to 
follow a different developmental pattern than other group memberships. Barrett, Lyons and 
del Valle¶VUHVHDUFKRQQDWLRQDOLGHQWLW\VRPHWKLQJZKLFKPD\EHOHVVVDOLHQWIRU
young children in terms of a lack of strong physical identifiers, has proven to have less of an 
obvious developmental pattern. This lends support to the idea that some group membership is 
easier to ascribe and that, although children can recognise themselves as black or as a girl, 
they are less able to pick up on more subtle group memberships they possess which may be 
an important factor when trying to assess their group behaviour in a minimal groups 
paradigm. Anytime a group paradigm is introduced to children, researchers need to ensure 
that the group membership is obvious for the child in order for the manipulation to work.  
Bennett and Sani (2004) discuss a study which investLJDWHGFKLOGUHQ¶VIHHOLQJVRI
UHVSRQVLELOLW\IRULQJURXSPHPEHU¶VWUDQVJUHVVLRQV7KH\SUHVHQWHG-, 7- and 9-year-olds 
with a scenario where, during a sports visit to another school, either they or unknown 
children from their school committed a transgression. They were then asked about their 
response to this situation and it was found that only in the older two groups did children 
report a desire to apologise for the transgression when it was committed by another child 
from their school. This shows that a more fully developed social identity may not occur until 
middle childhood. If young children do not perceive group members actions as reflecting 
badly on themselves, it suggests that their identification with their ingroups are different from 
that of older children and adults who do show such behaviour.  
Children have been shown to be influenced by the salience of group categories, hold 
varying group memberships as more important than others and demonstrated awareness of 
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status differences between groups as well as demonstrating in-group bias (Ruble et al., 2004). 
Although the complexity of these phenomena may not match that of adults, it is clear that 
children have a very considered and detailed understanding of their social world. 
Svirydzenka, Sani and Bennett (2010) found that whilst children and adults did classify social 
groups in similar ways (task groups, social categories, intimacy groups and loose 
associations), they differed in terms of the factors they thought determined a group¶s 
HQWLWDWLYLW\µJURXSLQHVV¶&KLOGUHQHPSKDVLVHGFRQFUHWHSURSHUWLHVVXFKDVWKHGHJUHHRI
interaction between people and having shared activities where as adults emphasised the 
degree of similarity and the importance of the group to its members as important.  
Group memberships can also help young children to make sense of their social world 
and predict what others around them will do next (Birnbaum, Deeb, Segall, Ben-Eliyahu, & 
Diesendruck, 2010). In a series of studies conducted by Rhodes and Gelman (2008), when 
asked to predict individual consistency in behaviour, young children (4- to 5- years of age) 
relied on category based information (in this case gender membership) to help them predict a 
WDUJHW¶VIXWXUHSUHIHUHQFHV. Children were presented with a pair of targets that were either the 
same gender or different gender. Each individual within the pair was presented as having 
different initial preferences for made up games. When the pair belonged to the same gender 
group, young children were unable to predict based on previous preference information, what 
the targets preference would be later on. When the targets belonged to different gender 
groups however, young children predicted that the target would remain consistent in their 
initial preference. When more benign groups were used (the colour of shirt targets are 
wearing), children were unable to predict what a targets future preference might be. This 
GHPRQVWUDWHVKRZFKLOGUHQFDQXVHRWKHUSHRSOH¶VJURXSPHPEHUVKLSWRKHlp them predict 
DQGSODQWKDWSHUVRQ¶VIXWXUHEHKDYLRXUDQGRSLQLRQV7KLVHIIHFWRIJHQGHURQSUHGLFWLQJ
individual consistency diminished for older children (10 years) as these children were able to 
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use the information about previous preferences to predict future preferences without the aid 
of a group context. 
Rhodes (2012) also published an additional series of studies that looked at the naïve 
theories of social groups in children aged between 3- and 10-years. Children were introduced 
to novel groups and asked to make predictions about their behaviour. 3- to 5-year-olds 
predicted that group members would harm others belonging to a different group (rather than 
people in their own group) but expected group members to help people belonging to both 
groups equally regardless of group membership. Older children expected group members to 
harm members of another group and to only help members of their own. Again, these 
ILQGLQJVGHPRQVWUDWHFKLOGUHQ¶VSURFOLYLW\WRXVHJURXSPHPEHUVKLSWRJXLGHSUHGLFWLRQV
about behaviour.  
 A further demonstration of more complex understandings of what is expected in 
group behaviour comes from the theory of Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics 
(Abrams & Rutland, 2008). The theory argues that children from an early age are able to 
distinguish between intergroup members but that it is not until later that children differentiate 
between intragroup members. At this point, children understand that deviance by an ingroup 
member constitutes a departure from group norms that other group members may wish to 
protect. This then leads them to be able to make different judgements on whether to include 
ingroup and outgroup members based on their adherence to group norms. The theory 
postulates that older children would rate normative ingroup members and deviant outgroup 
members more highly than deviant ingroup members and normative outgroup members. This 
is because a deviant outgroup member lends more support to the ingroup relative to a deviant 
ingroup member.  
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 Research evidence supporting this theory demonstrates that it is not until middle 
childhood (10-11-years) that children develop this ability to differentiate between their own 
ingroup members although the exact age has been debated (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 
2003; Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, & Marques, 2003). If the content and understanding of our 
social identity and group membership can change that must impact on intragroup processes 
and behaviour demonstrated in children. Understanding what it means to be a part of a group 
and the expectations attached to that group member in terms of behaviour and attitude, are 




children as their understanding of group membership changes.  
&KLOGUHQ¶VLQWHrgroup behaviour 
8QGHUVWDQGLQJDVSHFWVRIFKLOGUHQ¶VLQWHUJURXSEHKDYLRXULVLPSRUWDQWZKHQ
considering their intragroup behaviour because motivations such as wanting their ingroup to 
remain distinct and wanting their ingroup to be superior to others, could affect their 
intragroup behaviour. According to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), people 
are motivated to belong to groups that are superior to others as this enhances their self-
esteem. This can lead to individuals believing themselves to be similar to other members of 
their group and having more favourable opinions, attitudes and behaviours toward members 
of their own group. Out-groups on the other hand are viewed as different from members of 
the in-JURXSDQGµOHVVJRRG¶DQGLWLVWKURXJKWKHVHPHFKDQLVPVWKDWSUHMXGLFHDQG
discrimination can occur (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The theory itself however, did not concern 




Despite the lack of application of this theory directly to children, several studies have 
demonstrated both ingroup bias and prejudice in this population. Gender, ethnicity, race and 
HYHQDFFHQWVKDYHEHHQVKRZQWRLQIOXHQFHFKLOGUHQ¶VRSLQLRQVDQGGHFLVLRQVDERut others. 
Augoustinos and Rosewarne (2001) found children aged 5 years showed ethnic bias when 
associating positive and negative adjectives to others of different races; positive traits were 
more likely to be supported when applied to white stimuli and negative traits were more 
likely to be supported when applied to black stimuli. Prejudice has also been found in 
children in relation to gender comparisons, with both male and female children selecting their 
own sex for positive attributes and both male and female children giving the more negative 
attributions to boys (Zalk & Katz, 1978). Kinzler, Shutts, DeJesus and Spelke (2009) found 
prejudice in relation to accents finding that children prefer others who have similar accents to 
them, choosing those with similar accents as friends regardless of their race.  
 Prejudice is reported to decrease with age with research showing a peak in prejudice 
at around 7-years and a decline thereafter, which is a trend predicted by social cognitive 
researchers (Aboud, 1988). Despite this apparent decline, prejudice has such adverse effects 
on those being stigmatized (Neisser, 1986) that a lot of focus in the intergroup literature has 
been given to interventions attempting to reduce such behaviour. There are many forms of 
intervention studies that can be found in the literature based on theories such as empathy 
(Nesdale, Griffith, Durkin, & Maass, 2005), socialisation (Graves, 1999) and cognitive 
development (Bigler & Liben, 1992). One theory that has garnered particular attention comes 
IURP$OOSRUW¶VLQWHU-group contact theory which purports that contact with an 
outgroup can reduce prejudice provided certain conditions are met. These conditions include 
equal status between groups, shared goals, intergroup cooperation and support of an authority 
figure or establishment (Pettigrew, 1998).  
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  There has been an argument in the literature of late as to whether studies 
demonstrating prejudice are actually measuring positive ingroup bias rather than outgroup 
derogation. Nesdale (2004) developed the Social Identity Development Theory (SIDT) which 
argues children who eventually express prejudice toward the outgroup go through four 
distinct stages. At phase one children are undifferentiated paying little attention to things such 
as racial cues and as they get older they enter phase two where children are able to recognise 
and distinguish different racial groups and label themselves accurately as belonging to a 
certain group. During phase three children focus their attention on their ingroup; their 
perceived similarity, superiority and preference for their ingroup over others. At this point 
Nesdale argues, any display of differential treatment between groups is simply a reflection of 
ingroup focus. Only those children who reach phase four and shift their focus to equally 
attend to both the in- and outgroup begin to display prejudice.  
Ingroup bias has been shown to occur in children, even in the context of minimal 
group paradigms. Bigler, Jones and Lobliner (1997) found that children as young as 6-years-
old demonstrated a preference for their ingroup despite it being a temporary group (lasting 
only four weeks) and Dunham, Baron and Carey (2011) found similar findings when 
randomly assigning children to a colour group. Vaughan, Tajfel and Williams (1981) also 
IRXQGLQJURXSELDVLQFKLOGUHQ¶VUHVRXUFHDOORFDWLRQVILQGLQJKLJKOHYHOVRILQJURXSELDVIURP
the age of 7- to 11-years. Such preferences for the ingroup mirror that of adult populations 
DQGOHQGVXSSRUWWRWKH1HVGDOH¶VLGHDthat children display ingroup preference rather than 
outgroup derogation. 
Children and Peer Relations 
Throughout childhood and adolescence the amount of time spent interacting with 
peers increases with age (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 1998). Given this increasing time, 
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understanding how children work together with their peers is important if we are to 
understand the social world they live in. Particularly during middle childhood concerns about 
peer acceptance increase sharply (Kuttler, Parker, & La Greca, 2002). The nature of 
FKLOGUHQ¶VIULHQGVKLSFRQFHSWVDOVRFKDQJHZLWKDJHZLWK\RXQJHUFKLOGUHQIRFXVVLQJRQ
concrete benefits such as sharing toys and enjoying the same activities (Bigelow, 1977). 
When children reach 10 to 11-years they begin to focus on shared values and the importance 
of sticking up for each other. This then develops at 11 to 13-years into the idea that friends 
share the same interests and that it is important to understand each other and share personal 
information (Bigelow, 1977). It is during middle childhood that cliques begin to appear 
which are friendship based groups and by the age of 11-years children report that most of 
their social interaction occurs within the context of their clique (Rubin et al., 1998).  
A lot of research into peer relations has focussed on researching those children who 
get rejected by their peers and those who are considered popular. Given the serious impact 
exclusion can have on children it is easy to understand why this has been a focus. Exclusion 
can lead to a variety of problems for the target of the exclusion including withdrawal, low 
self-esteem, poor academic performance, impaired cognition and depression (Williams, 
Forgas, & von Hippel, 2005). Children who struggle to make friends are reported as more 
likely to be at risk of victimisation by bullies (Boulton, Trueman, Chau, Whitehand, & 
Amatya, 1999).  
Research has looked at what traits popular children have and what traits those who are 
likely to be rejected have in an attempt to distinguish reasons for the difference between the 
two groups. Popular children are seen to be cooperative and friendly, helpful to others, skilled 
at maintaining positive relationships with others, good at communication and are more likely 
to show leadership than children who are not rated as popular (Black & Hazan, 1990; Rubin 
et al., 1998). Some groups of rejected children on the other hand tend to be more aggressive 
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than their peers (Newcomb, Bukowski, & Pattee, 1993) and others who are rejected are more 
timid and withdrawn (Parkhurst & Asher, 1992).  
Research into intergroup contexts as mentioned previously (see intergroup 
subheading) has shown that children will often exclude others based on differing group 
membership (Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner, 1997). With the introduction of Developmental 
Subjective Group Dynamics this focus on exclusion has also been investigated within the 
group. Abrams, Rutland, Pelletier and Ferrell (2009) posited the idea that older children are 
able to distinguish between ingroup members based on their adherence to ingroup norms. 
Those ingroup members for example, who were shown to be deviant, are rated as less liked 
by children than outgroup members who are also shown to be deviant (Abrams et al., 2009). 
It is argued that this is because deviant ingroup members are seen as a threat to the stability 
and superiority of the ingroup whereas a deviant outgroup member lends support to the 
ingroup (Abrams & Rutland, 2008).  
It seems exclusion and rejection in children can be based on individual competence 
and characteristics as well as group membership and adherence to group norms. As human 
beings are motivated to avoid exclusion and rejection by others, understanding the factors 
involved that can lead to this rejection are important considerations when thinking about 
FKLOGUHQ¶VLQWUDJURXSSURFHVVHV,WIROORZVWKDWFRQFHUQVDERXWUHMHFWLRQE\LPSRUWDQWSHHU
groups may affect the behaviour demonstrated by children when working within a group.  
&KLOGUHQ¶V,QWUDJURXS%HKDYLRXU 
The following sections focus on research that has already begun in the area of 
FKLOGUHQ¶VLQWUDJURXSSURFHVVHV7KHUHLVQRW\HWDQ\WKHRUHWLFDOIUDPHZRUNIRUWKLVDUHDDQG
the research remains sparse and therefore disjointed. The intragroup literature presented 
below has been organised into the following main categories: collaborative learning, social 
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loafing, decision making (including the risky shift paradigm), conformity and information 
sharing. Several of these papers will be discussed elsewhere in the thesis so this chapter will 
focus solely on their findings and implications. Chapters where these papers are discussed 
more fully will be highlighted to the reader throughout. Those studies which will remain 
unique to this chapter are explained more fully.  
Collaborative Learning: Piaget (1932) and Vygotsky (1978) were some of the first 
UHVHDUFKHUVWRVWUHVVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQVIRUFKLOGUHQ¶VFRJQLWLYHJURZWK
Research following the socio-constructivist approach (based on Piaget) demonstrated several 
situations in which children working together demonstrated a higher level of reasoning than 
children who worked alone (Doise & Mugny, 1984; Glachan & Light, 1981). The reason for 
this according to the approach is that conflict in points-of-view or solutions lead children to 
be exposed to other ways of thinking. This exposure allows children to incorporate new 
knowledge and opinions with their own, leading to the mastering of new skills and ways of 
thinking (Doise, 1990).  
9\JRWVN\¶VDSSURDFKWRFROODERUDWLYHOHDUQLQJLVUHIHUUHGWRDVWKHVRFLR-
cultural approach, as it emphasises the role of interaction with others and the internalisation 
of that interaction by the individual (DillenbRXUJ%DNHU%OD\H	2¶0DOOH\
Rumelhart and Norman (1978) suggested that through verbalising ideas and introducing them 
to the social plane, children receive feedback from peers that can highlight various problems 
LQWKHFKLOG¶VRULJLQDOVROXWLRQ The highlighting of these shortcomings can lead to the child 
refining their knowledge of the problem and correcting themselves. 
Whilst most research into collaborative learning produced positive results, there were 
negative results which, when found, were often attributed to methodological error 
(Dillenbourg et al., 1996). Empirical studies using dyads tended to find results that suggested 
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collaborative learning was more effective than those studies using larger groups, however 
changes to methodology have been shown to remove the difference between groups of 
differing size (Colbourn & Light, 1987). Another factor to consider when looking at the 
EHQHILWVRIFROODERUDWLRQEHWZHHQFKLOGUHQLVWKHFKLOG¶VDJHZKHQLQWHUDFWLQJ7REHDEOHWR
understand and take RQDQRWKHUSHHU¶VLGHDVUHTXLUHVVRPHOHYHORI7KHRU\RI0LQGZKLFK
typically begins to develop at around 4-years of age (Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). 
This would mean that collaborative learning would only be effective in children of school age 
who would be able to use this skill effectively.  
Although no consensus has been reached in this literature regarding how collaboration 
aids children, it is important to consider, as it is some of the first literature considering the 
impact of others on children. The nature of the tasks used in the experimental paradigms 
means that intragroup processes would have been at work so the theoretical arguments and 
ideas made in this literature, although now dated, should be considered when investigating 
future intragroup behaviour (for further application of collaborative learning see Chapter 6).  
Social Loafing: Social loafing is the tendency for individuals to input less effort 
when working in a group than when working alone (Karau & Williams, 1993). Karau and 
Williams (1993) conducted a meta-analysis of 78 studies all of which reported social loafing 
in adult and child samples. Of the 78 studies, only 17 used children and adolescents as 
participants. They found that several variables moderated levels of social loafing across 
VWXGLHVLQFOXGLQJWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUIRUPDQFHVWREHHYDOXDWHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
expectations of co-workers performance, how important or meaningful the task was and the 
cultural background of the participants.  
Gabrenya, Latane and :DQJV¶VWXG\ZLWKFKLOGUHQIURP7DLZDQIRXQGVRFLDO




by the experimenter). The level of noise they produced individually and in pseudo-pairs was 
compared and social loafing was found across all age groups. When clapping in pseudo-pairs 
performances for clapping were reduced to 92% of their individual level and shouting 
reduced to 82%. Although less social loafing occurred in 8- and 9-year-olds, the study did not 
find reliable age effects. This demonstrates the propensity for children to socially loaf when 
asked to perform together on a task.  
Social loafing has been demonstrated by research as a group process present in both 
children and adults although less research has been conducted using child participants. The 
development of social loafing over time remains unclear (Gabrenya, Latane, & Wang, 1983) 
and this may be due to evidence finding that social loafing is less common in highly cohesive 
groups (Karau & Hart, 1998). As testing with children is often done within schools, the 
likelihood of children knowing one another is greater than in samples where adult 
participants are sampled at random. This may mean that the children see themselves as more 
accountable to the rest of the group and loafing on a particular task may have ramifications 
for them outside of the experimental paradigm. More research needs to be conducted in this 
area in an attempt to map the development of social loafing with age controlling for these 
variables.  
Decision making: There has been some recent research on intragroup processes 
particularly on the topic of decision making. Gummerum and colleagues have conducted 
studies looking at the impact of the group on decision making in children in dictator and 
ultimatum games. As these studies will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter 
(Chapter 4), a summary of the findings will be all that is presented here. Gummerum, Keller, 
Takezawa and Mata (2008) found that in groups of three children, prosocial majorities were 
more likely to win in the group when the child with the highest level of moral reasoning was 
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for the prosocial argument and therefore had a higher level of reasoning than the selfish 
group member. This interaction between developmental factor and group outcome 
demonstrates in part the reason that groups of children should be considered distinct from 
adult groups. Although Social Domain Theory argues that it is simply the focus of reasoning 
that changes with age (Smetana, 2006) by the time we reach adulthood (considered here to be 
University age given the proclivity to use undergraduates as adult participants in social 
psychology research), we will have reached a plateau of similar reasoning level. This means 
that factors such as higher levels of reasoning would no longer influence the outcome of the 
group decision as theoretically all group members should be at a similar level.  
 Keller and Canz (2007) observed arguments made during group discussions about 
resource allocation by children. Young children (3rd grade) used basic principles such as 
fairness and selfishness for their reasoning and children in 6th grade referred to the needs of 
the self and others when discussing equal allocation (whether they argue for or against the 
allocation). Children in 8th grade used fairness and reciprocity norms or excuses to justify 
their choices and the eldest age group (11th grade) used more sophisticated arguments 
including the use of negative stereotypes about the other group they would have to share 
resources with. The changes with age in reasoning demonstrate again how developmental 
factors influence group outcomes in children. The stages children go through and their 
relative success using the strategies observed at different stages could reasonably be 
considered to shape the way they argue in groups as an adult. These intragroup processes 
described here also reflect the changes in XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIFKLOGUHQ¶VVRFLDOZRUOGZLWKWKH
eldest age group being able to negatively stereotype groups in order for their own ingroup to 
benefit.  
The ways in which groups interact have also been shown to affect the levels of moral 
reasoning in children. Killen and Damon (1982) found that after group discussions, moral 
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reasoning improved with higher levels of reasoning being used after the group discussion had 
taken place and those children who did improve were found to be more collaborative with 
onHDQRWKHUDQGEXLOWXSRQHDFKRWKHU¶VLGHDVZLWKLQWKHJURXSGLVFXVVLRQ&KLOGUHQZKRZHUH
rejecting of others¶ ideas and had conflict in their discussions did not show any advance in 
their moral reasoning after group discussion.  
This study demonstrates the impact intragroup processes can have on development; in 
particular that certain intragroup processes work better than others at producing beneficial 
outcomes for children. Why is it that some children working together end up in conflict while 
others do not and what does that mean about the ways in which they develop and progress in 
their intragroup behaviour? It would seem logical that past intragroup experiences could 
shape future behaviour and expectations when working in groups and being able to map 
intragroup development could help in creating a fuller picture of adult group processes.  
Other studies looking at decision making in children have focussed on conformity in 
groups. Some of the first researchers looking at conformity in children were Hoving, Hamm 
and Galvin (1969) who tested children in grades 2, 5 and 8, and (controlling for task 
ambiguity) asked them which of two slides had the greater amount of dots. The children were 
taken out in groups of three but kept in separate booths and shown each RWKHU¶VDQVZHUV
through a series of lights controlled by the experimenter who changed them to give the 
impression of an erroneous majority. Ambiguity in the task was manipulated and the authors 
found that conformity decreased with age on non-ambiguous tasks and increased with age on 
ambiguous tasks. It has been argued that these findings reflect two needs present in children: 




These ideas reflect findings in the literature with adult population where these two 
types of conformity have also been found (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Findings in more 
modern research also support these conformity types. Corriveau, Fusaro and Harris (2009) 
looked at conformity among preschool children and found that children in the study 
continually sided with a majority group member and distrusted answers given by a dissenter 
(someone who disagreed with the majority).  The most recent studies into conformity have 
used adaptations of the Asch paradigm, using differing sizes of picture rather than lines. Haun 
and Tomasello (2011) found that children (4- to 5-year-olds) generally performed the task 
well and conformity only occurred when the child was asked to publicly share their response 
by saying it aloud.  
In a second study, the researchers confirmed that in conflict with a majority, minority 
children performed significantly better when giving private over public answers. Children 
tended to conform more in public than in private overall and adapted their level of conformity 
to match the level of privacy from trial to trial. This suggests that children conform mainly 
for social reasons but more research needs to be conducted to understand fully under what 
circumstances need for peer approval overrides the need to be correct.  
The findings in these studies again reflect the same phenomena found in adults 
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Sharing answers publicly increases levels of conformity in 
adults and when allowed to keep their answers private, adults prefer to give the correct 
answer rather than conform. The similarity in findings suggests that some aspects of group 
experience are the same for both children and adults and that conforming with the majority is 
inherent in our behaviour. More work needs to be done in order for the literature on children 
and conformity to be as extensive as the literature is with adults. Whilst the outcome may 
look the same, the processes behind conformity or when it happens could be quite different.  
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The Risky Shift Phenomenon. Another phenomenon recorded in the decision 
making literature with adults is that of the risky shift. Most research into the Risky Shift (the 
idea that people are more likely to make riskier decisions in groups than alone; Stoner, 1961), 
has typically focussed on participants aged between 14- and 60-years-old. It has been found 
that adolescents tend to make riskier decisions than adults but that all ages tend to make 
riskier decisions in groups than alone (Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky, & Pedulla, 2003). Josic 
(2011) looked at the impact of groups on risky decision making in 10-year-olds to see if 
children demonstrated the same pattern as adolescents and adults. In the paper Josic cited 
previous work where she found that 10-year-olds made less risky decisions when placed in a 
group (Josic, Budevac, Baucal, 2012). In the current paper the purpose was to determine why 
children did not make more risky decisions by looking at the conversational content in the 
group discussion phase.  
Children were SUHVHQWHGZLWKDVFHQDULRFDOOHGµ3HWDU¶VGLOHPPD¶DQGZHUHDVNHG
what they would do in his situation (they had a list of 6 options to choose from). After their 
individual choice, they were then put into same-sex groups of three and asked to come to a 
group decision on the dilemma. Josic found that in groups where a safer decision was made, a 
group member(s) involved an authority figure to help win their argument, the children 
favouring more risky choices were passive (did not speak as much, choosing to observe 
rather than participate) or the children favouring risky choices were in the minority. In the 
few groups where the riskier decision was made by the group, the individual who supported 
the risky decision was loud, persistently interrupted other group members and dominated the 
group. The findings demonstrate the divergence of group decision making literature in adults 
and children (children not making riskier decisions) as well as explanations as to how or why 
this might occur.  
26 
 
Information Sharing: Gummerum, Leman and Hollins (2014) looked into how 
FKLOGUHQVKDUHLQIRUPDWLRQLQJURXSV8VLQJVLPLODUPHWKRGRORJ\WRWKDWXVHGLQDGXOWµKLGGHQ
SURILOH¶VWXGLHV.HUU	7LQGDOHWKH\JDYHJURXSVRI- and 9-year-old children shared 
or unshared information about two potential candidates for the lead in the school musical. In 
the shared condition, all group members received full information on both candidates (one 
candidate was obviously better than the other having seven positive traits over the other 
candidates four) and in the unshared condition, all group members received one piece of 
shared information and each member received two pieces of unique information only known 
by them. They measured how often unshared information was discussed in groups compared 
to shared information and the how likely it was across the two conditions (and ages) that the 
best candidate was selected.  
They found that in the shared condition 74% of 7-year-olds and 86% 9-year-olds 
chose the best candidate and that in the unshared condition these numbers fell to 37% and 
11% respectively. Both ages groups were significantly more likely to choose the best 
candidate in the shared rather than the unshared condition. The proportion of shared and 
unshared information mentioned in the group discussion was only marginally significant for 
7-year-olds (9-year-olds discussing significantly more shared information than unshared). 7-
year-olds were more likely than 9-year-olds to detect the hidden profile and pick the better 
candidate due to this smaller ratio of shared to unshared information being discussed. The 
researchers also investigated the impact of intersubjectivity by measuring joint focus; group 
members look at each other with affective state, engage with same object or follow gestural 
points, meta-communication- communication that initiated, maintained or terminated 
collaborative discussion and communication- utterances that repeat or complement another 
group members previous utterance. They found groups who detected the hidden profile had 
significantly less intersubjectivity than those groups who did not discover the hidden profile.  
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 Gummerum et al.¶V (2014) study demonstrates support for the collective information 
sampling model (Stasser & Titus, 1985) which argues that shared information is more likely 
to be discussed as it only needs to be mentioned by one group member to bring it to the 
JURXS¶VDWWHQWLRQ$VDOOJURXSPHPEHUVFRXOGEULQJXSDSLHFHRIVKDUHGLQIRUPDWLRQEXW
only one member can bring up a piece of unshared information, the probability of shared 
information being discussed is higher. The authors also interpret their findings alongside the 
collaborative inhibition theory (Basden, Basden, Bryner, & Thomas, 1997) which states that a 
group recalling or producing ideas will generate fewer answers than nominal groups due to 
retrieval strategy disruption. This occurs when a group disrupts individuals¶ recall strategies; 
the theory assumes each group member encodes and retrieves information differently. By 
listening to other members who may use recency retrieval for example, would disrupt a 
member who uses primacy retrieval. This study demonstrates the importance of 
developmental findings on social psychology literature as Gummerum et al. findings 
supported theories developed initially with adults.  
Concluding points 
The research included in this chapter has demonstrated that although children and 
adults are similar in some ways, in the way they perceive and are affected by groups, there 
are clear and distinct differences which could affect the way children work within a group. 
The research presented here provides support for the notion that group behaviour does not 
simply start when we reach University (Durkin, 1995) but that our adult group behaviour 
reflects the outcome of a complex developmental process. Understanding this process and 
mapping the changes throughout childhood will lead to a better understanding of the 
phenomena presented in adult literature. Two areas of social psychology are examined within 
this thesis to investigate intragroup processes further: decision making and production loss.  
The next chapter of the thesis looks in detail at a particular decision paradigm, resource 
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DOORFDWLRQWKHWKHRULHVXVHGWRH[SODLQFKLOGUHQ¶VGLVWULEution decisions, how this changes 
developmentally and what contextual factors can influence it. The aim is to gain a better 
understanding of the processes behind this particular form of decision making as it will be 





Sharing and Social Motives in Childhood 
 
Overview 
The aim of this chapter is to review literature available on decision making in children 
with particular emphasis on distributive decision making (the sharing of resources) as this 
literature was used to develop the methodology for studies 1 and 2 in the thesis. The role of 
JURXSVRQFKLOGUHQ¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJZLOODOVREHRXWOLQHGas the focus of the thesis is how 
JURXSVPD\LPSDFWDQGFKDQJHFKLOGUHQ¶s initial decisions. Potential methods for studying 
such decision making, taken from Social Psychological literature, including the Social 
Decision Scheme (SDS) and Social Judgement Scheme (SJS) models will be outlined along 
with studies that have used these methods with children. The chapter argues that research on 
FKLOGUHQ¶VJURXSGHFLVLRQPDNLQJFRXOGEHEHQHILWWHGE\XVLQJWHFKQLTXHVVXFKDVWKH6'6
and SJS as they provide a unique way of assessing how groups come to their final decision 
from an initial set of preferences and that previous research with children has failed to use 




Moral reasoning is a broad concept which deals with issues such as fairness, justice, 
equal opportunities and others welfare (Killen, 2007). In relation to the development of moral 
reasoning, it was initially thought to be a stage process (Kohlberg, 1971; Piaget, 1932). More 
recent empirical research however, has found that children as young as preschool age can use 
what would be considered higher level moral reasoning in complex exclusion situations 
(Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001). To explain this discrepancy and others like it, a newer 
theory of moral reasoning was developed: Social Domain Theory (Smetana, 2006).  
 
Social Cognitive Domain Theory 
Social-Cognitive Domain Theory argues that social knowledge is broken up into three 
distinct categories, the first of which is the moral domain (Smetana, 2006). The moral domain 
deals with the same issues relating to moral reasoning as mentioned above; fairness, justice, 
equal opportunities and other¶s welfare. The second domain is the socio-conventional domain 
which involves social norms and the rules and conventions involved in social interactions 
(Horn, 2003). The last domain considered by the model is the psychological domain which is 
principally concerned with judgement and common sense issues such as harm to the self, 
personal health and preferences with regard to friends and privacy (Smetana, 2006).  
Whilst the model argues that reasoning in these domains develops independently of 
one another, age trends have still been found with regard to the emphasis of one type of 
reasoning over others (Killen, 2007). In very simplistic scenarios such as whether it is right or 
wrong to exclude someone from a group based on their gender, no age related patterns in 
types of reasoning are found (Killen & Stangor, 2001). All children use moral reasoning to 
explain why such exclusion is wrong. Age related patterns do emerge however, in more 
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complex scenarios where the children are asked to pick one of two children to join their 
JURXSDQGWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VTXDOLILFDWLRQVDUHPDQLSXODWHGRQHFKLOGEHLQJPRUHTXDOLILHGWR
join the group than the other). In these situations, there is an increase in the amount of socio-
conventional reasoning used as children get older (Killen & Stangor, 2001). Older children 
focus on the individual merits of the child and the functioning of the group if the child were 
to join (for H[DPSOHµWKHJURXSZRQ¶WZRUNZHOOLI\RXSLFN WKHFKLOGWKDWLVQ¶WJRRGDWWKH
task¶&KLOGUHQ¶VYLHZVRQZKHWKHUHIIRUWRUDELOLW\FRXQWVIRUPRUHKDYHEHHQVKRZQWR
impact on whether they view the sharing of resources as fair or not (Killen, 2007). 
These age trends suggest that there is some developmental difference occurring as 
children age in what types of reasoning they use. What is causing this change however is less 
clear from these studies. The focus of the current research is on sharing and distributive 
justice, one specific aspect of moral reasoning. Literature on the developmental trends of 
potentially related factors, are going to be looked at further.  
Sharing Behaviours 
Egalitarian sharing is something that is considered a human only trait (Warneken, 
Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011). The difference between humans and other animals is that 
we cooperate and share resources across many situations with genetic strangers (Fehr, 
Bernhard, & 5RFNHQEDFK7KLVµRWKHU-UHJDUGLQJ¶EHKDYLRXULVLPportant as it seems to 
be the driving force for the sharing behaviour humans exhibit (why else would someone share 
out valued resources unless they cared for the other person?). However, research suggests we 
are not born with this ability and that we develop it over time.  
 )HKU%HUQKDUGDQG5RFNHQEDFKORRNHGDWWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIRQHVXFKµRWKHU-
UHJDUGLQJ¶SUHIHUHQFHLQHTXDOLW\DYHUVLRQEHKDYLRXUWKDWUHGXFHVLQHTXDOLWLHVUHJDUGOHVVRI
whether inequality is advantageous to them or not). Across thUHHGLIIHUHQWµJDPHV¶ZKHUH
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children could choose various sweet allocations between themselves and an anonymous 
partner, the experimenters found that children aged 3- to 4-years behaved selfishly with only 
8.7% choosing the option to share when the game allowed it. This selfishness decreased with 
age until, at 7-8-years, other- regarding egalitarian preferences were found across all games 
in the experiment. Additionally, they discovered that the number of siblings children have 
and their birth order affected their sharing behaviour, with only-children sharing more than 
children with siblings and youngest children sharing the least.  
 The results support another study by Fehr, Rutzler and Sutter (2013) who investigated 
the development of altruism, spite, egalitarianism and parochialism and revealed that spite 
decreased with age (between 8- to 17-years) and egalitarianism peaked at the age of 8-years. 
After this age however, egalitarianism declined and altruism appeared to take over as the 
predominant other-regarding preference. This again demonstrates the development of other-
regarding behaviours with age. Fehr, Rutzler and Sutter (2013) argue that this focus on 
altruism in adolescence is vital for smooth and positive interactions with others especially in 
the workplace. Another finding from the paper is sex-differences with males being more 
altruistic and females remaining predominantly egalitarian (Fehr, Rutzler& Sutter, 2013). 
This is not a consistent finding as other studies have shown that girls are more altruistic than 
boys (Benenson, Pascoe, & Radmore, 2007) but it demonstrates the importance of 
considering gender as a potential moderator in this area.  
 Even when children are given the opportunity to monopolise rewards, they have been 
found to share equally. In a study by Warneken, Lohse, Melis and Tomasello (2011), 3 year 
old children were asked to work collaboratively on a task with a partner. The task varied in 
such a way that on some trials it was easy for one child to monopolise the rewards received 
for completing the task. They found that, even when rewards could be monopolised, the 
majority of children shared out the reward equally. This demonstrates the human specific 
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nature of egalitarianism and sharing, as similar studies in chimpanzee populations have found 
that despite collaboration, chimpanzees monopolise as many rewards as they can (Melis, 
Hare & Tomasello, 2006).  
Factors affecting other-regarding behaviour 
 Another factor that seems to affect the development of other-regarding behaviour is 
socio-HFRQRPLFVWDWXV6(6%HQHQVRQ3DVFRHDQG5DGPRUHVWXGLHGFKLOGUHQ¶V
altruistic behaviour using the dictator game; a paradigm where the participant (the dictator) 
chooses how to hand out resources between themselves and another anonymous individual. 
The offer cannot be rejected and it is played only once so that there cannot be any 
repercussions for their behaviour. Therefore, any offer of resources to the anonymous 
individual can be seen as a prosocial act by the dictator (Camerer, 2003).  They found that 
children with higher SES demonstrated more altruism than children with lower SES and that 
age differences in altruism could only be found in children with high SES. This finding seems 
to suggest that the development of altruism is not universal and does depend on cultural and 
situational factors. It also supports )HKU5XW]OHUDQG6XWWHU¶V) argument that altruism is 
beneficial for the workplace, as those with lower SES would be in lower level jobs. This 
could be because of their lower levels of altruism, meaning that they are less suited to 
working environments than those with higher SES and therefore more altruism.  
 Another argument being developed in the literature is the role that Theory of Mind 
(ToM) might play in fairness preferences. ToM refers to our ability to understand another 
SHUVRQ¶VDFWLRQVLQUHODWLRQWRWKHLUHPRWLRQVEHOLHIVDQGGHVLUHV&XWWLQJ	'XQQ$Q
overall preference for fairness increases with age between 7 and 18 years (Harbaugh et al., 
2003). Takagishi, Kameshima, Schug, Koizumi and Yamagishi (2010) argue that Theory of 
Mind is key to these fairness behaviours as an understanding of others¶ reactions to unfair 
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behaviour encourages the child to be fair. Using an ultimatum game in a face-to-face setting, 
children had to decide how to hand out resources but their partner could reject the offer made. 
They found that preschoolers who had developed a ToM gave fairer offers than those 
children who had not yet acquired ToM. These children could understand and predict that 
another person given an unfair allocation of resources would be angry, which would lead 
them to potentially reject the offer made. The methodology used in the study however, could 
be argued to create a pressure to act fairly. Having the other child present in the room and 
knowing them would facilitate fairer behaviour especially given that the partner had the 
ability to reject the offers made. It may have therefore inflated levels of fairness in their 
sample.  
 Alongside this development of fairness preferences, children also become more 
accepting of inequalities relating to differences in individuals¶ achievements. Almas, 
Cappelen, Sorensen and Tungodden (2010) gave children 3 dictator games requiring them to 
focus on either individual achievement or efficiency considerations. They found that with 
age, individual achievement became increasingly important in their fairness considerations 
and that older children were more likely to differentiate based on these achievements. Levels 
of self interest appeared to remain stable over this period of development (5th to 13th grade) 
but a shift from egalitarian to more meritocratic fairness preferences occurred.  
 These studies show that with age, FKLOGUHQ¶VIRFXVRQGLIIHUHQWDVSHFWVRIVKDULQJ
seem to shift and include considerations of the self, altruism, egalitarianism, equity and 
meritocracy. These factors must at some point come together to aid children in their 
reasoning of how to share and there seems to be a definite developmental trend. Damon 





of justice that is concerned with who in society should get what proportion of the available 
UHVRXUFHVSUDLVHDQGRWKHUUHZDUGV´S'LVWULEXWLYHMXVWLFHORRNVDWKRZSHRSOHFKRRVH
to allocate resources amongst themselves and others and how they reason about these 
distributions (Gummerum, Hanoch, & Keller, 2008). Damon initially categorised the stages 
that children go through developmentally to achieve a greater level of distributive justice. The 
ILUVWVWDJHRI'DPRQ¶VWKHRU\VWDJH-A, is when the child believes that the person 
who wants something the most should get it. This then develops into stage 0-B where the 
FKLOGEDVHVWKHLUGHFLVLRQVRQSHRSOH¶VRIWHQLUUHOHYDQWFKDUDFWHULVWLFVVXFKDVWKHWDOOHVWRU
eldest should get the most. At stage 1-A the child becomes focussed on equality believing 
that everyone should get an equal amount regardless of their input. In the next stage, the child 
bases decisions on behavioural reciprocity (1-B) meaning that those who work harder or do 
the best/most should get more resources. The next stage (2-A) concerns psychological 
reciprocity, where those who need the most should get the most for example the poorest 
person, should get the most money. In the final stage (2-B) children attempt to compromise 
between behavioural and psychological reciprocity when making their distributive decisions 
(Damon, 1977). 
  Damon (1980) conducted several studies to test his theory of distributive justice. 
Distributive justice studies involve children allocating rewards amongst hypothetical people 
who have usually worked together on a task, are described in basic detail and differ from one 
another on certain characteristics (for example effort and age). Damon (1977) conducted a 
one year longitudinal study in order to assess the universality and invariance of sequence of 
his distributive justice theory. Using children ranging from 4 to 9 years of age, Damon gave 
WKHPDµSRVLWLYHMXVWLFH¶LQWHUYLHZZLWKWKHVHFRQGVWDJHRIWHVWLQJD\HDUODWHULQFOXGLQJ
both the original interview and a newly developed one to prevent test-retest bias. 35% of the 
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children remained at the same reasoning level in both parts of the study whilst the others 
VKRZHGDFOHDUGHYHORSPHQWDOSDWWHUQLQOLQHZLWK'DPRQ¶VWKHRU\7KHVDPSOHVL]HZDV
small however (5 or 6 children in each age category) making the findings hard to generalise.  
To address this issue, and that children did not change their reasoning in the time 
period, Damon conducted a second two year longitudinal study (Damon, 1980). Damon 
measured 4 and 9 year olds¶ levels of positive justice 3 times over the course of the study at 
yearly intervals. Despite the regression of some children to earlier levels of reasoning, overall 
the vast majority improved along the sequence predicted by 'DPRQ¶V theory.  
Enright, Manheim and Franklin (1980) developed a standardised scale to measure 
GLVWULEXWLYHMXVWLFHEDVHGRQ'DPRQ¶VWKHRU\$FURVVWKUHHVWXGLHVWKH\YDOLGDWHGWKH
PHDVXUHDGGLQJZHLJKWWR'DPRQ¶VWKHRU\7KH\IRXQGWKHUHOHYDQWDJHWUHQGVSUHGLFWHGE\
the distributive justice theory and validated them by replicating them in a second study. Of 
more importance however, was the replication of results in a cross-cultural study completed 
in Africa. Cross-cultural studies have also been conducted in Sweden and the USA with 
results supportiQJ'DPRQ¶VOHYHOVRIGLVWULEXWLYHUHDVRQLQJ(QULJKWHWDO*LYHQWKDW
Damon (1977) claims his theory is universal, cross-cultural studies are vital in supporting his 
argument.  
$SUREOHPKRZHYHUZLWK(QULJKW0DQKHLPDQG)UDQNOLQ¶VILUVWWZo studies is 
that the children were recruited from the same school for both studies. This means 
confounding factors such as social class and other environmental factors, may explain the 
replication of results. As already mentioned, levels of altruism differ in children with 
different social economic statuses (Benenson, Pascoe & Radmore, 2007) and there may be 
other factors not yet discovered that may be confounded which taking samples from different 
places could factor out.  
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Contextual factors affecting distributive justice 
Enright, Enright and Lapsley (1981) found social class differences in distributive 
justice reasoning in their study of distributive development. Children in lower classes were 
consistently lower in distributive justice reasoning than their middle-class peers and this 
difference continued to at least 3rd grade. These findings replicate those of Enright, Enright, 
Manheim and Harris (1980) who also found these differences between classes despite there 
being no difference in verbal ability between them. 
There have also been cross-cultural studies that have demonstrated differences in 
reasoning. In a study by Mann, Radford and Kanagawa (1985) children from Japan and 
Australia were asked to share out rewards amongst a majority and a minority group. Japanese 
FKLOGUHQDGRSWHGDQµHTXDOVD\¶SROLF\ZKHUHE\PDMRULW\DQGPLQRULW\JURXSVZRXOGJHWDQ
equal chance to obtain rewards (despite their obvious size difference) whereas Australian 
children went for a more proportional distribution. Although the scenario is not quite the 
same as the ones used in the studies above, it demonstrates a clear cultural impact on how 
children reason on the distribution of resources.  
The development of distributive justice reasoning has also been shown to be different 
in other cultures. Sin and Singh (2005) found that Chinese children were more likely to match 
their distributive justice decisions to Asian values of maintaining group harmony; younger 
children using equity based reasoning and older children more equality based reasoning. In 
Western cultures, the pattern of distributive development is the complete opposite; younger 
children basing their decisions on equality and older children on equity. The study 




Distributive justice development has also been found to be contextually dependent. 
Enright et al., (1984) found that, despite an overall increase in distributive justice reasoning 
with age, when the characters involved in scenarios were family members, levels of 
distributive justice were higher than when people in scenarios were peers. McGillicuddy-De 
Lisi, Watkins and Vinchur (1994) also found differences iQFKLOGUHQ¶VUHVSRQVHVZKHQ
characters in a scenario were either strangers or friends. As children got older, they were 
more likely to take this relationship between characters into account and change their 
reasoning accordingly. Benton (1971) also found sex differences with regard to these 
FRQWH[WXDOHIIHFWV7KLVILWVLQZLWK'HXWVFK¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWGLVWULEXWLYHMXVWLFH
principles change depending on the aims of the decision maker. For example, if people want 
to achieve economic productivity they would use an equity principle but if people want to 
encourage positive social relationships then equality would be a more suitable principle.  
,Q%HQWRQ¶VVWXG\, pairs of children completed a task (one was the better performer 
than the other) and asked to decide how to share out toys between them. Male dyads 
maintained an equity principle between each other regardless of their relationship (friend vs 
non-friend) whereas females only used equity reasoning in non-friend pairs. The nature of the 
relationship made little difference to boys overall but girls were seen to discuss their 
preferences more when with friends and displayed more emotional behaviours with friend 
pairs than non-friend pairs.  
Equity Theory of Distributive Justice 
Adams¶) equity theory of distributive justice suggests that people regard 
distributions of resources as fair when their inputs are proportionally related to the outcome 
(rewards). People do not like violations on this principle, whether it is they who receive too 
much for their efforts or too little (Montada, 2003). Studies testing this theory have found that 
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only adults and adolescents follow a strict equity rule whereas younger children are more 
concerned with self-interest (Hook & Cook, 1979). As children get older (junior school into 
adolescence) the equity principle is used but not as precisely; the person who contributes 
more gets more but the proportions of reward are not calculated (Hook & Cook, 1979). 
 Hook and Cook (1979) argued that cognitive and mathematical ability was likely to 
be the cause of this developmental treQGDQGIRXQGWKDW3LDJHW¶V) stages of cognitive 
development corresponded with the patterns seen in equity theory. Preoperational children 
distribute rewards according to self-interest, concrete operational children according to basic 
equity principles and Formal operational children use proportional equity. These findings are 
also supported by Damon (1975) who found similar links with distributive justice reasoning 
DQGFRJQLWLYHDELOLW\VSHFLILFDOO\UHODWHGWR3LDJHW¶VVWDJHV 
Contextual factors in distributive justice 
It is not only relationships between characters that can influence distributive 
reasoning but also situational factors. Distributive justice studies tend to focus on situations 
around a reward-for-work setting but in other settings, different strategies of reasoning may 
be more appropriate. In voting for example, one cannot say that one person deserves more 
votes than another because they worked more throughout the year. Distributive justice 
reasoning based on equity in this situation would be both inappropriate and wrong. In the 
same scenario an equality based preference would be most appropriate but it is often 
described as being at a lower level of distributive reasoning. Sigelman and Waitzman (1991) 
found that changing the situational context of the task FKDQJHGFKLOGUHQ¶VGLVWULEXWLYHMXVWLFH
level. Whilst the youngest children (5 years) always chose to distribute resources equally 
regardless of the situation, 9 and 13 year olds chose the equity rule in performance related 
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situations, an equality rule in voting situations and an equality rule in charity situations 
although they paid special attention to needy children.  
The ability to change reasoning strategies based on situational information should 
demonstrate a more advanced stage of distributive reasoning given the greater understanding 
and flexibility required, yet previous studies have not always considered this when testing 
DFURVVPXOWLSOHVFHQDULRV'DPRQ¶VOongitudinal work (1977, 1980) used a variety of 
VFHQDULRVWRDVVHVVFKLOGUHQ¶VOHYHOVRIGLVWULEXWLYHMXVWLFHUHDVRQLQJFODVVPDWHVGLYLGLQJ
profits from a paint sale, siblings splitting newspaper round money and picking classmates to 
win free ice cream). This raises questions about the validity of his findings, as he may have 
EHHQPHDVXULQJFRQWH[WXDOHIIHFWVRQFKLOGUHQ¶VUHDsoning leading him to underestimate or 
overestimate FKLOGUHQ¶VDFWXDOUHDVRQLQJOHYHO$GGLWLRQDOO\WKLVPXFKIOH[LELOLW\EDFNDQG
forth through the stages of distributive justice reasoning would suggest its stage-like structure 
is not accurate either. A norm of reasoning must therefore be found for each contextual 
VFHQDULREHIRUHDFKLOG¶VDFWXDOOHYHOFDQEHDVFHUWDLQHG 
Another contextual issue is that of task complexity. Tompkins and Olejnik (1978) 
found that the number of rewards children had available to them influenced the way in which 
they shared WKHUHZDUGVRXW$µJRRG¶SHUIRUPHUZDVDOZD\VJLYHQPRUHUHZDUGVWKDQWKH
µSRRU¶SHUIRUPHUEXWWKLVSDWWHUQZDVOHVVSURQRXQFHGLQVLWXDWLRQVZKHUHWKHUHZHUHWRR
many or too few sweets to give each performer one sweet for each unit of work. This pattern 
may be because the task and maths involved were too complex for the age of children they 
worked with. Children in the study who scored high in a proportions test were more likely to 
JLYHPRUHVZHHWVWRWKHµJRRG¶SHUIRUPHUGHPRQVWUDWLQJWKDWODFNRIDELOLWy may be a 
confound in research in this area.  
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Messick (1993) further highlights this problem in his work in that, when presented 
with an ambiguous or novel situation, people were shown to choose to share equally as it is 
less cognitively demanding. Given the young ages of participants in these studies, it may be 
problematic to assume that their answers reflect their level of distributive reasoning rather 
than their ability at mathematics or other such skills. Additionally, Debusschere and van 
Avermaet (1984) demonstrated that adolescents (some of the older participants used in these 
studies) will fall back on equality as a means of solving a complex and difficult task.  
Despite these concerns, there also exists research demonstrating that children as 
young as 4 years can divide resources equitably when they are explicitly instructed to do so 
(Nelson & Dweck, 1977). Nelson and Dweck (1977) also asked children to rate how fair their 
decisions on sweet distribution were and those children who did not follow an equity rule 
admitted to not being fair in their sweet allocation. McGillicuddy-De Lisi, Watkins and 
Vinchur (1994) found a similar pattern of results in their study on distributive reasoning too, 
finding that 3rd grade children did not take into account the relationships of the characters 
involved in the distributive justice scenario when asked how to share out rewards, but did 
recognise the importance of the relationship when asked to rate the fairness of sweet 
distributions already done for them. These studies demonstrate the problems in relying on 
FKLOGUHQ¶VEHKDYLRXUWRLQIHUWKHLUOHYHORIGLVWULEXWLYHUHDVRQLQJDVWKH\PD\KDYHDJUHDWHU
understanding then their behaviour would suggest.  
Despite these findings, Leventhal, Popp and Sawyer (1973) found that preschool 
children could distribute resources equitably but that the larger the difference between the 
good and bad performers, the more equitable the children were. This again highlights the 
importance of complexity in the tasks set as simpler tasks may produce more instances of 




distributive justice up to the age of 10 years. He admits that the reasoning achieved in his 
final stage, 2-B, is still very basic and that the development of justice reasoning continues 
throughout adolescence (Damon, 1977). This cannot be considered, then as a full explanation 
of the development of distributive justice as it does not explain the latter stages or defines 
what completely developed distributive reasoning would be.  
Economic Game Theory 
 More recent studies on children¶V sharing have focused on a different methodology 
stemming from economic game theories. Many economic games are based on distribution of 
resources between people. The ultimatum game and dictator game have been specifically 
developed to measure fairness preferences (Gummerum, Hanoch & Keller, 2008). Although 
WKH\GRQRWUHIHUWRµGLVWULEXWLYHMXVWLFH¶WKH\DUHUHOHYDQWWRWKHWRSLFDVWKH\DUHDGLIIHUHQW
way to measure how children share out resources but in an alternative context. In a dictator 
game (as mentioned previously), children are given a certain amount of resources (these can 
be anything including sweets, money or stickers) and told that they can share them with an 
anonymous partner. The partner cannot reject the offer made and no repercussions can arise 
from the decision the child makes. Due to its simplicity and nature, it is considered a reliable 
ZD\RIPHDVXULQJFKLOGUHQ¶VVKDULQJEHKDYLRXUHVSHFLDOO\DOWUXLVP*XPPHUXP+DQRFK
Keller, Parsons, & Hummel, 2010). In university student populations, the typical amount of 
resources offered by participants to their partners in dictator games is between 20-30% 
(Benenson, Pascoe, & Radmore, 2007). Studies with children have found this number to be 
lower however, with Harbaugh and Krause (2000) finding that younger children (2nd grade) 




idea that children give more as they get older. They looked at how moral emotions affect 3-5 
year-olds distribution of resources in the dictator game. They found that younger children 
preferred a more self-serving distribution of resources but that this decreased with age. Older 
children opted for more egalitarian choices (supported by Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 
2008) and those who understood the emotional consequences of violating moral norms (guilt) 
ZHUHPRUHOLNHO\WRDOORFDWHPRUHUHVRXUFHVWKDQWKRVHZKRGLGQ¶WGirls gave more resources 
to their anonymous partner than boys did and children who understood the emotional 
consequences of immoral behaviour (guilt, shame) gave more generously in the dictator game 
than those who did not.  
Role of Groups in Distributive Justice Development 
 What is of current interest is the role that groups can play in the development of 
GLVWULEXWLYHMXVWLFHUHDVRQLQJ3LDJHWDQG9\JRWVN\ERWKDUJXHGWKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VGHYHORSPHQW
cognitive and otherwise, occurs during interactions with peers. Piaget (1926) believed 
development occurred when a child learns to takHDQRWKHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHLQWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\
whereas Vygotsky (1962) argued the transmission of knowledge from an advanced peer to a 
less advanced peer would aid development. Children working together in pairs on problem 
solving tasks have achieved higher post-test scores than other children who only received 
individual training on the tasks (Doise & Mugny, 1984) and children working together have 
also been shown to come to the correct solution when they both initially had the wrong 
answer (Glachan & Light, 1981).  
 1RWRQO\GRSHHUVVHHPWRHQKDQFHHDFKRWKHU¶VGHYHORSPHQWWKH\DUHDOVRYHU\
influential in other ways. Harris (1995) argued that parents have no long lasting effects on 
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FKLOGUHQ¶VEHKDYLRXUDVLGHIURPWKHLUJHQHWLFVDQGWKDWSHHUJURXSVZHUHmore influential in 
WKHGHYHORSPHQWRIFKLOGUHQ¶VSHUVRQDOLWLHVDQGLQUHOD\LQJHQYLURQPHQWDODQGFXOWXUDOQRUPV 
 Although this view is contentious, supporting evidence for this idea comes from 
Lamb, Easterbrooks and Holden (1980) who found that children as young as 3 and 4 years 
UHLQIRUFHGRQHDQRWKHU¶VJHQGHUDSSURSULDWHEHKDYLRXUDQGSXQLVKHGJHQGHULQDSSURSULDWH
behaviour. The children whose behaviour was punished by their peers terminated their 
behaviour significantly sooner than those who were reinforced by their peers. Older children 
were more likely to give and receive intentional punishment; actions or words that were 
specifically designed to stop the behaviour rather than general criticism. Lamb et al. also 
found that positive reinforcement in younger children took the form of joining play, imitating 
DQGFRYHWLQJWKHWDUJHWFKLOG¶VWR\2OGHUFKLOGUHQZHUHVLJQLILFDQWO\PRUHOLNHO\WRFRPSO\
and observe behaviour.  
7KLVVWXG\GHPRQVWUDWHVFKLOGUHQ¶VUROHVDVVRFLDOLVLQJDJHQWVFRUUHFWLQJHDFKRWKer 
for inappropriate behaviour that does not comply with societal norms of gender roles. The 
correction here teaches children what behaviour is acceptable in society and demonstrates the 
role of peers in effectively transmitting environmental and cultural norms. This behaviour has 
been demonstrated in other studies (Fagot, 1977; Lamb & Roopnarine, 1979) and supports 
+DUULV¶QRWLRQRIWKHLPSRUWDQFHRISHHUVIRUJXLGDQFHLQWKHVHPDWWHUV7KHILQGLQJLQWKLV
study is a demonstration of conformity which refers to the changing of attitudes, verbalised 
statements or behaviours by individuals so that they adhere more closely to a social norm and 
it can be seen as a type of social influence (Baron & Kerr, 2003).  
Conformity in children 
Studies attempting to map conformity developmentally have been somewhat divided 
as to when conformity is at its highest and lowest (Constanzo & Shaw, 1966; Iscoe, Willams, 
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& Harvey, 1964). In an attempt to explain these disparities in findings Hoving, Hamm and 
Galvin (1969) argued that across the studies, the levels of ambiguity in tasks were not kept 
consistent. They argued that ambiguity may act as a confound in the relationship between age 
and conformity. They tested children in grades 2, 5 and 8, asking them which of two slides 
had the greater amount of dots. They were taken out in groups of three but kept in separate 
ERRWKVDQGVKRZQHDFKRWKHU¶VDQVZHUVWKURXJKDVHULHVRIOLJKWVFRQWUROOHGE\WKH
experimenter who changed the lights to give the impression of an erroneous majority. The 
task was changed so that effects of ambiguity could be tested and they found that conformity 
decreased with age on non-ambiguous tasks and increases with age on ambiguous tasks. 
The findings were argued to demonstrate a conflict of two needs: the need to be 
correct and the need for peer approval (Hoving, Hamm & Galvin, 1969). Older children seem 
to have a greater need to be correct and so, in the simpler tasks, do not conform to an 
incorrect majority. On harder tasks where their own answers may not be accurate, they are 
more likely to conform. These findings and interpretations fit with literature on the adult 
population by Deutsch and Gerard (1955). They argued that there are two types of influence: 
normative and informational social influence. Normative social influence is the influence on 
a person to conform to the expectations of a group such as liking a certain pop band or 
wearing certain clothes. Informational social influence is the influence on a person by 
information from group members about reality such as confirming a rumour or seeking help 
with homework.  
 Findings in more modern research seem to confirm this idea. Corriveau, Fusaro and 
Harris (2009) looked at conformity among preschool children. The children were shown a 
video in which a group of 4 people were asked to name unknown objects. Three of the people 
gave the same answer and the fourth gave a different one. In later clips, only the dissenter 
(the fourth person) and one of the people in the majority position of the group were left and 
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continued to give names of unfamiliar objects. Children in the study continually sided with 
the majority group member and distrusted answers given by the dissenter. This finding 
demonstrates that even young children are able to both recognise and trust group consensus, 
especially in ambiguous situations where they are asked to give a correct answer. Their need 
to be right, therefore, encourages them to conform.  
 Other research has also demonstrated that children are very careful of who they select 
to give them information suggesting that informational social influence is of high importance. 
Children as young as 4 years of age have demonstrated monitoring the accuracy of potential 
µLQIRUPDQWV¶DFURVVWDVNVLQRUGHUWRPDNHMXGJPHQWVRQZKRPWRWUXVWODWHUZLWKHIIHFWV
being seen up to one week after the initial exposure to accuracy information (Pasquini, 
Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007; Corriveau & Harris, 2009). With these effects found in 
such an early age group, it is questionable then as to whether it is only children who are older 
that are concerned with being correct and what it is that influences any child with such a 
strong bias to submit an answer known to be wrong.  
 If children in conformity studies were known to one another then their ability to 
monitor the accuracy of their classmates may be a potential confound in all conformity 
studies. If for example, a child is put into a group with two other children known to be of a 
lower ability than them (therefore being more likely to be viewed as inaccurate informants), 
they may be less likely to conform when put into a group with similar or higher ability 
children. The random sampling of children may have helped this problem to a degree; 
however studies cannot escape the problem that children will often have a very intimate 
knowledge of one another, their intellectual abilities and their social standing within the class. 
All of these things could affect the amount of conformity a child displays.  
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 The most recent studies into conformity have used adaptations of the Asch paradigm. 
Haun and Tomasello (2011) lookeGDWSUHVFKRROFKLOGUHQ¶VFRQIRUPLW\XVLQJGLIIHUHQWVL]Hd 
pictures of animals and asked children to judge their relative size. They found that children 
generally performed the task well and a drop in performance (suggesting conformity to an 
incorrect majority) only occurred when the child had to publicly share their response by 
speaking it aloud. In a second study, the researchers confirmed that in conflict with a 
majority, minority children performed significantly better when giving private over public 
answers. Children tended to conform more in public than in private overall and adapted their 
level of conformity to match the level of privacy from trial to trial. This suggests that children 
conform mainly for social reasons but little is known under what cLUFXPVWDQFHVFKLOGUHQ¶V
preferences for being correct get overridden by their need for peer approval. Haun and 
Tomasello (2011) explained their findings as children conforming in order to avoid any 
conflict resulting in their going against the majority. They may have learned from previous 
experience that the best way to avoid such conflict is to simply go along with what everyone 
else is saying. 
 The pattern of very young children conforming for social rHDVRQVUHLQIRUFHV3LDJHW¶V
(1969) idea that peer conformity would decrease from middle childhood through adolescence 
due to a change in a solitary respect for rules encouraging such conformity, to a mutual 
respect for peers allowing for the tolerance of non-conforming behaviour. Therefore, at a 
young age, children are still bound to conform by their developmental stage. Regardless of 
the developmental pattern, it is clear that children do conform, which means they are 
LQIOXHQFHGE\WKHSUHVHQFHRIRWKHUV+RZWKHQHVSHFLDOO\JLYHQFKLOGUHQ¶VPRUHOLPLWHG





conversations. In adult literature, it has been found that those with logical well structured 
arguments are more likely to persuade others, whereas those with weaker arguments are more 
influential when reasoning is not considered (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Moscovici and 
Personnaz (1980)  demonstrated that minority influence can lead to conversion, a cognitive 
change in one¶s opinion, by the presentational style used; that of being consistent but not 
dogmatic (Leman, 2002). Both reasoning and style, then can be important in persuading 
VRPHRQHWKDWRQH¶VRZQYLHZSRLQWLVFRUUHFW&KLOGUHQ¶VVW\OHDQGUHDVRQLQJKDYHERWKEHHQ
researched. 
 Leaper (1991) developed a coding scheme for the interactions of children in 
conversation. He created four broad categories that conversational phrases could be coded 
into: controlling, collaborative, withdrawing and obliging. Controlling phrases involve direct 
influence and can include phrases that are rejecting, commanding, countering and resisting 
VXFKDVµ'RQ¶WGRWKDW¶µ7KDW¶VQRWULJKW¶&ROODERUDWLYHSKUDVHVDOVRXVHGLUHFWLQIOXHQFHEXW
DUHPRUHDIILOLDWLYHLQFOXGLQJPXWXDODIILUPDWLRQµ,OLNHSOD\LQJZLWK\RX¶FRQVWUXFWLYH
elaboration of problems and initiating joint action with another child. Withdrawing phrases 
involve non-direct influence and include non-SDUWLFLSDWLRQVLOHQFHVUHOXFWDQWVXEPLVVLRQµ,
GRQ¶WFDUH¶DQGGHOD\LQJWKHLUSDUWLFLSDWLRQIRUH[DPSOHVD\LQJµXPP¶EHIRUHDQVZHULQJWKH
question. The last category, obliging, applies indirect influence and is also affiliative. It 
includes things like going along with the other person, being willingly submissive and 
seeking help from the other person.  
Leaper (1991) also pointed out the importance in the sequence of these types of 
exchanges. For example, if an obliging act was noted in response to a controlling act it would 
suggest a dominant-submissive relationship or possibly conformity. If however, the obliging 
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act followed on from a collaborative act, it suggests mutual agreement. Therefore measures 
of exchanges should also be taken and coded for, when dealing with conversational data.  
 Leman, Ahmed and Ozarow (2005) XVHG/HDSHU¶VFRGLQJVFKHPHLQtheir 
work with children and problem solving tasks whereby dyads had to come to an agreement 
on the correct solution. Leman et al., found that with boy-boy pairings, more controlling 
speech was used, moreover in mixed-sex pairs, boys dominated girls using more controlling 
communications and girls more obliging speech than in other pairings. Female dyads used 
more affiliative speech than their male counterparts but were less likely to engage in 
faciliative overlaps (interruptions that aided the conversation, such as words of agreement). In 
UHODWLRQWRZKRµZRQ¶WKHDUJXPHQWZKRse answer the pair gaYHWKRVHFKLOGUHQZKRµZRQ¶
used more assertive (collaborative but not controlling) and less affiliative speech acts. The 
losers in the pair were unassertive and more obliging. In those pairs where a compromise was 
made, collaborative speech was more frequent but contained fewer controlling speech acts 
WKDQGLVSOD\HGLQFKLOGUHQZKRµZRQ¶They concluded that girls tend to use more coaxing 
strategies when attempting to influence a partner whereas boys were more direct in their 
influence attempts.  
 These findings of gender differences are not new as Serbin, Sprafkin, Elman and 
Doyle (1982) found that boys were more direct and girls more indirect in their influencing 
techniques and that each sex tried to influence their own sex more than children from the 
opposite sex. Boys seem to become less influenced with age, owing to a greater resistance of 
indirect, more polite forms of influence (typically used by girls). Jacklin and Maccoby (1978) 
noted that even in children as young as 33 months, the sex of the influencer and influencee 
were important. Girls were more likely to be passive and ignored when paired with a boy 
than in any other gender pairing however, given the year the study was conducted, these 




strategies used by children with differing levels of reasoning. Using an adapted version of 
3LDJHW¶VPRUDOUHDVRQLQJVFHQDULRVFKLOGUHQZHUHSXWLQWo pairs depending on their moral 
reasoning levels. They were then presented with a scenario, asked for their initial preferences 
and then told to discuss the issue and come to an agreement. Leman found that out of those 
FKLOGUHQZKRµZRQ¶WKHILQDOGecision of the dyad being the same as their initial preference)  
WKHZRUGµDQG¶ was used more often than those who did not win. Less advanced peers who 
ZHUHVXFFHVVIXOLQZLQQLQJGHVSLWHWKHLUORZHUOHYHORIUHDVRQLQJXVHGµEXW¶PRUHDQGKDG
more justifications in support of their argument than those who lost. This demonstrates that 
those who have more developed arguments can influence another child by signalling support 
IRUWKHLUSRVLWLRQXVLQJWKHZRUGµDQG¶ZKHUHDVWKRVHZLWKOHVVHUDUJXPHQWVXVH
FRQYHUVDWLRQDOVW\OHWRFRQWLQXDOO\EULQJFRQYHUVDWLRQEDFNWRWKHLUYLHZSRLQWXVLQJµEXW¶
and eventually win over their partner.  
 Dyads may not be like groups and the studies mentioned so far have only included 
G\DGVLQWKHLUPHWKRGRORJ\ZKLFKGRHVQ¶t explain what happens in group discussion or how 
content can influence decisions. Gummerum, Keller, Takezawa and Mata (2008) looked at 
the dictator game scenario with children both individually and in groups of three. The 
children recorded their preferences on how to share money privately and then discussed the 
situation as a group and were told to come to a group decision. They found that all groups 
referred to simple allocation principles of fairness when justifying equality arguments and 
egoistic principles when trying to defend selfish behaviour. Older children used more 
developed and complex justifications to explain their preferences but still based in the same 
basic principles. Prosocial majorities were more likely to win in the group when the child 
with the highest level of moral reasoning was for the prosocial argument and therefore had a 
higher level of reasoning than the selfish group member.  
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 This finding seems logical when considering the asymmetry of the argument between 
prosocial/altruistic motives and egotistical/selfish motives. Egotistical reasoning is more 
logical and beneficial to the group with immediate gratification (having more resources) 
whereas altruistic motives leave the group with less. Therefore, the altruistic person needs to 
have a higher level of reasoning in order to effectively persuade others to give up more 
resources. Haidt (2001) claimed, somewhat controversially, that moral reasoning is not the 
cause of individuals¶ moral judgments. He also believed that moral reasoning is only of 
LPSRUWDQFHLQVRFLDOVLWXDWLRQV,WLVLQWKHVRFLDOVSKHUHWKDWRQH¶VOHYHORIPRUDOUHDVRQLQJ
may be used as a means of influencing others to agree; this is not a new concept in literature, 
with peer interaction always being seen as a key factor in stimulating cognitive and moral 
development (Walker, Hennig, & Krettenauer, 2000). However it does highlight that the 
social context of a group may alter how children make decisions and judgements.  
 Takezawa, Gummerum and Keller (2006) attempted to WHVW+DLGW¶VFODLPORRNLQJDW
children aged 11- and 13-years in groups completing a dictator and ultimatum game. They 
IRXQGWKDWLQGLYLGXDORIIHUVZHUHQRWUHODWHGWRPRUDOUHDVRQLQJVXSSRUWLQJ+DLGW¶VWKHRU\
Levels of moral reasoning were higher in the older age group and there was a significant 
difference in group decisions with age. Younger children were more egoistic with their offers 
in the dictator game whereas older children followed a majority rule pattern. As egoism 
reduced with age, prosocial reasoning became more influential. This suggests that a higher 
level of reasoning is needed to influence others to behave in a prosocial way and confirms the 
importance of reasoning in social settings. 
 Keller and Canz (2007) also looked at arguments children made in the group 
discussion phase of the dictator game. They found that the youngest children (3rd grade) used 
basic distribution principles such as fairness and selfishness for their reasoning where as 6th 
graders referred to the concrete needs of the self and others to argue on equal allocation 
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(either for or against). Children in 8th grade used fairness and reciprocity norms to justify 
their choices, and in unequal distributions used simple excuses. The eldest age group (11th 
grade) used the most sophisticated arguments including using negative stereotypes of the 
other group. The complexity of the argument also followed a developmental pattern (as one 
would expect) with young children often offering no explanation at all for their decisions, 
young adolescents using psychological and social circumstances present in the situation and 
the oldest adolescents referring to normative behaviours and considerations.  
Groups have also been shown to increase overall levels of moral reasoning. Killen and 
Damon (1982) found that group discussion and argument impacted on chiOGUHQ¶VOHYHOVRI
moral reasoning in distributive justice settings. After peer discussion, moral reasoning 
improved with higher levels of reasoning being used afterward. Children in this condition 
outperformed other children who had had similar justice discussions with adults, 
demonstrating the importance of peers being involved in developing reasoning levels. 
Children who did improve were found to be more collaborative with one another and 
developed the ideas of each other in the discussion. Children who were rejecting of others¶ 
ideas and had conflict in their discussions did not show any advance in their moral reasoning 
after group discussion. This study highlights the role groups can play in developing moral 
reasoning and the importance of the type of interactions taking place within the group 
discussion.  
What remains unknown in the developmental literature on resource allocation but also 
decision making generally, is how children come to group decisions when individual answers 
are different from one another. In an attempt to look at the influence of individual preferences 
on groups decisions in the adult literature, a mathematical model has been developed. Social 




models in order to predict a group outcome based on known facts about individual group 
members preferences and their interaction (Levine, 1999). It applies various mathematical 
models (based on a set of predictions made from the outset) to best explain the outcome of 
the group decision. Such models include the proportionality model, whereby the probability 
of group choice rests on the proportion of members favouring that choice, and the majority 
equi-probability otherwise model which assumes the group will choose the decision favoured 
by the majority of its members (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997). These models are 
compared to observed data and the one that best fits is used to explain the process. The 
method enables researchers to test assumptions about group processes by comparing them to 
the baselines the models create, without having to directly observe groups (Levine, 1999). 
Individual Preference         
 Social Decision Scheme Models (SDS) is comprised for four components. The first, 
individual preference, usually refers to the proclivity of an individual to choose a particular 
option from a set of finite responses (although its meaning can change depending on the 
context of the task). In order to discuss the mathematical aspects of the theory, Stasser (1999) 
will be quoted as the explanation given in the paper is the most succinct and clear explanation 
of SDS available. Applied examples of the mathematics will be given alongside these quotes 
to demonstrate understanding and also aid the reader in conceptualising these ideas.  
µ/HWa denote a finite set of discrete and mutually exclusive response options, a = {a1, a2, 
a3,...,an}, where n the number of response options. Define two companion vectors. The 
vector p is a distribution of probabilities, p =  {p1, p2, p3,...,pn}, where pi is the probability 
that an individual will prefer response ai. The vector r contains the distribution of preferences 
within a group of size r, r =  {r1, r2, r3,...,rn}, where ri the number of members that prefer ai. 
Note that r  ri¶6WDVVHUS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To explain with an example consider a group of three children (r=3) who have to 
choose whether to eat some sweets now (a1) or wait until later (a2). The vector p represents 
the probability of randomly selecting a child who favours each response (before entering a 
group discussion). So p= (.7, .3) would represent a population of children who would prefer 
to eat sweets immediately rather than waiting until later. The vector r contains any of the 
possible patterns of preference within the given group for example r= (2, 1) would indicate a 
group where 2 members would prefer to eat sweets immediately and 1 member who would 
prefer to wait until later.  
Group Composition 
Group composition is the distribution of preferences among group members (which is 
r). The number of potential distributions will change depending on the group size (r) and the 
number of possible responses (n). Using mathematics to symbolise this Davis (1973) came up 
with the following notation (n+ r-1)Cr  where C represents the binomial coefficient. A 
binomial coefficient is the mathematical way to determine how many different ways there are 
to do something. So C will equal the number of preference distributions possible within a 
particular group. So in the example used above with a three person group and two potential 
decisions, there are (2 + 3-1) Cr which equals 4C3 = 4 possible distributions in the group. 
.QRZLQJZKHUHDJURXSVWDUWVLQWHUPVRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VSUHIHUHQFHVPHDQVLWLVSRVVLEOHWR
predict where the group will end up, which is central to the SDS theory. Alternatively, we can 
map the decision rules groups use to come to a final decision by knowing the initial 
SUHIHUHQFHGLVWULEXWLRQDQGWKHJURXS¶VILQDODQVZHU 
Group influence processing 
Once the group composition is known, knowledge about social influence can be 
applied to attempt to predict the group process. For example, majorities often win in group 
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settings either due to a normative influence (social pressures to conform) or through 
informational influence (appearing to have more knowledge than other group members) 
SDUWLFXODUO\ZKHQQRµFRUUHFW¶DQVZHUH[LVWV/DXJKOLQ	(OOLV1986). Additionally, when the 
majority of a group favours a particular decision, this may trigger notions of fairness in 
others; in democratic countries in particular, where votes are taken and the majority decision 
is taken. Those who disagree with the majority may only voice their dissent about views that 
are particularly important to them given the low likelihood they have to achieve group 
consensus.  
Although this is often the case, studies have also demonstrated that some positions are 
more easily defended than others. MacCoun and Kerr (1988) found a leniency bias in 
jury decision making tasks whereby acquitting someone was found to be an easier 
position to defend than convicting someone of a crime. This is not only found in jury 
decision making groups, as research has shown in problem solving tasks, groups often 
side with a single member¶s answer if they provide the group with a correct answer and 
are confident in their answer (Hinsz, 1990). Therefore both the group composition and 
group process must be known/predicted in order for an accurate SDS model to be 
applied. Collective response  
The last component of the SDS is the final group decision. Usually, the group can 
choose from the same set of options as the individual (answer A, B or C for example) 
however this similarity is not needed for the SDS to be applied. One area in particular where 
WKLVLVQRWWKHFDVHLVLQMXU\GHFLVLRQPDNLQJZKHUHWKHJURXSKDVDWKLUGRSWLRQRIµKXQJ¶
which an individual juror cannot choose from.  
Development of the Social Judgement Scheme 
One of the problems with SDS models is that they are only able to handle discrete 
decisions and are not applicable to continuous variables. This is because the SDS predicts 
different compositions of the group and with continuous variables the number of 
compositions becomes infinite. Due to this shortcoming, a new model was developed which 
could be applied in this area; the Social Judgement Scheme (SJS).  
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 The SJS is based on the distance among preferences amongst group members, along a 
response continuum (Kameda, Tindale, 	'DYLV)RUH[DPSOHXVLQJ6KHULI¶V (1937) 
autokinetic study where participants had to guess individually (and then in a group) how 
much a single white dot moved along a black screen, the SJS would look at the differences 
between each individuals initial guesses (the distance between their estimates). The model 
then uses the following equation: 
G= c1x1 +  c2x2 «Frxr. 
G represents the group decision and r the number of people in the group. X is that 
group PHPEHU¶VSUHIHUHQFHDQG&LVWKHZHLJKWRIWKDWSUHIHUHQFH0HDQLQJWKDWF[LV
JURXSPHPEHU¶VZHLJKWRISUHIHUHQFHPXOWLSOLHGE\WKHLUDFWXDOSUHIHUHQFH$VLQLWLDO
preferences can be collected before the group phase of the study, they will not be discussed 
further however what is left to be explained is the weight of each preference. 
Preference Weighting  
An iQGLYLGXDO¶VSUHIHUHQFHZHLJKWYDULHVGHSHQGLQJRQKRZFHQWUDOWKHLUSRVLWLRQLV
relative to other group members. The closer WKHJURXSPHPEHU¶Vanswer is to others, the more 
weight their answer is given in directing the final group decision. Group members whose 
LQLWLDOJXHVVHVDUHIDUDZD\IURPWKHUHVWRIWKHJURXS¶VSRVLWLRQV are given the least weight.  
Decision Models in Developmental Psychology  
At present, only a few studies have employed this type of methodology with 
developmental populations. Takezawa, Gummerum and Keller (2006) used the SJS and 
DYHUDJLQJPRGHOVRQWKHLUGDWDORRNLQJDWFKLOGUHQ¶VLQGLYLGXDODQGJURXSGHFLVLRQPDNLQJRQ
dictator and ultimatum games (studies mentioned above). In their study, Takezawa, 
Gummerum and Keller were interested in moral reasoning, particularly egoistic and prosocial 
arguments put forward by group members in the group discussion phase. As the SJS model 
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assumes that there is no difference in influence between egoistic and prosocial arguments and 
the authors expected that fair offers would occupy majority decisions, if their data set 
violated the SJS prediction, it would suggest a greater influence in egoistic arguments.  
 They used the SJS to compare the influence of egoistic and prosocial arguments in 
groups by looking at how much and in what direction groups deviated from the prediction 
made by the SJS model. What they found was that the influence of prosocial arguments 
relative to egoistic arguments becomes greater in older children (13 to 14-years) compared to 
younger children (11-years-old). In a second paper Gummerum, Keller, Takezawa and Mata 
(2008) used the SJS in the same way as described above, using the model as a baseline to 
look the influence of different arguments. They found that in groups of older girls (17-years) 
and young boys (11-years), selfish minorities were more influential than the generous 
majority. 
 What these studies demonstrate is the applicability and usefulness of applying 
decision models to developmental data. This chapter argues that there is a need to apply 
JURXSGHFLVLRQPRGHOVWRFKLOGUHQ¶VUHVRXUFHDOORFDWLRQVRWKHUWKDQSDSHUVE\*XPPHUXPHW
al., this method has not been applied before and the results garnered could be very valuable. 
If researchers are able to understand the types of decision rules children use and how these 
differ between groups making fair or unfair decisions, psychologists can understand more 
fully why and how groups behave. If we know the decision rules that lead to bad group 
decisions or behaviours, then interventions can be introduced and our understanding of 







Decision making in social contexts: How groups impact resource allocation 
 
Overview 
The purpose of the following studies was to investigate how group contexts might influence 
FKLOGUHQ¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ,QRUGHUWRDVVHVVWKLVDVFHQDULRKDGWREHFUHDWHGWKDWFKLOGUHQ
could make a decision about. Resource allocation scenarios were used as there is a wealth of 
literature in this area with children, meaning that accurate predictions of how children of 
difference ages might behave individually or interpersonally could be made. Also, any 
changes in the types of decisions made could be compared to previous literature and a 
conclusion made as to whether the group scenario changed the way children of a certain age 
would typically decide about the issue.  
The aim of Study 1 was to investigate how children would come to a final group 
GHFLVLRQZKHQWKHLULQLWLDOSUHIHUHQFHVGLIIHUHG&KLOGUHQ¶VUHMHFWLRQLQFOXVLRQDQGSUHIHUHQFH
decisions were explored as well as which target the decision was applied to. The key finding 
from this study was that there was no difference in terms of amount of rejection, inclusion or 
preference decisions between groups and individuals but that the group context did influence 
who children preferred and included. Being in a group made children significantly more 
likely to include and prefer the child in the scenario who worked the hardest compared to the 
child with the best ability, or the child who was ill. Groups were also significantly more 
likely to reject the child that was ill compared to individuals.  
 Study 2 focussed on the effHFWVLQWHUJURXSFRQWH[WVZRXOGKDYHRQFKLOGUHQ¶VGHFLVLRQ
making about resource allocation. When reviewing the literature it was noted that only one 
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study by Vaughan et al. (1981) had considered this issue and this study aimed to improve on 
the methodology and extend the original findings (for full discussion see introduction to 
Study 2). Children were asked to share sweets out in intergroup settings (between themselves 
and a fellow ingroup member, themselves and an outgroup member, an ingroup and outgroup 
member) or in an interpersonal setting (themselves and another student). The key finding 
IURPWKLVVWXG\ZDVWKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VVKDULQJVLJQLILFDQWO\GHFUHDVHGLQFRQGLWLRQVZKHUHWKH




For the purposes of Study 1, the Social Decision Scheme Model will be used (see 
&KDSWHUIRUPDWKHPDWLFDOSULQFLSOHVEHKLQGLWWRKHOSXQGHUVWDQGZKDWRFFXUVLQFKLOGUHQ¶V
group discussions in terms of what decision rules children use. The group decision making 
literature has shown that when there is no logically correct answer or when no one can 
demonstrate the correctness of an opinion, a majority usually dominate (Kameda, Tindale, & 
Davis, 2003). Given this and the evidence on conformity to majorities presented in the 
previous chapter, we will be including a majority decision rule as one of the rules to be tested 
against the data collected. 
Based on prior research, Study 1 was developed to look at distributive justice in 
children and how their individual preferences can shape the final group decision. The aim is 
to use the SDS to look at the types of decision rules children in groups use and compare this 
across ages. In order to do so, the scenario presented to children needed to produce variability 
in their individual preferences in order to be able to test different types of individual 
preferences within a group and how this affected the group outcome. 
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Children aged 6-8-years, 9-10-years and 12-14-years were asked to share out seven 
sweets between the three targets: the smart target, the target who worked hard and the ill 
target. First, they filled in their preferences individually on a piece of paper which was then 
taken away by the experimenter. They were given a filler task and then asked to make a 
group decision on the final distribution of sweets. This was again recorded on paper and 
removed after the group had agreed to their final decision. A large sample size was needed 
for the study as when analysing the group level data, each group of three people only counted 
as one participant meaning a larger sample size was needed in order to have an appropriate 
amount of power to run the analyses.  
Variability  
It was decided that three targets would be introduced; one target who was ill, one who 
was clever (and therefore able) and one who tried their best (thus being a hard worker). Each 
RIWKHVHWDUJHWVFRUUHVSRQGVWR:HLQHU¶VDWWULEXWLRQDOWKHRU\RIDFKLHYHPHQWDQGPRWLYDWLRQ
:HLQHU:HLQHU¶VWKHRU\DWWHPSWHGWRRXWOLQHWKHZD\VLQZKLFKSHRSOHH[SODLQHGWKH
causes of their successes and failures. The attribution of these successes and failures can be 
attributed to three general causes: first whether the factors of success are within a person 
(internal) or factors within the environment (external), the second, whether these factors are 
stable over time or unstable and lastly controllability, whether a person is able to exert control 
over these factors or not. To give an example, the smart target in the scenario used in this 
study would be considered as an internal factor, a stable factor over time and uncontrollable 
(you cannot control whether you are capable at a task or not). On the other hand, the target 
who tried their best represents an internal factor that is unstable (you do not always put the 
same amount of effort in to every task) and also controllable- it is up to you how hard you 
work. Lastly, being ill can be categorised as an external factor, unstable (you are not always 
ill) and also uncontrollable (you have little control over when you will get better). How their 
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respective outputs within the group task are perceived by children should vary based on these 
attributions types.  
$GGLWLRQDOO\.LOOHQGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VYLHZVRQZKHWKHUHIIRUWRU
ability counts for more have been shown to impact on whether they view the sharing of 
resources as fair or not, using an able and effortful target was thought to produce a variety of 
UHVXOWVLQFKLOGUHQ¶VLQGLYLGXDOUHVSRQVHV7KHLOOWDUJHWZDVLQFOXGHGWRDGGDGGLWLRQDO
complexity to the scenario and it was thought that moral reasons of fairness may influence 
the number of sweets given to this target as their illness cannot be helped.   
Given the differences of gender in some of the research findings mentioned above, 
gender will be controlled for by making sure all children are in same-sex groups. 
Additionally, as research has shown that children are prone to using equality as a means of 
distribution in complex scenarios, the children were instructed to hand out seven sweets 
amongst the targets meaning that equality was not possible. This has also been done to ensure 
variability in individual responses as a favourite target would have to be selected.  
 For clarity, the hypotheses have been organised by predicted age differences, group 
and individual differences and SDS model predictions.  
Age Differences 
It is predicted that the oldest children will prefer the smart target more than the other 
two age groups as they rely more on social-conventional reasoning when making their 
decisions (Killen & Stangor, 2001) as demonstrated by giving the target more sweets. It is 
also predicted that the youngest children will give more sweets to the ill target than the other 
age groups as they will focus more on equality than equity (Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991) 




as demonstrated by giving these targets more sweets.  
Group and individual differences 
It is predicted that groups will give more sweets to both the effortful target and able 
target than individuals. Research has shown that being in groups increases levels of 
distributive justice reasoning (Killen & Damon, 1982) and equity is seen more in older age 
groups (Hook & Cook, 1979) as is a preference for social-conventional and individual merit 
based reasoning (Stangor & Killen, 2001).  
SDS predictions 
It is predicted that group decisions in this study will follow a majority rule pattern with 
the final group decision reflecting the majority of the initial preferences prior to group 
discussion. Literature has shown that children are influenced by majorities (Haun & 
Tomasello, 2011) and that in ambiguous situations where there is no obvious correct answer 




400 children participated in the study across three age ranges. There were 127 
children aged between 6-8-years (67 boys and 60 girls); 123 children aged 9-10-years (69 
boys and 54 girls); 150 children aged 12-14-years (51 boys and 99 girls). Participants were 
recruited from primary and secondary schools in Kent, South-East of England. Schools were 
approached by letter and then contacted by phone. Informed consent letters were given to all 
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parents and in schools where Opt-Out was chosen as a method, a Loco Parentis was signed 
by the Headteacher.  
Design 
A mixed 3 factor design was used with a 2 (Context: Individual and Group) x 3 
(Target: Ill, Smart or Effort) x 3 (Age: Year 2-3, Year 5-6, Year 8-9) design. Context and 
target were within-subjects factors and age was the between-subjects factor. The dependent 
variable was operationalised as the number of sweets given to the targets in both the group 
and individual contexts. Children were informed they could give out the sweets however they 
wanted until all seven sweets were given out, meaning that the number of sweets each target 
received was interdependent.  
Procedure 
Children were taken out of the classroom in same-sex groups of three and given a 
verbal description of what the study involved. It was explained that both their parents and 
teachers knew what was involved and had allowed the experimenter to talk to them. Once 




tried really hard to do his best. At the end of the presentation the teacher gave them 7 sweets. 
How would you share the sweets out? Write the initial of the child you want to have the 
VZHHWXQGHUHDFKSLFWXUH¶WKHQDPHVRIWKHFKLOGUHQZHUHFKDQJHGWRNatasha, Sarah and 
Louise for the female groups). The children were told verbally that their answers should 
remain secret and the experimenter intervened at any signs of copying. 
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  Once this was completed, the sheets were collected by the experimenter and the 
children were asked to do a brainstorming task together. The task was part of another study 
but also acted as a filler task and a method to increase group identification under the minimal 
group paradigm setting. The subject the children were asked to bUDLQVWRUPRQZDVµWKLQJV\RX
QHHGLQVSDFH¶$WWKLVSRLQWLQWKHVWXG\WKHFKLOGUHQZHUHLQIRUPHGWKDWWKH\ZRXOGEHYRLFH
recorded to ensure that all their ideas were accurately recorded by the experimenter. The 
voice recorder remained on for the rest of the experiment to enable the experimenter to revisit 
WKHFKLOGUHQ¶VJURXSGLVFXVVLRQVDQGFRGHWKHPDWDODWHUGDWH 
Children were presented with the same sweet sharing scenario and instructed that this 
time they had to make a group decision on how best to share out the sweets. They were 
encouraged to come to an agreement but told that the experimenter would not help them do 
this. When they had completed the task, they were instructed to write the answer on the sheet 
in front of them. The experimenter did not participate in this part of the study and only 
intervened when time was running short. At this point the children were prompted to make a 
decision but no more help or advice was given. When the task was finished, the children were 
verbally debriefed and given a certificate and sticker for their participation. Debrief letters 
were sent home to their parents with participant codes on them should any wish to withdraw 
their child from the study.  
Results 
Constructing decision models 
Models were run using ANOVAs; first an overall model on the data file was 
conducted, followed by more specific models relating to certain types of behaviour such as 
inclusion, rejection and preference.  These behaviours were chosen due to the focus on such 
behaviours within the peer relation literature (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 1998). Ability 
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wins and effort wins models were also investigated as two separate models relating 
specifically to the smart and tried best targets. To help understand the following analysis, age 
was split into three age ranges. The first age range refers to children aged 6-8-years, the 
second age range 9-10-years and the third age range 12-14-years.  
Overall ANOVA 
The following analyses were run using an aggregated data file so that group data was 
not WULSOLFDWHG7KHGDWDZDVDJJUHJDWHGE\XVLQJWKHµDJJUHJDWH¶IXQFWLRQRQ6366ZKLFK
summated the data file by group number (so that each group appeared only once in the data 
set). Gender, age, individual distributions of sweets to each target and the group distribution 
of sweets to each target were all included in the aggregated data set. A repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted examining sweet distributions between the targets with target (ill, 
smart and tried) and context (individual or group) as within-subjects factors and age and 
gender as between-subjects factors. A main effect of target was found with F(2, 254)= 55.12, 
p<.001, partial eta=1.00. The ill target was given significantly fewer sweets than both the 
smart and tried best target (MD=-.756, p<.001 and MD=-.753, p<.001 respectively).  
There was a significant target x age-range interaction F(4, 254)=7.50, p<.001, partial 
eta= .997. Looking at the simple main effects it was found that across all age groups the ill 
target was liked the least getting significantly fewer sweets than both the smart and tried best 
targets. In age range 2, the tried best target was liked significantly more than the smart target 
MD=.357, p =.01. In age range 3, the only significant differences found were for the ill target 
with the other two targets (ill target was liked significantly less than both the smart target 
MD= -1.24, p<.001 and tried best target MD= -.99, p < .001). The ill target was liked 
significantly more in age range 1 than age range 3 (MD=.486, p<.001) and by age range 2 
than age range 3 (MD =.298, p<.05). The smart target was liked significantly more by age 
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range 3 than the other two age ranges (MD =.329, p<.005 for age range 1, MD =.454, p<.001 
for age range 2). The tried best target was liked significantly more by age range 2 than age 
range 1 (MD =.314, p<.005). No other significant differences were found. 
               Another interaction effect was found for target and context F (2, 254)=9.04, p<.001, 
partial eta=.97. At the individual level, the ill target was liked significantly less than both the 
smart and tried best target (MD =-.676, p<.001 and MD =-.497, p<.001 respectively). The 
smart target was liked significantly more than the tried best target too, MD =.179, p<.05. In 
groups the same pattern occurs for the ill target with them being liked the least. There was no 
significant differences between the tried best target and smart target however, suggesting that 
the strong preference for the smart target at the individual level was somehow negated by 
groups. The ill target was significantly more liked by individuals than groups MD =.179, 
p<.05. The tried best target was significantly more liked by groups than individuals MD 




both individual and group level for each target if children gave the target one sweet or less 
and 0 if they gave the target more than one sweet. This was done because it is thought that by 
giving a target only one sweet compared to other targets, it demonstrates a rejection of that 
particular target as that target could have received two sweets and still be the least favoured. 
These new variables were then entered into a repeated measures ANOVA with context 
(individual rejection scores for each target and group rejection scores for each target) being a 
within-subjects factor and age range and gender a between-subjects factor. A significant main 
effect of target was found F(2, 254)= 60.58, p<.001. The ill target was significantly more 
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likely to be rejected than the smart and tried best targets (MD=.27, p<.001 and MD=.28, 
p<.001) 
An interaction effect of gender and target was found F (2, 254)= 3.50, p<.05. Looking 
at the simple main effects, boys were more likely to reject the ill target than girls, MD =.13, 
p<.05. Girls were significantly more likely to reject the ill target than the smart and tried best 
targets however (MD =.30, p<.001, MD=.34, p<.001 respectively). The same pattern was 
found in boys who were also more likely to reject the ill target over the other two (smart 
target MD=.21, p<.005, tried best target MD=.20, p<.001), which overall suggests that the 
patterns in gender for rejection are the same but more pronounced for boys.  
An interaction effect was also found with target and age range F(4, 254)=5.56, 
p<.001. Simple main effects showed that across all age ranges, the ill target was significantly 
more likely to be rejected than the smart and tried best targets. The oldest children (age range 
3) were more likely to reject the ill target than both children from age ranges 1 and 2 
(MD=.17, p<.05, MD =.20, p<.01). For the smart target, the youngest children were 
significantly more likely to reject them than the children at age ranges 2 and 3 (MD =.08, 
p<.01, MD=.10, p<.001). No significant differences were found between age ranges 2 and 3. 
The same pattern for the tried best target was found with the youngest children being more 
likely to reject the tried best target than children at age ranges 2 and 3 (MD=.07, p<.01, 
MD=.06, p<.01).  
There was a third interaction effect for target and context F (2, 254)= 6.49, p<.005 
(this effect can be seen in Figure 4.1). The pairwise comparisons showed that individuals 
were significantly more likely to reject the ill target than the smart or tried best targets 
(MD=.22, p<.001, MD =.20, p<.001). In groups the same pattern is found (ill-smart MD=.29, 
p<.001, ill-tried MD=.33, p<.001). However, children in groups were also significantly more 
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likely to reject the smart target than the tried best target MD=.04, p<.05. The ill target was 
significantly more likely to be rejected by groups than individuals (MD=.85, p<.05) and 
interestingly the tried best target was significantly more likely to be rejected by individuals 
than groups (MD=.04, p<.05). No differences were found for the smart target and rejection by 
individuals and groups. The findings suggest that the differences here occur because groups 
favour the tried best target more rather than favouring the smart target less.  
 
Figure 4.1: The interaction effect between context and target in terms of which target the 




The inclusion model again looked at all three targets and coded participants answers 
at both individual and group level as 1 if the target was given at least two sweets and 0 if they 
were given less than two sweets (therefore rejected). This is a different decision from 
rejection because participants do have the option of only giving the target one sweet. By 
giving them an additional sweet, it suggests a different decision other than rejection, an 
attempt to include the target more. Another repeated measures ANOVA was run with context 
(individual inclusion scores for each target and group inclusion scores for each target) as a 
between subjects factor and gender and age range as a between-subjects factor. A main effect 
of target was found F(2, 254)=14.06, p<.001. The ill target was significantly less likely to be 
included than both smart and tried best targets (MD=-.27, p<.001 and MD=-.28, p<.001 
respectively).  
An interaction effect was found for context and target F(2, 254)=5.11, p<.01 (as 
demonstrated in Figure 4.2). At the individual level, the ill target was significantly less likely 
to get included than the tried best target (MD=-.07, p<.05). At the group level, the ill target 
was significantly less likely to be included than both the tried best target and smart target 
(MD=-.21, p<.001, MD=-.15, p<.005 respectively). A significant simple main effect was also 
found between the smart target and tried best target at the group level with the smart target 




Figure 4.2. The interaction between the context and target in terms of who the participants 
included when sharing sweets 
Preference Model 
The preference model was constructed by scoring participants sweet distributions at 
the individual and group level as 1 if they gave the target three or more sweets or 0 if they 
gave them less than three sweets. It is argued that by giving a target three sweets or more, 
they are not just including them but clearly preferring them over at least one other target. A 
repeated measures ANOVA was run with context (individual preference scores for each 
target and group preference scores for each target) as a within-subjects factor and gender and 
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age range as between-subjects factors. Again there was a main effect of target F(2, 
254)=62.29, p<.001, partial eta=1.00. The ill target was significantly less likely to be 
preferred than both the smart and tried best targets (MD=-.39, p<.001 and MD=-.43, p<.001).  
Interaction effects were found for target and age range F(4, 254)= 14.65, p<.001 (see 
Figure 4.3; for ease of interpretation age range was put on the X-axis), partial eta=1.00. 
Looking at the pairwise comparisons, it was found that in age range 1, the ill target was 
significantly less likely than the smart target to be preferred (MD=-.18, p<.01). At age range 
2, there were significant differences between all targets with the ill target being less preferred 
than the smart and tried best targets (MD=-.24, p<.001 and MD=-.59, p<.001). The tried best 
target was also preferred significantly more than the smart target at this age with MD=.35, 
p<.001. In the final age range (3), the ill target was also significantly less preferred than the 
smart and tried best targets (MD=-.70, p<.001, MD=-.55, p<.001) but there were no 





Figure 4.3. The interaction effect between the age of the participant and the target in terms of 
which target the participants preferred.  
 
For the ill target, there were significant differences between age range 1 and age 
ranges 2 and 3 with this youngest age range being significantly more likely to prefer the ill 
target more than the other age groups (with age range 2 MD=.15, p<.001 and with age range 
3 MD=.24, p<.001). Also, a significant difference between age ranges 2 and 3 were found 
with age range 2 being significantly more likely to prefer the ill target than the older children 
(MD=.99, p<.05).  
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For the smart target, the eldest children (age range 3) were significantly more likely to 
prefer the smart target than both age ranges 2 and 1 (MD=.38, p<.001 and MD=.29, p<.001). 
For the tried best target, only age range 1 was significantly different from both age ranges 2 
and 3 with this youngest group being less likely to prefer the tried best target than the other 
two age groups (age range 2 MD=-.32, p<.001, age range 3 MD=-.18, p<.01).  
There was also an interaction of target and context F(2, 254)=10.06, p<.001, partial 
eta=.99 (see Figure 4.4). Looking at the pairwise comparisons it demonstrated that at both 
group and individual levels, the ill target was significantly less likely to be preferred than 
both smart and tried best targets. However the ill target was significantly more likely to be 
preferred at the individual level than the group level (MD=.10, p<.001). The context did not 
have a significant effect on how much the smart target was preferred, but for the tried best 





Figure 4.4. Interaction between context and target type in terms of which target was preferred 
when participants shared out sweets.  
Ability Model 
As the results demonstrated repeatedly that the ill target was the least preferred out of 
all the targets, further analyses looked specifically at what happened between the smart and 
WULHGEHVWWDUJHWDFURVVDJHJURXSVDQGJHQGHUV3DUWLFLSDQWV¶VFRUHVZHUe coded at both 
individual and group level so that any participant who gave more sweets to the smart target 
were coded as 1 and those who gave an equal number of or less sweets to the smart target 
were coded as 0. A repeated measures ANOVA was then run with context (individual scores 
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for ability and group scores for ability) as a within-subjects factor and age and gender as 
between-subject factors.  
A significant main effect of context was found F(1, 127)=4.14, p<.05, partial eta=.52. 
Individuals were significantly more likely to give sweets to the smart target than the tried best 
target with MD=.08, p<.05 compared to groups.  
Effort Model 
An effort model was created using the same method as above with those giving more 
sweets to the tried best target receiving a score of 1 and those giving the same amount of or 
more sweets to the smart target being coded as 0. A repeated measures ANOVA was then run 
with context (individual scores for effort and group scores for effort) as a within-subjects 
factor and gender and age as a between subjects factor. 
A significant main effect of context was found F(1, 127)=5.09, p<.05, partial eta=.61. 
Groups were significantly more likely to give more sweets to the tried best target than 
individuals. There was also an interaction effect of context and age range F(1, 127)=3.11, 
p<.05 and partial eta=.59. Simple main effects were run which found that, at the individual 
level, there were significant differences between children in age range 2 and age ranges 1 and 
3 (MD=.24, p<.001, MD=.22, p<.001 respectively). Children in age range 2 at the individual 
level were significantly more likely to give more sweets to the tried best target than the smart 
target compared to other age groups. At the group level this difference shifts and age range 3 
has significantly different results from age ranges 1 and 2 (MD=-.20, p<.05, MD=-.35, 
p<.001). Children in age range 3, when in groups, were significantly less likely to give more 
sweets to the tried best target than the smart target compared to other age groups.  
At the individual levels, the youngest and oldest children were less likely than 
children in age range 2 to give more sweets to the tried best target. In the group stage, both 
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ages 1 and 2 were more likely to give more sweets to the tried best target than smart target, 
whereas children in age range 3 did not show much change across contexts hence the changes 
in significances. The group process did not seem to impact their decisions.  
A 3-way interaction was also found between context, gender and age, F(2, 127)=3.65, 
p<.05, partial eta=.66 (see Figures 4.5 and 4.6). The difference is due to a significant 
difference between boys and girls in age range 2 at the group level; with girls being more 
likely than boys in groups to give more sweets to the tried best target than smart target 
(MD=.39, p<.01). There were also significant differences in girls individual and group 
decisions in age range 2 with girls being significantly more likely to give more sweets to the 
tried best target when in groups than when they are alone (MD=.259, p =.01). For boys, a 
significant difference occurs at age range 1 where individuals and groups differ with boys 
being significantly more likely to give more sweets to the tried best target in groups than 











Figure 4.6. The interaction effect of age and context on female participants¶ allocation of 
VZHHWVWRWKHµWULHGEHVW¶WDUJHW 
 
Girls at the individual level in age range 2 had significant differences between both 
age ranges 1 and 3 (MD=.16, p<.05, MD=.22, p<.05). This suggests that individually, girls 
were more likely than at any other age to give more sweets to the tried best target. At the 
group level this difference disappears between age ranges 2 and 1 & 3, with a significant 
difference occurring between only ages 1 and 3 (MD=.38, p<.05). This suggests that in 
groups, younger children are more likely to give more sweets to the tried best target than 
older children. For boys, at the individual level, the same pattern was seen where boys at age 
range 2 were significantly more likely to give more sweets to the tried best target than ages 1 
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and 3 (MD=.32, p<.001 and MD=.22, p <.01 respectively). This pattern remains in the group 
stages however with age range 2 still giving more sweets than ages 1 and 3 (MD=.48, p<.01, 
MD=.51, p<.001). 
SDS 
SDS models were conducted using a Dos programme to attempt to uncover what decision 
rules children were using when making their group decisions. SDS enables the testing of 
various types of decision rules to see which rule significantly fitted the data. Using the same 
premise as the ANOVA models, Rejection, Inclusion and Preference models were conducted 
using SDS and were all looked at within levels of age. As three person groups were used, it 
limited the number of different decision rules the SDS could be applied to. For example, the 
SDS allows you to distinguish between two thirds majority, majority, and truth supported 
decision rules (where one person plus a supporter influences the group decision). All three of 
these models are identical in a three person group and so only one could be tested. 
Additionally the plurality model, which is when the solution with the most votes win but no 
absolute majority occurs, could not be tested as it would not be possible to distinguish as no 
outcome in a three person group could reflect this rule.  
The models chosen to be looked at were the proportional model, which suggests that the 
final group decision is based on the number of group members advocating it, majority wins 
model and the equiprobability model, where each answer suggested has equal chance of 
being chosen. In Table 4.1 are the D matrices of each model, demonstrating the probability of 
the group answer based on the distribution and the decision scheme rule. The reason for 
selecting the majority model was because research into children and conformity have 
demonstrated children follow a majority rule when making decisions (Corriveau, Fusaro, & 
Harris, 2009). The equiprobability model was chosen as it would suggest children chose their 
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final group decision by chance; as the task was not related to class work children may have 
simply picked an answer at random. The last model, proportionality, was included in case 
some groups failed to follow the majority rule; this model allows for some groups to choose 
differently from the majority.  
Due to several factors in the methodology, multiple decision schemes came out as non-
significant (see Table 4.2). First, the use of three person groups meant that a two thirds 
majority and majority rule were identical so the full predictive power of the SDS was not 
used to its full extent. Another factor was limiting the choice of the number of sweets that 
could be shared out amongst three people to seven sweets. Although this prevented children 
from being able to be equal in their decision making and forced them to make a preference, it 
limited the variability of the individual choices. Initially, using nCr(n,r) = nPr(n,r) / r! (which 
calculates the number of different, unordered combinations of r objects from a set 
of n objects) there are 35 possible ways to share out the sweets, however this did not take into 
account the likelihood of these choices being made. Of the 400 participants who answered the 
sweet distribution question individually, 65.3% chose the distribution 2, 2, 3. This meant 
there was less variation of individual answers which is what the SDS looks at to distinguish 
between different models. Due to the lack of variation, multiple models were non-significant 
meaning the information that could be gained from using SDS did not help differentiate the 




This table shows the probability DJURXSZLOOFKRRVHDFHUWDLQRXWFRPHEDVHGRQWKHJURXSPHPEHU¶VLQLWLDOLQGLYLGXDOGHFLVLRQVDQGWKHJURXS




Proportionality Model Majority Wins Model Equiprobability Model 
Choosing A Choosing B Choosing A Choosing B Choosing A Choosing B Choosing A Choosing B 
3 0 1.00 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 .00 
2 1 .67 .33 1.00 .00 .50 .50 
1 2 .33 .67 .00 1.00 .50 .50 
0 3 .00 
1.00 




Table showing the findings for SDS models on data; models given an X were non-significant 
(therefore fit the data). Models with a ± were significant and therefore did not explain the 
data 










Ill target Age 1 - X - 
Ill target Age 2 - X - 
Ill target Age 3 X - - 
Smart target 
Age 1 
X X X 
Smart target 
Age 2 
X X X 
Smart target 
Age 3 
- - - 
Tried best target 
Age 1 
X X X 
Tried best target 
Age 2 
X X X 
Tried best target 
Age 3 










Ill target Age 1 X - - 
Ill target Age 2 X - - 
Ill target Age 3 - X - 
Smart target 
Age 1 
X X X 
Smart target 
Age 2 
X X X 
Smart target 
Age 3 
X X X 
Tried best target 
Age 1 
- - X 
Tried best target 
Age 2 
X X X 
Tried best target 
Age 3 










Ill target Age 1 - - - 
Ill target Age 2 - - X 
Ill target Age 3 - - X 
Smart target 
Age 1 
- - X 
Smart target 
Age 2 
- - X 
Smart target 
Age 3 
- - X 
Tried best target 
Age 1 
X - - 
Tried best target 
Age 2 
X - - 













       Overall the results largely support the initial predictions. Older children were shown 
to favour the smart target more than did the other two age groups and allocated the ill target 
the least compared with other age groups. Given that the scenario mentioned that the ill target 
did not do as much work as the other targets, this result was expected. Not only have older 
children been shown to prefer using equity reasoning when dealing with distributive justice 
scenarios (Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991), meaning the ill target would get less because they 
did less work, they also have a tendency to focus more on socio-conventional reasoning 
(Killen & Stangor, 2001). As the ill target did not benefit the group in any way and it was 
implied they did not do as much work as the other group members, socio-conventional 
reasoning, which focuses on social norms and rules of interaction, would deem their 
behaviour and therefore the ill target as undeserving.  
 In addition, the findings that older children focus more on individual merit (Killen, 
2007) explain the particular liking of the smart target in this scenario. Almas, Cappelen, 
Sorensen and Tungodden (2010) also found that with age, individual merit became 
increasingly important when considering fairness and older children were more able and 
likely to accept inequalities based on individual achievement. The middle age group 
demonstrated a strong preference for the target who tried best which does fit with socio-
conventional reasoning expected in older age groups as the target worked hard for the benefit 
of the group. 
 This finding however, does not fit entirely with the predominance of social-conventional 
reasoning, as it was implied that the quality of work produced by this target was not as good 






quality of work produced. The differences of preference in the two older age groups seems to 
demonstrate a change in their overall beliefs in that for younger children, trying one¶s best 
seems the most important factor but once older, ability becomes the main focus. This may be 
a consequence of the norms found in schools, where children are encouraged by teachers to 
do their best. Yet, as children get older and take more tests, it becomes apparent that trying 
your best does not get as good a grade as being clever. Therefore a clever person may be 
viewed as more useful for the group than an effortful one.  
In line with predictions, young children did favour the ill target more than the other age 
groups. Although overall, the ill target was still liked the least, this apparent preference for 
the ill target may demonstrate children in this age group attempting to be more equal in their 
distributive decisions. Fehr, Bernhard and Rockenbach (2008) found that children aged 
between 7- to 8-years predominately used egalitarian sharing preferring to give equal 
amounts of sweets to themselves and another child. Nucci (2001) noted the development of 
moral domain reasoning develops from a concern with harm to others with young children, a 
concern with equality during middle childhood and focuses on issues of equity for pre-
adolescent children.  
Given that overall the ill target was liked the least but that younger children were more 
likely to give them sweets it could be interpreted as an egalitarian preference as there was no 
reason (given the overall unpopularity of the ill target) to give the ill target more sweets 
unless children were attempting to be equal. Although young children are able to make 
decisions based on socio-conventional reasoning (Smetana, 2006) they are more able to make 
these types of reasoning in familiar situations than unfamiliar situations and are not able to 






& Black, 1983; Smetana, 2006). It remains likely then that a fairness principle of equality 
ZDVXVHGLQ\RXQJFKLOGUHQ¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ 
In terms of groups versus individuals, groups were more likely to include and prefer the 
tried best target as predicted. There were no significant differences between individuals and 
groups, however, in terms of the rejection or preference of the smart target. It may be that 
when individually making decisions individual merit is more salient and so children choose 
the smart target both at the individual level and group level. In groups, however, trying hard 
to benefit others may be seen as more desirable and so preference for this target increases in 
group settings. The tried best target was significantly more likely to be rejected by 
individuals than groups but no differences were found for the smart target in terms of 
rejection by individuals and groups suggesting that in groups the preference for the smart 
target remains constant but trying hard becomes more important.  
 A limitation of the study is that there was not as much variability in individual 
preferences as had been hoped for. The current analysis conducted using the SDS has not 
been as fruitful as expected because of this issue. Although manipulating the groups by 
putting individuals together with different preferences was considered by the researcher, it 
was decided that it would not be practical given the constraints of working in a school 
environment. It may not have worked either, however, as there would not have been enough 
variability in the individual preferences to create the groups desired. To solve this problem, a 
different scenario should be used creating more compelling arguments for each target to 
ensure that individuals are more divergent in their preferences. Additionally, more sweets 
could be given to the children so that there would be more ways to share the sweets out. Due 
to this problem and the varying results from the SDS, these findings will not be discussed as 






Another problem with the study was that the sequence in which the sweets were given 
out was not recorded. As the number of sweets each target received was dependent on the 
number of sweets other targets were given, the order of sweet sharing may have been an 
interesting factor to measure. The order of sweet sharing may have also given further insight 
into the fairness preferences children were using. If the children for example gave two sweets 
to all targets and then chose which target to give the extra sweet to, it would imply children 
were more focused on equality reasoning. If however, children gave more sweets 
immediately to the smart target, it may suggest equity was the preferred method of 
distribution. For future studies, it is recommended that this is measured.  
 A further limitation of the study is that the children themselves were not involved in 
the scenario and so did not gain anything from the sweet distribution they chose. This may 
not reflect their actual behaviour in situations where distributive justice affects them directly. 
As the research was more focused on the group process however, it was not considered to be 
an important factor given the direction the research was going to take. Also, the children were 
all known to one another so other factors may be been in play that could not be controlled for. 
For example children have been shown to be selective as to who they choose to give them 
information (Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007). This would be a problem when 
attempting to predict the group processes taking place as what may initially appear to be a 
majority influence, may actually be children choosing to follow one child in particular who is 
viewed as a more capable peer, trusting them to be correct.  
Study 2: Intergroup context DQGFKLOGUHQ¶VUHVRXUFHDOORFDWLRQ 
 
Killen, Margie and Sinno (2006) argued for the importance of understanding how 






development and research into intergroup relations, research combining these two topics is 
still relatively new (Killen, 2007). When looking at society however, it is evident that 
although people support the idea of justice and equality for all, some groups are deemed 
µPRUHHTXDO¶WKDQRWKHUV.LOOHQHWal. use the example of the founding fathers of the United 
States of America who espoused the idea of a nation of equality, with rights for all members 
including liberty and the pursuit of happiness, whilst being slave owners.  
Moral reasoning development  
 Moral reasoning development initially argued that children develop moral reasoning 
through three broad stages (each made up of two sub-stages) which were preconventional, 
conventional and postconventional (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). At each stage children justify 
acts of right and wrong differently; first based on consequences to themselves, then in 
relation to group norms and finally using individual principles on how to treat others. 
However more recent research has suggested that these stages are redundant and that children 
as young as preschool age use reasoning containing each of these considerations (self, group 
norm and justice) (Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001). 
 Despite the idea that these develop simultaneously, there are still developmental 
patterns found in terms of the extent to which each is used and when. In straightforward 
scenarios such as excluding someone from joining a group because of their gender, children 
of all ages focus on moral reasoning (Killen & Stangor, 2001). When scenarios become more 
complex, and differing levels of individual merit are introduced, older children (12- to 13-
year-olds) are more likely to view exclusion as acceptable and give socio-conventional 
reasoning to explain their decision than younger age groups (6- to 7- years, 9- to 10-years, 
Killen & Stangor, 2001). This could suggest then, that older children are more likely to 






consider social conventional reasoning more so than younger children. Having more 
resources would be beneficial to their in-group and, although it can be considered a type of 
exclusion (Mulvey, Hitti, Rutland, Abrams, & Killen, 2014), older children may find it more 
acceptable to be biased in their allocations.  
Sharing behaviours 
When looking at the development of distributive justice and resource allocation in 
JHQHUDOZLWKDJHFKLOGUHQ¶VLQHTXDOLW\DYHUVLRQLQFUHDVHV)HKU%HUQKDUG	5RFNHQEDFK
2008), egalitarianism peaks at 8-years when altruistic motives take over (Fehr, Rutzler, & 
Sutter, 2011), an overall preference for fairness increases particularly between 7- and 18-
years (Harbaugh et al., 2003) and meritocratic fairness increases (Almas, Cappelen, Sorensen, 
& Tungodden, 2010). If given a scenario where meritocracy is made redundant (individual 
achievement is not included or relevant to the scenario), these findings would suggest 
children would be more likely to share equally as they get older, at least at an interpersonal 
level.  
Leman, Keller, Takezawa and Gummerum (2008) incorporated an intergroup scenario 
into their research paradigm. They involved children aged between 7- and 17-years in either a 
dictator game or ultimatum game and asked them to make a decision on how to share out 
money individually and then as part of a three person group. They found that the group 
GHFLVLRQVPLPLFNHGWKDWRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VGHFLVLRQVDOWKRXJKQRGLUHFWFRPSDULVRQVZHUH
made. The results demonstrated that between 8- and 10-years, there is a shift in distribution 
of resources, with children giving less as they age, due to a greater understanding of the 
strategy involved in each game and because of an appreciation of gender group membership. 






Due to restrictions in sample size, the paper did not look at the intergroup context of 
the decisions to see how sharing resources from one group to another would affect the 
GLVWULEXWLRQRIPRQH\7KHµRWKHU¶JURXSLQWKHVWXG\ZDVQRWPDQLSXODWHGHLWKHUVRDOWKRXJK
it was a different group, the out-group context was not highlighted. Additionally, the rules of 
each game restricted the way children distributed money and the paper was more focussed on 
the outcome these different games provided than any other variables. The paper does 
demonstrate however, that when self-interest is present, sharing actually decreases rather than 
increases with age. This may mean, given that children identify with their in-group (Bennett 
& Sani, 2008a, 2008b), that when they or their in-group stand to benefit from a decision, they 
will engage in more self-favouring resource allocation.  
Development of in-group bias 
According to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), people are motivated to 
belong to groups that are superior to others as this enhances their self-esteem. This can lead 
to individuals believing themselves to be similar to other members of their group and having 
more favourable opinions, attitudes and behaviours toward members of their own group. Out-
groups on the other hand are viewed as different from members of the in-JURXSDQGµOHVV
JRRG¶DQGLWLVWKURXJKWKHVHPHFKDQLVPVWKDWSUHMXGLFHDQGGLVFULPLQDWLRQFDQRFFXU7DMIHO
& Turner, 1979). The theory itself, however, did not concern the development of such in-
group biases and how they may affect children and their behaviour.  
 Bigler, Jones and Lobliner (1997) demonstrated the existence of in-group bias in 
children as young as 6-years with temporarily created groups (children were divided into two 
different teams for 4 weeks) with others reporting in-group bias in children as young as 5-
years (Nesdale, 2004). This suggests that children, like adults, are motivated to belong to a 






task, children may allocate more resources to an in-group member due to this in-group bias 
taking precedence over their inequality aversion.   
Vaughan, Tajfel and Williams (1981) conducted a resource allocation task looking at 
interpersonal and intergroup contexts. Children were asked to either give out money to 
PHPEHUVRIWKHµUHG¶JURXSDQGµEOXH¶JURXSWKHLUPHPEHUVKLSWRRQHEHLQJSUHYLRXVO\
GLVFORVHGRUWRVKDUHPRQH\EHWZHHQDIULHQGDQGDµQRWIULHQG¶7KH\IRXQGKLJKOHYHOVRI
in-group bias with no age (they tested 7- and 11-year-olds) or sex effects nor did the patterns 
change significantly depending on condition (intergroup or interpersonal). Their simple 
priming of group membership (using a minimal intergroup situation) was enough to produce 
the same level of favouritism shown when considering how to share sweets out to a friend 
and someone who was not a friend.   
Current study (Study 2) 
 
The purpose of the next study is to look at how different intergroup/interpersonal 
scenarios impact on the distributive justice of children (rather than inclusion/exclusion 
principles which are normally the focus) thus further bridging the gap between intergroup 
UHVHDUFKDQGGLVWULEXWLYHMXVWLFH9DXJKDQHWDO¶VVWXG\ZDVH[WHQGHGE\ORRNLQJDWKRZ
children would share sweets in different contexts; intergroup sharing (in-group/out-group 
pupil), intragroup sharing (themselves and in-group members), self-out-group sharing and 
interpersonal sharing (themselves and another person without group context).  
Intergroup scenarios were created by giving the children a short passage explaining 
µ3UHWHQGWKDWSXSLOVDUHSOD\LQJDJDPH6RPHSXSLOVZLOOSOD\WKHJDPHZLWKSHRSOHWKHLU
own age from their own school. Other pupils will play with people their age from a different 






yourself/ingroup or you can give it to another pupil from Orchard Park School/your own 
school. On the line next to each picture of sweets write an M if you want to give the bag to 
yourself or an O if yRXZDQWWRJLYHLWWRWKHSXSLOIURP2UFKDUG3DUNVFKRRO\RXUVFKRROµ,Q
the interpersonal condition, children were simply told pupils were playing a game and no 
outgroup was mentioned. Rather than using a real stigmatised group, an out-group of a 
different (imaginary) school was created so that all children tested would belong to the in-
group. Other studies have used similar minimal intergroup situation paradigms and have 
found it to work effectively (Vaughan et al., 1981; Bigler et al., 1997).  
Although studies have not found age differences in in-group bias (Bigler et al., 1997; 
Vaughan et al., 1981), given the differences in moral reasoning and the fact that the 
distribution of resources is considered a moral issue, age differences were expected. It was 
hypothesised that as children get older, they will be less likely to give sweets to another pupil 
(when they were part of the sharing scenario) or out-group member (in the intergroup sharing 
scenario) as their socio-conventional reasoning will take precedence and self-interest is 
involved. It is also predicted that significantly fewerVZHHWVZLOOEHJLYHQWRWKHµRWKHU¶SXSLO
(either interpersonally or intergroup) in any scenario containing an explicit out-group 





271 participants took part in this study with 100 year 2s (M= 6.28, SD= 0.45), 82 year 
5s (M= 9.30, SD= 0.46) and 106 year 8s (M= 12.61, SD= 0.50). In year 2 there were 56 males 






All participants were recruited from schools in the South East of England, Kent. Schools 
were contacted by letter or e-mail and then by phone. Follow up meetings were arranged to 
discuss the procedure and materials with senior staff (usually the Head teacher) and to 
arrange testing dates with the schools. The schools chose the Opt-Out method for gaining 
parental consent so a Loco Parentis  was signed by the Head teacher (or senior staff member 
in charge of liaising with the researchers)  
Design 
The experiment was a 4 (Condition: intergroup sharing, intragroup sharing, self-out-
group sharing, interpersonal sharing) x 3 (Age: Year 2, year 5, year 8) between subjects 
design. The dependent variable was the number of sweets given to each pupil in the scenario.  
Materials 
Participants were given a scenario on a piece of paper: µPretend that pupils are playing 
a game. Some pupils will play the game with X. Other pupils will play with people their age 
from Y. You have 5 bags of sweets and can give each bag of sweets to X or you can give it to 
Y. On the line next to each picture of sweets write a M (for Me/My school) if you want to 
give the bag to yourself or an O if you want to give it to X. Start at the top and work your way 
GRZQ¶7KHFRQWHQWVRIWKHVFHQDULRVZHUHFKDQJHGGHSHQGLQJRQWKHFRQGLWLRQVRWKDW;
either depicted themselves or an in-group member and Y depicted another pupil or an out-
group member. They were then given five pictures to sweets to write the letters against.  
 Procedure 
On the mornings of the experiment, the researcher met with the class teacher to 
discuss the procedure of the study. When the children arrived, they were introduced to the 
experimenter by the teacher and informed that the experimenter had been given permission 






were asked if they would be willing to take part in the study and they were told they could 
stop taking part and leave any time they wished. They were also told that their answers would 
remain a secret and that no one would be allowed to see them. Only children who agreed to 
take part in the study were spoken to. 
 The children were then either taken out of the classroom (the younger two years) or 
given a piece of paper with the scenario on, and instructed to fill in the form whilst remaining 
in class (the year 8 participants). The younger children were spoken to on a one-to-one basis 
with the researcher and talked through the scenario. They were then asked who they would 
like to give each of the sweets to and the experimenter filled in the answers for them. This 
was done to prevent any confounding issues with reading ability on the part of the children 
and to enable children to ask if they did not understand the scenario fully. Once completed, 
they were debriefed, given a sticker and certificate to thank them for their time and taken 
back to class. The older children were debriefed together as a class and given a chocolate for 
their participation. All children were given debrief letters to take home to their parents.  
Results 
 
The data were entered into SPSS and the dependent variable scored to represent the 
total number of sweets given to the out-group/other pupil. Data were analysed using an 
ANOVA with condition, gender and year group as independent variables. 
There was no main effect of gender F(1, 247)= .19, p= .66, but main effects of year 
group, F(2, 247)= 6.96, p<.005 and sweet condition F(3, 247)= 14.70, p< .001, were 
VLJQLILFDQW/RRNLQJDWWKHGHVFULSWLYHVWDWLVWLFVIRU\HDUJURXS\HDU¶VJDYHWKHOHDVWQXPEHU
of sweets with an average of 2.30, followed by year 2s with an average of 2.59 and year 5s 







sweets to otheUV¶RXW-JURXS¶WKDQERWK\HDUDQG\HDUFKLOGUHQVHH7DEOH 4.3 for pairwise 
comparisons). The results demonstrate that the eldest age group were the least likely to share 
sweets with an out-group/other, supporting the hypotheses but the most generous age group 
was year 5 rather than the youngest children, contrary to expectations.  
As the literature strongly suggests that children have an inequality aversion (Fehr et 
al., 2008), it was decided to test whether these scores were significantly different from 2.5, 
the average number of sweets if divided into two (therefore representing a different 
GLVWULEXWLRQRWKHUWKDQHTXDOLW\7KHRYHUDOOPHDQQXPEHURIVZHHWVVKDUHGWRµRWKHUV¶ZDV
compared to the average of 2.5 using a paired sample t-test. There was no significant 
difference between year 2 means and the equality mean suggesting that they may have tried 
to use equality when sharing out the sweets. However year 5 pupils gave significantly more 
sweets to others than equal t(64)= 4.64, p<.001 suggesting they did not share the sweets out 
equally. A marginally significant effect was found for year 8 pupils where they gave 
marginally fewer sweets to others than equal t(105)= -1.71, p= .09 again suggesting that a 
different form of sharing was used.  
Table 4.3 
Pairwise Comparisons of the Main Effect of Year Group on Sweet Distribution to 
Others/Out-group 
Year group (i) Year group (j) Mean difference 
(i-j) 
Significance Partial Eta 
squared 
5 2 0.36 p<.05 .05 
8 2 -0.29 p<.05 .05 
8 5 -0.65 p<.001 .05 
 
When looking at the pairwise comparisons for the main effect of condition, 






condition than in any other condition (including self-out-group sharing). The only other 
significant pairwise difference found in the data was between interpersonal sharing (no group 
scenario) and the self-out-group sharing condition where significantly more sweets were 
JLYHQWRWKHµRWKHU¶SXSLOLQWKHinterpersonal sharing condition than the self-out-group 
sharing condition (see Table 4.4 for pairwise comparisons). This is in line with expectations, 
when in an intergroup situation participants will give fewer sweets to an out-group member 
than themselves or an in-group member.  
Table 4.4 
Pairwise Comparisons of the Main Effect of Sweet Condition on Sweet Distribution to 
Others/Out-group 
Condition (i) Condition (j) Mean 
difference (i-j) 




























-0.50 p<.01 .15 
 
No interaction effects were found between year group and condition F(6, 247)= .95, 
p= .46 because, as can be seen from the Figure 4.7, the participants in each age group acted in 
a similar way across each condition. This was not expected as it was thought that older 













The purpose of the current study was to understand the effects of intergroup context 
on resource allocation. The findings support the first hypothesis that older children would be 
less likely to share out sweets to another pupil/out-group member. In the study, year 8 
children gave significantly fewer sweets than both year 5 and year 2 pupils. However, the 
gradual decline of sweet sharing (as children get older) was not supported as generosity 
peaked at year 5 with this age group giving significantly more sweets than both year 2 and 






 The results could reflect the peak of egalitarianism which other studies have 
suggested occurs around the age of 8 years (Fehr et al., 2011). Looking at the means 
however, year 5 shared on average 2.92 of their sweets to others which was significantly 
higher than the 2.5 expected if it was simply a peak in egalitarian sharing. In fact the only age 
group who shared less than equally was the eldest group (year 8) who only shared on average 
2.29 sweets to others (although this difference was only marginal). Likewise, if it was 
because of altruistic motives developing then it does not explain the drop in altruism as it is 
argued that this line of reasoning continues to increase with age (Fehr et al., 2011). 
 A potential methodological explanation might be that of self-presentation bias. 
Rutland, Cameron, Milne and McGeorge (2005) found that younger children (below 10 
years), when placed in high public self-focus conditions, inhibit their in-group bias more than 
compared to low public self-focus conditions. When children in year 5 (9-10 years) were 
asked to share out sweets to themselves/in-group and others/out-group, they may have acted 
in a more pro-social way because the experimenter was helping them fill in the questionnaire 
making it a more public decision. As the opportunity for them to share sweets equally was 
removed, they may have felt that the only other desirable option was to give more sweets to 
WKHµRWKHU¶SXSLO7KH\RXQJHVWDJHJURXSZKRDOVRUHFHLYHG help filling in the 
questionnaire) did not express this same bias with their sharing reflecting that of egalitarian 
principles instead, but as they have a preference for fairness (Harbaugh et al., 2003; Fehr et 
al., 2008) they may not have considered their answers socially undesirable as they tried as 
best they could to be as equal as possible within the confines of the experiment.  
Year 8 participants on the other hand filled in their questionnaires alone meaning they 
may have been freer to express more biased opinions than the other two age groups, hence 






conventional reasoning (Killen & Stangor, 2001) and previous studies using group based or 
self- interest scenarios have also seen a decline in sharing with age (Leman et al., 2008) this 
result does seem to reflect a psychological phenomenon rather than a methodological one.  
,WZDVDOVRSUHGLFWHGWKDWVLJQLILFDQWO\IHZHUVZHHWVZRXOGEHJLYHQWRWKHµRWKHU¶
pupil (either interpersonally or intergroup) in any scenario containing an explicit out-group 
member, rather than another in-group member or pupil with no group affiliation (intergroup 
sharing or self-out-group sharing conditions). This was also supported with the intergroup 
sharing FRQGLWLRQUHVXOWLQJLQVLJQLILFDQWO\IHZHUVZHHWVJLYHQWRWKHµRWKHU¶LQWKLVFDVHDQ
out-group member) than all other conditions. Significantly fewer sweets were also given to 
WKHµRWKHU¶LQWKHself-out-group sharing condition compared to the interpersonal sharing 
condition demonstrating again the negative impact of out-group categories on sharing 
behaviour.  
Interestingly however, there was no significant difference in sharing between 
intragroup sharing scenario and the self-out-group sharing scenario despite there being a 
difference between interpersonal sharing and self-out-group sharing. This could be due to the 
fact that both of the people receiving sweets in the intergroup context were in-group members 
so the distribution of sweets between them was irrelevant. What was of main focus for the 
children was that their group received more, meaning that their in-group bias, according to 
researchers present in children from the age of 5 (Nesdale, 2001), would have been satiated. 
A mediator in this relationship could have been group identification, with children who have 
low in-group identification (in this case their school), giving fewer sweets to the in-group 
pupil than themselves. As this result was not predicted however, a measure of in-group 
identification was not included as a measure which is something that will be considered in 






 It is unclear whether these results support a positive in-group bias effect or negative 
out-group bias effect (giving more sweets to the in-group because you like them more or 
fewer sweets to the out-group because you dislike them). Unfortunately it was not possible to 
distinguish between the two choices with the variables included in the current study. 
However, if the findings were due to a positive in-group bias, it would be expected that 
significantly fewer VZHHWVZHQWWRWKHµRWKHU¶SXSLOLQWKHinterpersonal sharing condition than 
the intragroup sharing pupil condition and that there would be no difference in the number of 
VZHHWVJLYHQWRWKHµRWKHU¶LQWKHself-out-group sharing and interpersonal sharing condition. 
 The results found seem to imply that an out-group bias was present in the sample 
leading them to exclude pupils from a different school by giving them fewer resources. 
Nesdale (2004) distinguishes between in-group bias and out-group bias in his Social Identity 
Development Theory (SIDT). Although applied to ethnic prejudice, it may reflect the 
development of any intergroup bias and certainly seems applicable here. Nesdale argues that 
in-group bias occurs once the child is able to categorise people based on group membership 
and that out-group bias is not an inevitable feature. Children simply prefer their own group 
and the focus of decisions in terms of distribution of resources for example, would solely 
focus on the benefits of the in-group with no real consideration of out-group disliking being 
present.  
 In the fourth stage of this theory, Ethnic prejudice, Nesdale argues that from the age 
of 7-years children begin to develop prejudiced thoughts and attitudes (but this does not occur 
for all children). It is at this stage that the out-group are not simply liked less than the in-
group but are actively disliked and hated because of their group membership. As it was 
initially applied to ethnic prejudice development, Nesdale argued that not all children develop 






other intergroup scenarios are considered, out-group dislike does develop as a matter of 
course. It may be because children are aware of the inappropriateness of ethnic prejudice 
(Rutland et al., 2005) whereas a dislike for children from other schools is not something 
society has particular rules about so all children develop an out-group dislike without fear of 
repercussion.  
 Some of the limitations of the study include the types of scenario used in the 
methodology. Children were simply asked to share pictures of sweets between two children 
meaning that there was no real resource allocation present. At no point were real sweets given 
to the child or promises made that the child would receive the sweets they gave to 
themselves. Had this been part of the experimental paradigm, there may have been a 
reduction in the number of sweets given to others, particularly by the year 5 sample. The 
results then, may have reflected more extreme in-group/self-interest principles as the child 
would have had a tangible reward for choosing this behaviour.  
Additionally, using sweets as the resource may have led to a certain set of results 
arising if compared to using a different resource. Sweets are not something that is needed in 
order to survive but rather seen as a luxury item. In real world scenarios, intergroup resource 
distribution is rarely so straightforward or concerns such unimportant resources. Things such 
as general wealth, food and access to public services and housing are the focus of dispute or 
inequality between groups and the simplistic scenarios presented to children here may not 
reflect such complex considerations. However, it is rare that children would be placed in such 
a position to have to reason about these situations or in fact have the cognitive ability to 
consider such complex scenarios. Looking at how children initially decide on their resource 
distribution may give clues as to the building blocks of these more complex decisions they 






Another issue with using sweets is that not all children like them. When testing, some 
children gave all their sweets away citing that as the reason and others said that they were not 
allowed sweets because they were bad for them. With an ever increasing focus on healthy 
eating and obesity, children may have less access to sweets or more negative opinions of 
them instilled in them by their parents. Future studies should focus on using other resources 
such as money (provided the scenario is mathematically simplistic enough for young children 
to understand) or using the latest craze (such as Pokemon cards or Ben 10 stickers) in order to 





decision making on resource allocation tasks. Taken together, the studies have demonstrated 
both intergroup and intragroup contexts can affect the ways in which children allocate 
resources. When put into groups, children prefer more socially beneficial behaviour over 
intrinsic ability suggesting that group contexts increase the salience or importance of this 
behaviour. Individuals on the other hand are less likely to include and prefer these individuals 
and more likely to reject them when making decisions alone. This would suggest a positive 
VKLIWLQFKLOGUHQ¶VGHFLVLRn making as intrinsic ability is not something others can control. 
Rejecting or failing to include or prefer children, in terms of resource allocation because of 
their lack of intrinsic ability, does seem to violate fairness principles or more moral 
considerations.  
Despite a seemingly positive effect of intragroup contexts on decision making, 






of resources in children overall and particularly for children in the eldest age group. 
Decisions in this task however were made alone rather than in groups so it would be 
interesting to see how intragroup processes could affect this type of decision making in 
intergroup contexts. Before the combination of intra- and intergroup processes is investigated 
further, it is important to continue to establish a clearer picture of the intragroup processes 
occurring first. The focus of this thesis in the following chapter therefore will be on 






























The purpose of the following study was to investigate how children would come to a final 
group decision when initial preferences differed using a different paradigm than the previous 
studies. Due to the methodological issues highlighted in the previous chapter (and again 
briefly below), a new task was designed not only to improve on these limitations, but also to 
investigate decision making in a new context which could be directly compared to studies in 
adult literature. Based on previous research by Frings, Hopthrow, Abrams and Julbert (2008), 
a cumulative estimation task was used to investigate what decision rules children used to 
come to a group decision and whether the rules used changed with age.  
 The key findings from Study 3 were that older children (12-13 years) were 
significantly more likely to use the mean when coming to a group decision compared to any 
other age group. Additionally, the youngest age group (6-7 years) were significantly more 
OLNHO\WRXVHDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VDQVZHUDVWKHILQDOJURXSGecision and the answer was chosen 
based on who they thought the most popular person in the group was, rather than the most 
LQWHOOLJHQW7KLVVWXG\GHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWJURXSVFHQDULRVGRKDYHDQLPSDFWRQFKLOGUHQ¶V










Given the problems in the previous study of trying to assess the decision rules that 
groups chose, a different methodology was used to look at this problem. A cumulative 
estimation task was thought to be a good method of looking at group decision rules because 
of the potential variability of the answers at the individual phase of testing. Therefore, unlike 
the previous study, it would be possible to distinguish between a mean and median rule for 
example because the initial pool of numbers would not be so restricted (as it was in Study 1). 
A cumulative estimation task requires participants to keep track of an amount (the exact 
nature of this can vary); in the study reported below, participants were asked to count the 
QXPEHURIWLPHVWKH\KHDUGWKHZRUGµWKH¶LQDVSRNHQSDVVDJH 
 The SDS models could not be used in Study 3 because the nature of the methodology 
prevents it. The SDS cannot be used for decisions that occur on a continuous scale such as 
cumulative estimation tasks (for more on the theory see Chapter 3, pp. 51). The Social 
Judgement Scheme (SJS; an extension of SDS) however is designed specifically for dealing 
with continuous dependent variables as it weights individual participants¶ answers in the 
group, depending on how far away their initial judgment is from the group mean; that is 
judgements in closer proximity (indicating more consensus) carry greater weight in 
determining the group decision. Using the SJS in the current study will add to the little 
research there is currently using this method within child populations.  
It is predicted that with age, children will be more likely to use the mean as they develop 
more mathematical understanding. Using the mean in mathematics is not introduced in 
schools in the UK until Key Stage 2 which is the curriculum taught in UK schools for 
children aged 7- to 11-years. Therefore, the youngest children in the experiment (who are 5- 
to 6-year-olds) may not have the ability or knowledge needed to conduct the averaging of 






outlying answers will be more obvious at this age than at other ages. Working memory, 
which involves our ability to store information while simultaneously completing a task, is 
needed in order to complete the task in the following experiment as children will need to 
VWRUHWKHQXPEHURIµWKH¶ZRUGVWKH\KDYHKHDUGDOUHDG\ZKLOVWDOVROLVWHning out for more.  
Research into working memory has found that children have a limited capacity and 
that this capacity increases with age, alongside other developments and changes in brain 
activity and memory strategy (Towse, Hitch, & Hutton, 1998; Klingberg, Forssberg, & 
Westerberg, 2002). Therefore, it is thought that younger children will find this task harder 
than older children and are more likely to guess their initial answers rather than having a 
more accurate estimate. This would mean that their initial answers will have a greater range 
and be less reliable than those given by children who are better able at the task.  




252 participants took part in the study with 99 year 2s (M= 6.28, SD= 0.45), 58 year 
5s (M= 9.29, SD= 0.46) and 95 year 8s (M= 12.61, SD= 0.49). Overall 147 males and 105 
females participated and within year 2, 55 males and 44 females participated, in year 5, 37 
male and 21 female participants and in year 8, 55 males and 40 females took part. 
Participants were recruited from several schools (both Primary and Secondary) in the South 
East of England, Kent. Schools were initially contacted by letter or e-mail and then contacted 
by phone. Meetings were made with the Head teacher (or Deputy Head/ Head of Years where 






researcher were given informed consent letters to hand out to parents. All schools chose to 
Opt-Out so Loco Parentis forms were signed by the Head teacher for those students who did 
not return their letter. The testing for this experiment took a year in order to get the sample 
size required as due to the nature of the study, some schools refused to take part or simply did 
not have the space to accommodate the research.  
Design 
The study employed a 3 (age: 6- to 7-years, 9- to 10-years, 13- to 14-years) x 2 
(context: individual decision or group decision) design with context being a within subjects 
YDULDEOHDQGDJHDEHWZHHQVXEMHFWVYDULDEOH7KHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHZDVWKHQXPEHURIµWKH¶




choice of two which were all pilot tested on other children for their difficulty. On the basis of 
the pilot study, this story was chosen as the most straightforward and the length varied 
slightly for the different age groups to prevent them from giving up because the task was too 
hard and to avoid ceiling effects because the task was too easy.  
A questionnaire was also given to the children to assess their opinions on other 
members of their group, their social theory of mind and their categorisation ability. The three 
questions relating to other group members asked the child to rank the group members on 
µZKRZRXOGJHWWKHKLJKHVWVFRUHLQDWHVW¶µZKRKDVWKHPRVWIULHQGV¶DQGµZKRLVWKHPRVW
OLNHG¶7KH\ZHUHDVNHGWRSXWLQRUGHUWKHILUVWJURXSPHPEHUVQRWLQFOXGLQJWKHPVHOYHV






at anything, but this information could be gained by the experimenter by looking at the name 
of the child that was not listed.  
Procedure 
The class was arranged into same sex groups of 5 and seated at tables by the teacher 
who was instructed to place students together at random. Participants were introduced to the 
experimenter by the classroom teacher. The experimenter requested verbal informed consent 
from pupils to participate once the basic tasks of the experiment were explained. Once verbal 
consent was given, the researcher proceeded to explain in detail the nature of the vigilance 
WDVNJLYLQJDOOSXSLOVWKHVDPHLQVWUXFWLRQVµ,ZLOOVKRUWO\EHUHDGLQJDQHZVVWRU\:KLOVW
reading this story, I would like you to count the number of times you hear me say the word 
µWKH¶:KHQ,KDYHILQLVKHGUHDGLQJZULWHGRZQRQWKHSLHFHRISDSHULQIURQWRI\RXKRZ
PDQ\WLPHV\RXWKLQNWKHZRUGµWKH¶ZDVVDLG<RXDUHQRWDOORZHGWRFRXQWRQ\RXUILQJHUV
or write anything down. If you are not sure of the answer, then put down your best guess. It is 
important that this part of the task is your own work. Please keep your answers secret and do 
QRWFRS\DQ\RQHHOVH¶V¶ 
They were then given two practise examples to ensure all participants understood the 
WDVN7KHILUVWZDVµWKHTXHHQDWHWKHDSSOH¶DQGWKHQµWKHSULQFHVVDQGWKHIURJLVDSRSXODU
FKLOGUHQ¶VVWRU\7KHSULQFHVVNLVVHVWKHIURJDQGWKHIURJWXUQVLQWRDSULQFH¶7KHVH
examples were done as a class and when the right answer was given by students, the 
experimenter went on to read the news extract. This extract was slightly different in length 
depending on age group to ensure that no children gave up because the task was too difficult.  
 Once the news story had finished, the experimenter raised her hand to signal the end 
and the pupils were asked to right down the number they had. Once this was completed the 






come to a group decision on what the answer was, using their initial guesses. Unlike previous 
studies in this thesis, the group part of the experiment was conducted with the whole class at 
the same time, so research assistants were used to help keep the groups on track and the class 
generally under control. They were given 2 minutes to come to a decision and during this 
time the experimenter and research assistants went around the classroom and ensured that the 
children were on task and collected the individual and group answers once a final decision 
had been made. Research assistants were instructed to give no advice as to how the children 
should come to a decision and for groups who had trouble reaching a final answer, time 
pressure was used and they were told that they only had one more minute to decide before 
their answers were collected. 
The next part of the study involved the children filling in the questionnaire. This was 
either done by themselves (for the oldest age group) immediately after the experiment or 
conducted one-on-one with the experimenter in another room in the school who wrote their 
answers down for them. Once the questionnaire was completed, the children were debriefed, 
thanked and given a sticker and certificate (or a chocolate bar for the older age group) and a 





The individual and group answers for the vigilance task were entered into an excel 
spreadsheet (as used in Frings, Hopthrow, Abrams, & Hulbert, 2008) which computed the 
mean and median of the individual group members¶ answers, to create an expected variable if 






statistics from the data). The SJS was also calculated using this spreadsheet, using the 
formula as described in Chapter 3 (pp.54-55). This then weights the answers of each 
individual in the group, depending on how far away their initial guess is from the group 
mean.  
Once these variables were calculated (mean group, median group, SJS group) they 
were then put into a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test calculator to determine if any of these 
variables differed significantly from the observed data collected. The KS calculator provides 
the value D which is maximum vertical difference between the two variables when plotted on 
a cumulative fraction plot.  If there is no difference between the observed data and one of 
these variables, we can use this information to gain an insight into how the groups came to 
their overall group decision. The KS test is advantageous as it does not make any 
assumptions about the distribution of the data unlike other more conventional tests such as 
the t-test. 
Table 5.1 
Descriptive Statistics Showing Mean Guesses and Standard Deviations by Age Group 
Year Group Mean Standard Deviation Range 
Year 2    
Individual 16.76 20.34 99 
Group 16.44 15.41 73 
Year 5    
Individual  17.04 4.92 27 
Group 17.79 2.71 10 
Year 8    
Individual 19.96 5.57 41 
Group 20.53 3.78 14 
 
Overall Data 
First, the KS test was conducted on the dataset as a whole comparing the observed 
group variable (actual group answers) to the mean group variable. The variables did not differ 






between the two variable scores, was 0.10. Similar findings were found for both the SJS 
(D=0.16, p=.52) and the median (D=0.12, p=.85) suggesting that all models provided a good 
fit of the data (see Figure 5.1). This meant it was not possible to determine which rules the 



















It was decided to try and distinguish between these models (mean, median and SJS) to 
see if one fitted the data significantly better than the others. In order to achieve this, bivariate 
correlations were conducted between the observed data and each of the three variables (see 
Table 5.2 for r values for each correlation). These correlations were then entered into a 
spreadsheet using t-tests (Steiger, 1980) to calculate if there was a significant difference 
between the correlation coefficients (thus suggesting that one variable provided a closer fit 
than the others). This produced the dependent correlation coefficient (dependent because the 
variables were all developed using the same data set) with a significance value (to see t-test 
results see Table 5.2). As the table demonstrates, the SJS was significantly more highly 
correlated with the actual decision than were either the mean and median variables, 
suggesting SJS was the rule the groups used when coming to their decision.  
 
Year 2 data 
Following the same procedures as described above the KS was conducted on the year 
2 data only. Again as the table demonstrates, all variables were not significantly different 
from the observed data so the dependent correlation coefficients were compared to each other 
to see if one was significantly better than the others. It was shown that for this year group, the 
SJS was significantly more correlated than the mean and median variables. This shows that 







Table depicting the K-S statistic results, the t-tests involved in the dependent correlation coefficient and the correlations between each model 
and the observed data both overall and within age 
 K-S statistic Dependent correlation coefficient r 
 




























.93** .65** .47* .75** .42** .59** 










t(16)=0.88,p=.39 .95** .62** .46* .75** .49** .59** 













.70** .59* .51 .79** .49 .67* 













.79** .90** .84** .95** .98** .96** 
 
** Significant at .01 






Year 5 data 
For this age group, the KS demonstrated that all variables (mean, median and SJS) 
were not significantly different from the observed data. However, unlike the year 2s, the 
correlation coefficients were not found to be significantly different from each other either. 
This means, then, that all 3 decision rules fit the data equally well. 
Year 8 data 
For this age group, the KS demonstrated that all variables were not significantly 
different from the observed data. However, as can be seen in the dependent correlation 
coefficients, the mean variable was significantly more correlated than the SJS and the 
median. This suggests that for this age group, the mean fit the data better than other models. 
Hierarchical Linear Modelling was not used for this study as no variance was 
expected between individual and group answers as the answers given by the group should 
reflect some averaging of the individual guesses. Additionally, as all age groups were given 
the same task and their aim was to get a correct answer, little variance was expected at the 
group level. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted which confirmed this. 
Participants¶ individual and group decisions were entered as the within subjects (repeated 
measures) variable and year group as the between subjects variable. Results showed that there 
was no significant difference between individual/group decisions F(1, 45)= .12, p= .73 or of 
age group F(2, 45)= .97, p= .39.  
Individual Variables 
During the experiment individuals were asked to rate other group members on how 
smart they were, how liked they were and how many friends they had. This meant that for 
each participant, there were four ratings of these variables from their fellow group members. 






created by adding all the scores given to the participant by the rest of their group. The 
variables µperceived liking¶ and µnumber of friends estimate¶ were correlated r= .70, p< .01 
and were both used to get a sense of each participants¶ popularity, so the two variables were 
collapsed (added together and the mean taken) into one variable of overall popularity. Overall 
perceived popularity and perceived intelligence variables only correlated r=.22, p<.01 so 
were kept separate in the remaining analyses.  
7RH[DPLQHZKHWKHUDJURXSPHPEHU¶VRYHUDOOSHUFHLYHGSRSXODULW\RUSHUFHLYHG
intelligence gave them more influence in the group, an additional dichotomous variable was 
FUHDWHGWKLVYDULDEOHPHDVXUHGZKHWKHUWKHJURXS¶s final answer matched that of the 
individuals (a score of 0= no and a score of 1= yes). This was then entered into a logistic 
regression along with overall perceived popularity, perceived intelligence and age to examine 
whether any of these variables predLFWHGZKHWKHURUQRWWKHJURXSFKRVHDSDUWLFLSDQW¶V
individual answer as the final group decision.  
 Overall model fit in logistical regression is conducted using a chi-square test. This test 
assesses the difference between the null model (the model that includes only the constant) 
and the model containing one or more predictor variables. The chi-square examines the 
improvement of the models¶ ability to describe the data once you add predictors into the 
model. The model for the analysis was significant with a chi-square value of 2(4, 
N=255)=10.06, p< .05. The Nagelkerke R2 = .059 meaning that the model significantly 
predicted 5% of the variance in the data. Looking at the odds ratios, overall perceived 
popularity was not a significant predictor overall of whether the group chose the same answer 
as the individual Exp(B)=1.05, p= .369.  The perceived intelligence variable was also not a 
significant predictor overall Exp(B)= 1.08, p= .12. Year group overall was a marginally 






that being in year 2 (compared to year 8), increases the odds of a group agreeing with an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VLQLWLDODQVZHUE\([S% S7KHFRPSDULVRQEHWZHHQ\HDUDQG\HDU
8 however proved non-significant. In order to compare year 2 and year 5, another analysis 
was conducted with year 2 as the reference group. When looking at year 5 compared to year 
2, results demonstrated that being in year 5 significantly decreased the likelihood of the group 
DJUHHLQJZLWKDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VDQVZHU([S% p= .05. The results show overall that 
participants in year 2 were significantly more likely when in groups to choose an individual 
JURXSPHPEHU¶VRULJLQDODQVZHUDVWKHILQDOJURXSGHFLVLRQ 
 $V\HDUFKLOGUHQZHUHVLJQLILFDQWO\PRUHOLNHO\WRFRS\DQLQGLYLGXDO¶VLQLWLal 
judgment as the final group answer than any other age group, another logistic regression was 
conducted separately on each year group, to see if there were any significant predictors in 
year 2 that were being missed due to noise in the data from the other two year groups. Year 2 
was the only model that was significant 2(2, N= 95)= 8.43, p< .05 with Nagelkerke R2= .12 
which means the model significantly explained the 12% of the variance seen in the dependent 
variable. Looking at the odds ratios, the perceived intelligence variable did not significantly 
predict whether the group chose the individual¶s initial answer Exp(B)= 1.00, p= .98, 
however participants¶ overall perceived popularity scores did Exp(B)= 1.39, p< .01. The 
results suggest then, that in \HDUIRUHYHU\LQFUHDVHLQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSRSXODULW\VFRUHWKH
group are significantly more likely to copy their initial guess by 1.39 (39% more likely to do 
so).  
Vigilance in groups 
To see how accurate (vigilant) participants had been, their individual and group 
answers were subtracted from the correct answer (how many times they reported the word 






underestimates and overestimates demonstrate poor vigilance on the part of the participant 
both types of deviation from the correct answer are of interest. However leaving the variables 
in their natural state may mean the null is wrongly rejected as an underestimation of 3 could 
be seen as cancelling out an overestimation of +3. Absolute error considers the amount 
of deviation from the correct answer without considering the direction (over- or 
underestimation) therefore removing this problem and reducing the risk of type II 
error. Therefore an absolute error score was computed, both for individuals and for the group 
aggregate. 
The data file was split by group number, using the aggregate function in SPSS. Year 
group, individual answers, group answers, absolute error group variable, absolute error 
individual variable and correct answer were aggregated. The remaining analyses were 
conducted on the newly aggregated data file. 
                A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted comparing the absolute error for 
individuals and the absolute error for groups. An ANOVA was used rather than a t-
test because the GLM output for ANOVA provides an estimate of effect (using partial eta 
squared). There was a significant difference between individual and group error levels F(1, 
51)= 5.87, p< .05, partial eta squared= .10. The absolute error for individuals was 
significantly higher (M= 8.89, SE= .86) than the absolute error for groups (M= 6.92, SE= 
1.18). This suggests that groups converged to a less erroneous estimate than had been 
provided by individuals, on aggregate. 
                Analyses were then conducted on each year group separately. When analysing the 
data this way, the only significant difference between individual absolute error and group 
absolute error was found in year 8 participants F(1, 18)= 5.75, p< .05, partial eta squared= 






found in the other age groups suggests that being in a group did not significantly improve 
levels of vigilance for those participants. 
 Discussion 
 
The aim of this study was to investigate the methods that children use to come to 
group decisions when individual group members¶ answers are different. As predicted, there 
was an increasing use of the mean, with children in the oldest age group (year 8) being 
significantly more likely to use the mean than SJS or median decision rules. When looking at 
the data set, the range of individual answers in year 8 was much smaller at 41 than the range 
RILQGLYLGXDODQVZHUVLQWKH\RXQJHVWDJHJURXSDW7KLVPD\PHDQWKDW6-6ZDVQ¶WXVHG
because outlying answers were less obvious in the year 8 sample compared to the year 2 
sample however the range in year 8 answers is still quite sizable.  
 By approximating to the mean, older children could be trying to account for outlying 
positions in individual guesses. Rather than excluding answers that seem inaccurate 
(therefore using SJS), they seem tREHLQFRUSRUDWLQJHYHU\RQH¶VDQVZHUVLQWRWKHILQDOJURXS
decision. This may be because of social factors as previous studies have shown that older 
children have a need to be correct (Hoving, Hamm, & Galvin, 1969) when giving answers, 
especially in ambiguous tasks. If they were guided by a need to be correct, this would suggest 
that the older children would exclude outlying answers rather than attempting to include 
them. However the conflict surround the needing to be correct and needing peer approval 
have been well documented in conformity literature (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Haun & 
Tomasello, 2011) and it would appear that in this sample, the need of peer approval or other 






 &KLOGUHQ¶VFRQFHUQVabout peer group acceptance increase during middle childhood 
(Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 1998) and the amount of time spent with peers continues to 
increase from middle childhood into adolescence (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 1998). 
Csikszentmihalyi and Larson (1984) found that adolescents spend approximately one third of 
their time with their peers and only 13% of their time with parents or other adults. The 
increase in contact with their own peer group may make older children, such as the year 8s in 
this sample, more concerned with peer relationships. This increased focus in their 
relationships may make older children prone to using methods such as the mean when 
attempting to come to a final group decision so as to preserve standing friendships and peer 
approval.  
*LYHQWKDW\HDUFKLOGUHQZHUHVLJQLILFDQWO\PRUHOLNHO\WRXVHDQLQGLYLGXDO¶V
answer as the final group decision and the likelihood of selecting an individual answer was 
predicted by how popular the child was, it suggests that children at this age are being 
influenced by normative concerns. This is surprising especially given that the children were 
told in the instructions of the study that they needed to be accurate in their guessing. Previous 
research has demonstrated that children are preoccupied with conforming to those who are 
likely to help them give a correct answer (Corriveau, Fusaro & Harris, 2009; Pasquini, 
Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007).  
 +XDQDQG7RPDVHOOR¶VUHVHDUFKGRHVVXJJHVWFKLOGUHQZLOOFRQIRUPIRUVRFLDO
reasons however. In an adaptation of the Asch paradigm they manipulated the level of 
privacy across trials and asked children to judge the relative size of pictures of animals. They 
found that when answers had to be shared publicly, there was a drop in accuracy as children 
were more likely to give the wrong answer in line with an incorrect majority. Given that the 






have overridden the desire to be correct leading to children copying the more popular group 
member but only in the youngest age group.  
A potential problem with the study is the small sample size of year 5 participants. Due 
to time constraints, it was not possible to get more participants of this age which could be the 
reason behind a lack of significant difference between the correlation coefficients. Thus, in 
this study, it is not possible to distinguish between the different decision rules the groups may 
have used at this age. This is unfortunate as it prevents a clearer developmental picture of the 
decision rules that children use and if a replication was to be made, this would be something 
that would need to be examined.  
 Additionally, it is not possible to tell whether children in year 2 excluded group 
members completely when their guesses were considered outliers or whether those children 
were included in the group discussion but their guess rejected. Further studies should record 
group discussion in an attempt to look at how children attempt to deal socially with the 
problem of outlying answers. Having a group member with a perceived incorrect answer is an 
interesting problem for children to have to deal with. Whether they ignore the individual or 
make attempts to include them within the discussion but disregard their guess when making a 
final decision would give us insight into how children handle differences within groups and 
whether this changes with age.  
 So far in this thesis, different types of decision making have been considered along 
ZLWKKRZLQWUDJURXSDQGLQWHUJURXSVHWWLQJVLPSDFWRQFKLOGUHQ¶VGHFLVLRQV:KLOVWWKHUHLV
more work to be done in this area, a different intragroup process will be looked at for the 
remainder of the thesis. The next part of the thesis focuses in particular on the productivity of 
brainstorming groups first reviewing the literature and then presenting two empirical studies 










Applying brainstorming theory to child populations 
 
Overview  
This chapter will review the brainstorming literature and discuss some developmental 
theories that may account for the way children work in groups on this task. The 
Brainstorming literature recently has focussed on specific ways of improving adult 
performance, cognitive aspects of brainstorming and the purpose of brainstorming; the 
selection of a good idea from the pool generated (Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2006). As 
there is no literature on children and brainstorming groups, it was felt that the focus of the 
literature review should be on the problems found within adult groups and whether these 
could be accounted for by developmental factors in children. Therefore, some of this recent 
research will not be considered in this chapter.  
Initial findings with adult participants 
Osborn (1957) was the first researcher to propose the idea of brainstorming; the 
generation of ideas in groups with the aim being to produce as many ideas as possible (Paulus 
& Dzindolet, 1993). He believed that working in a group to solve a problem would lead not 
only to a greater number of ideas but also a higher quality. In order for brainstorming groups 
to be successful, Osborn (1957) argued that certain instructions should be given to enable the 






say any ideas that come to mind (the wilder the better), quantity over quality of ideas is 
important and combine/elaborate on previous ideas to make new ones. Osborn believed that 
brainstorming in groups would double the number of ideas created against using other 
methods.  
 Brainstorming has been found to generate more ideas than other strategies not 
involving brainstorming (Bartis, Szymanski & Harkins, 1988) but its success may be limited. 
Taylor, Berry and Block (1958) were the first to empiricalO\WHVW2VERUQ¶VWKHRU\WKDWJURXSV
would facilitate brainstorming performance. They asked participants to brainstorm 
individually or in 4-person groups and created nominal groups (combining 4 individuals ideas 
together and removing any repeated ideas) to compare the performance against. They 
believed that nominal group scores acted as a baseline measure for the number of ideas a 
group would come up with if group interaction neither facilitated nor inhibited performance. 
&RQWUDU\WR2VERUQ¶VSUHGLFWLRQVWhey found that nominal groups outperformed real groups, 
coming up with nearly twice as many ideas.  
 Since this study, several others have replicated the findings that nominal groups 
produce more ideas than interactive groups (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Mullen, Johnson, & 
Salas, 1991; Paulus, Dzindolet, Poletes, & Camacho, 1993) and also, developing on from this 
point, that nominal groups produce ideas of a higher quality than interacting groups (for a 
review see Lamm & Trommsdorff, 1973). Since these results have been replicated, research 
has focussed on trying to find the reasons for this productivity loss in interactive groups. It is 
unlikely that interactive groups run out of ideas as they only come up with about half the 
ideas nominal groups think of. One of the problems may be that groups feel they have 
generated a sufficient number of ideas and stop which is plausible given that groups rate their 






 Overall, three types of mechanisms have been identified in relation to the poor 
performance of interacting groups in brainstorming tasks (Camacho & Paulus, 1995).  
Economic mechanisms focus on social loafing (the idea that people make less effort when 
working together than they do working alone) and free-riding  (not working hard because one 
can benefit from the work others do) as explanations for poor group performance. Social 
psychological mechanisms include issues that arise due to the presence of other group 
members such as arousal and evaluation apprehension (the concern that other group members 
will make negative judgements about the ideas shared). Procedural mechanisms are aspects 
of procedure that interfere with information pooling. Most relevant of these is production 
blocking which inFOXGHVKDYLQJWRZDLWRQH¶VWXUQEHIRUHVSHDNLQJDQGWU\LQJWRJHQHUDWH
ideas whilst others are talking.  
Economic mechanisms 
 Economic mechanisms such as free riding and social loafing may arise in 
brainstorming groups as the focus of the task is on the gURXS¶VJHQHUDWLRQRILGHDVPHDQLQJ
that individual performances are less noticeable, reducing individual accountability (Paulus, 
Dzindolet, Poletes, & Camacho, 1993). There may be a tendency to allow other group 
members to come up with the bulk of the grouS¶VLGHDVDQGVWXGLHVKDYHVKRZQWKDWZKHQ
group members are made accountable, their performance does increase (Borgatta & Bales, 
1953). This is supported by Harkins and Petty (1982), who found that increasing the 
indispensability of participants increased their productivity. They told participants that they 
were the only ones brainstorming on a certain task with the rest of the group working on 
something different, or that all group members were working together on the same problem. 
Those participants who thought they were working on a unique component produced more 
ideas than participants who thought they were working on the same problem with the rest of 






 Harkins and Petty (1982) did not compare this performance increase to nominal 
groups meaning that their study does not directly test free riding. Paulus and Dzindolet 
(1993) argue that free riding alone is not sufficient in explaining the discrepancy between 
interacting and nominal groups, an argument supported by the meta-analysis conducted by 
Mullen, Johnson and Salas (1991). These authors concluded that economic mechanisms 
lacked support overall arguing that given the nature of the tasks, with the experimenter and 
other group members being present, social loafing was unlikely to occur (Harkins & Jackson, 
1985). Social loafing tends not to occur when individuals can be identified with their ideas 
(Williams, Harkins, & Latane, 1981) so it seems unlikely to occur in interactive 
brainstorming groups as all members can both see and hear one another.  
Social mechanisms: Social Facilitation 
 Social mechanisms that influence interacting brainstorming groups have been argued 
to have both positive and negative effects. Zajonc (1965) argued that the mere presence of 
others increases levels of arousal and drive in individuals. This arousal can lead to an 
enhanced performance on simple, well learned tasks but can impair performance on complex 
and novel tasks (Zajonc, 1980). Harkins (1987) demonstrated this effect in brainstormers, 
finding that when others are present and acting as independent coactors, participants 
generated more ideas than when they were alone.  
 Street (1974) however, working from the same premise as Harkins, compared groups 
of individuals working in the same room and individuals working alone on a brainstorming 
task but found no difference between individuals working alone and in the same room. 
Indeed Street argued that one of the reasons that interacting groups may underperform 
compared to their nominal counterparts is because brainstorming is an unusual task with 






have suggested that the effect of the presence of others, is actually quite weak (Bond & Titus, 
1983) and so may not be a major part of the explanation into productivity loss found in 
interacting brainstorming groups. 
 
Social mechanisms: Evaluation apprehension   
Evaluation apprehension is another social mechanism that has received a lot more 
attention than other social mechanisms. Mullen, Johnson and Salas (1991) found that 
productivity loss (in terms of number of ideas) increased, therefore reducing the number of 
ideas shared when the experimenter was present, the contributions were tape recorded and 
when individuals in nominal groups performed in the same room together rather than alone. 
This apparent concern at the presence of others and its detrimental effect on idea generation 
lends strong support to evaluation apprehension being a factor in brainstorming groups.  The 
basic assumption of evaluation apprehension is that group members may experience anxiety 
over potentially being negatively evaluated by other members of the group for their ideas 
(Paulus, Larey, Putman, Leggett, & Roland, 1996). This anxiety can lead to group members 
withholding ideas or making it harder for them to think of ideas in the first place (Camacho & 
Paulus, 1995).  
 Colaros and Anderson (1960) demonstrated evaluation apprehension by manipulating 
the perceived expertise of other group members. Participants were either told that all group 
members were experts in brainstorming tasks, only one group member was an expert or 
group expertise was not mentioned at all. They found that performance was poorest in the all-
expert condition and strongest when expertise was not mentioned at all. Participants in both 
expert conditions also reported a greater reluctance to share ideas supporting the idea that 






 Not all research supports evaluation apprehension as Maginn and Harris (1980) found 
that telling participants they were being watched and rated on the quality of their ideas by 
three judges, did not influence individual brainstorming. Diehl and Stroebe (1987) however 
found that telling participants they would be judged in their ideas did influence productivity 
both in individual and group brainstorming conditions but only when individual performance 
comparisons were mentioned. These inconsistencies in research also reflect the debate on the 
importance of evaluation apprehension as an explanation of productivity loss in interactive 
groups with Diehl and Stroebe (1987) arguing that it is not enough of an explanation and 
Mullen, Johnson and Salas (1991) suggesting that it is the most important explanation of 
productivity loss. Although the importance of evaluation apprehension is debatable, it is 
important to note that it still does seem to play a part in interactive group brainstorming. 
Social mechanisms: Social comparison 
 Another socially based idea on brainstorming productivity loss comes from Paulus 
and Dzindolet (1993) and their social comparison theory. They suggested that group 
members adjust their performance to be similar to that of other group members they are 
working with. Factors such as production blocking (mentioned below), evaluation 
apprehension and social loafing are all initially present in the group interaction and ensure 
initial low levels of performance. These low levels are maintained, despite evaluation 
apprehension and blocking reducing with time during the interaction. The maintenance of this 
low performance level may be due to high performers initially matching their behaviour to 
low performers in the group as there is no incentive in brainstorming tasks for high individual 
performances. As their performance is similar to others they GRQ¶Wfeel uncertainty about how 
good their performance was because they can compare it to others- something individual 






 The authors tested their theory in the same paper and found that productive group 
members do match down their level of behaviour as the brainstorming session continues. 
Camacho and Paulus (1995) looked at interaction anxiety and found that it had a strong 
impact on the performance of interactive brainstorming groups. In low-anxious participants, 
there was no significant difference between interacting groups and nominal groups. When the 
groups were mixed with high and low-anxious participants together, they found evidence of 
performance matching: low anxious participants dropped their performance level until it 
more closely resembled that of high anxious participants. It may be that low anxious people 
do not feel pressure to perform well especially given that other group members¶ 
performances are not good. They may have also dropped performance noting their group 
members¶ high anxiety, in an attempt to keep pressure off of them. Whatever the 
interpretation of results however, it is clear that performance matching does occur.  
 Dugosh and Paulus (2005) also found that participants were more motivated to 
improve performance when told they were seeing a high number of ideas generated from 
another participant compared to ideas generated by a computer. This suggests that the theory 
of social comparison can be used to improve group performance, perhaps to a level matching 
the performance of nominal groups. 
People are motivated to match their level of performance to that of others (Seta, Seta 
& Donaldson, 1991). It would be expected then, that group members aim to produce a similar 
number of ideas as one another making interactive group members¶ performance more 
similar than that of nominal group members. In another study, Paulus and Dzindolet (1996) 
used participants in pairs and groups of 4 and demonstrated a greater similarity in the 
performance between interactive participants than nominal participants. They also looked at 






brainstorming session was similar to that in other sessions. In an attempt to use this 
comparison mechanism as an intervention, they informed interacting groups of the typical 
levels of performance nominal groups achieved. Interactive groups attained similar levels of 
performance accordingly in that condition. The studies demonstrate not only the influence 
others have on group members¶ performance but also introduced a new intervention for group 
brainstorming performance.  
Procedural mechanisms 
The last and most researched mechanisms are the procedural mechanisms and in 
particular production blocking. Lamm and Trommsdorff (1973) argued that the most 
important factor reducing productivity in interacting groups was production blocking; in 
particular the problem that only one person can speak at a time. They argued it was unlikely 
the problem was due to less speaking time as often interacting groups run out of ideas before 
the allocated time is up (see paper for a review of these studies). Ideas put forward to explain 
how production blocking works include participants forgetting their ideas or choosing not to 
say them as they sound too simLODUWRVRPHRQHHOVH¶VDQGOLVWHQLQJWRJURXSPHPEHUVLGHDV
distracting idea generation (Lamm & Trommsdorff, 1973).  
Bouchard and Hare (1970) attempted to test production blocking by increasing group 
size. Their reasoning was that in larger groups, there are more group members and so more 
things to listen to and longer to wait in between speaking turns. They found that as group size 
increased, the performance of interactive groups decreased which supported their argument. 
The study cannot be considered a direct measure of production blocking however, as 
increasing group size alone may have also impacted on other factors such as an increase in 






Diehl and Stroebe (1987, 1991) also supported the argument that production blocking 
was mostly responsible for the gap between interacting and nominal groups. They 
manipulated production blocking by controlling the speaking opportunities of participants 
and found that performance dropped significantly. The study demonstrated that by blocking 
VRPHRQH¶VDELOLW\WRH[SUHVVWKHLULGHDVWKHLUSHUIRUPDQFHGURSVEXWWKHVWXG\LWVHOIZDVYHU\
artificial. It only involved individual participants in controlled settings and not actual 
interacting groups so it cannot be considered a direct measure of production blocking. Paulus 
and Dzindolet (1993) also pointed out that production blocking cannot account for the impact 
of variables that influence group brainstorming without changing the nature of the 
interaction. Changing levels of evaluation and accountability for example do not change the 
group procedure but do affect group performance. Attempting to measure production 
blocking would require the procedure to be manipulated thus making it artificial.  
Researchers and corporations have put forward the idea of electronic brainstorming 
(EBS) as a way of overcoming the limitations of group brainstorming (Jessup & Valacich, 
1993). EBS involves getting individual group members to generate ideas on computers which 
are connected to a central processor. This then displays all the ideas typed on each 
individual¶s computer screen. It is believed to prevent production blocking as participants can 
share ideas as they have them rather than having to take turns (Dugosh & Paulus, 2005). EBS 
groups have been shown to outperform real interacting groups and also rate their experience 
positively and feel they have achieved a lot which is similar to real interacting groups 
(Gallupe, Bastianutti, & Cooper, 1991).  
Recent studies on brainstorming have begun to look at the possible cognitive factors 
involved in brainstorming. When someone says an idea, it may stimulate others to think of 






interactive brainstorming groups are not associated with increases in novel ideas relative to 
nominal groups (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987) it does not mean that this stimulation does not occur; 
it may be overridden by other factors.  
 
Cognitive aspects of brainstorming 
Dugosh, Paulus, Roland and Yang (2000) added a cognitive aspect to Paulus and 
Dzindolets (1993) social comparison model of brainstorming. In their new theory, not only 
GRJURXSPHPEHUVFRPSDUHHDFKRWKHU¶VSHUIRUPDQFHVDQGFRQYHUJHWRORZHUOHYHOVRI
performance but exposure to ideas can stimulate idea generation. Based on Associative 
Theories on cognition they argue that concepts and ideas are stored in an interconnected 
network of cognitive nodes called a semantic network (Dugosh, Paulus, Roland & Yang, 
2000). Concepts and ideas that are similar to one another have stronger connections than 
those that are different and when a particular node is activated, nodes surrounding it with a 
VWURQJFRQQHFWLRQWRLWDUHDOVRDFWLYDWHG7KLVZRXOGWKHQOHDGWRµWUDLQVRIWKRXJKW¶ZLWK
similar ideas being clustered together. This is a process called Spreading Activation 
(Anderson & Bower, 1973).  
 Brown, Tumeo, Larcy and Paulus (1998) posited that people generate ideas from the 
most accessible nodes first, followed by weaker nodes until they run out of ideas altogether. 
Exposure to others¶ ideas can stimulate idea generation as the ideas may make accessible 
other ideas that would not have otherwise been activated. Real groups then, should generate 
ideas they would not have had when alone. 
Connolly, Routhieaux and Schneider (1993) looked at the effects that being exposed 
to rare and common ideas had on participants¶ idea generation. If this cognitive theory was 






ideas than those exposed to common ones, as it would activate a whole range of ideas not 
previously accessible without this cue. They found no difference however, in idea generation 
between either condition or the control condition (where no ideas were shared) suggesting 
that idea exposure had no effect at all.  
A problem with the study however, is that participants were not told to attend to the 
ideas being shown, so their exposure to the ideas may have been limited. Dugosh, Paulus, 
Roland and Yang (2000) believed that attention was vital to the influence of idea exposure. 
They gave participants a recording of another brainstormer giving their ideas. They told some 
participants to memorise the ideas for a recall test later and told other participants nothing. 
After brainstorming themselves, participants told to memorise ideas generated significantly 
more ideas than participants who were simply exposed to ideas and the control (where no 
ideas were heard). The more ideas participants remembered in the recall test, the more ideas 
they managed to generate in their brainstorming session. This demonstrates the importance of 
attention and the impact of idea exposure on cognition.  
The results of this could also be explained however, by social comparison effects. 
Participants attending to the ideas would be more aware of the typical performance on the 
task by other brainstormers and so may have matched their performance accordingly. 
Another problem is that it is a very artificial manipulation of this effect as in typical group 
interactions, ideas but also irrelevant conversation is shared by group members.  
Production blocking the best explanation? 
Nijstad, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2003) maintained however, that it is production 
blocking that is the main cause for poorer performance rather than social comparisons. Citing 
a study by Gallupe, Cooper, Grise and Bastianutti (1994) they found that when groups 






productivity loss was found that was similar to that of verbally interacting groups. They argue 
that production blocking leads to productivity loss in two ways: the length of delays and 
predictability of delays. During a time delay (referring to the point in time a participant has 
the idea and to the time which they are given the opportunity to express it), ideas may 
become deactivated due to decay or the replacement of the idea with a new one. When this 
occurs, the idea lost cannot then be used to generate more ideas meaning that a new memory 
search for ideas is necessary. 
Additionally, the predictability of time delays causes problems. In order to think of 
ideas attention is required and therefore some cognitive capacity. When ideas have to be 
remembered it adds additional load to working memory meaning the process of coming up 
with new ideas is negatively affected. One of the biggest problems is that in groups there 
DUHQ¶WIL[HGWXUQWDNLQJRUVSHDNLQJSDWWHUQVDQGWKHVSHDNLQJWLPHYDULHVIURPSHUVRQWR
person. Monitoring turn taking and speaking time is another process requiring attention and 
thus placing working memory under additional load, leaving less capacity for new idea 
generation. They looked at their theory using 3 experiments designed to test different aspects 
of their overall model (named Search for Ideas in Associate Memory; SIAM) and found that 
productivity (in terms of number of ideas generated) decreases with longer delays and fewer 
clusterings of ideas demonstrating that participants¶ trains of thought get interrupted (Nijstad, 
Stroebe, & Lodewijkx, 2003).  
Despite all this evidence to the contrary, practitioners still continue to suggest that 
group brainstorming is effective in generating a high volume of ideas (Rickard, 1993).  
Paulus, Dzindolet, Poletes and Camacho (1993) looked at the problem of individuals 
overestimating group productivity. They asked participants to predict productivity on a 






As expected, participants thought they would come up with fewer ideas alone than in a group. 
They did estimate however, that they would generate more ideas alone than the number of 
ideas a four person group would generate divided by four. Most participants thought they 
would generate a better quality of ideas in groups than alone and participants perceived their 
performance as more favourable in interactive groups than alone despite the productivity 
losses present in the interactive group. Given the previous research on social comparisons of 
participants¶ own performance to that of group members, their favourable feedback may be 
due to participants being able to judge their performance against the average performance of 
others on the tasks. They conducted a third study to look at the impact of social information 
on participants¶ perceptions of their performance and found that participants were more 
positLYHDERXWWKHLURZQSHUIRUPDQFHZKHQJLYHQIHHGEDFNRQWKHLUSDLU¶VSHUIRUPDQFH 
Research into brainstorming has been quite comprehensive and newer directions on 
the topic have focussed not only on more cognitive aspects of brainstorming but also on the 
purpose of brainstorming; coming up with a good solution to a problem which would also 
involve idea selection (Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2006). Despite this, little is known of 
the development of these group processes that lead to productivity loss in interacting groups. 
Whilst researchers may expect that groups of children brainstormers fall foul of the same 
problems as adult populations, developmental literature suggests this may not necessarily be 
the case particularly for two key domains in productivity loss: production blocking and 
evaluation apprehension.  
Collaborative learning and production blocking in children  
Vygotsky (1978) was one of the first researchers to stress the importance of social 
LQWHUDFWLRQVIRUFKLOGUHQ¶VFRJQLWLYHJURZWK$OWKRXJKKLVZRUNZDVQRWNQRZQXQWLO






planes: the social plane and the psychological plane. It first occurs between children through 
interaction and dialogue and then within the child where the information is internalised and 
the child can reflect and think about the information they have received (Dillenbourg, Baker, 
Blaye, 	2¶0DOOH\9\JRWNV\DUJXHGWKDWFKLOGUHQOHDUQPRVWZKHQWDNLQJSDUW
in collaborative or cooperative dialogues with a more skilled person (be that a mother or 
more capable peer). The skilled person acts as a tutor, demonstrating to the child how to solve 
a problem. The child then internalises the information and uses it to guide their own 
performance later. Vygotsky (1978) labelled this the zone of proximal development which 
UHIHUVWRWKHGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQDFKLOG¶VFXUUHQt independent problem solving ability and the 
potential development the child could achieve via parental guidance or by working with a 
more capable peer.  
7KHWKHRU\VXJJHVWVWKHQWKDWLQWHUDFWLQJZLWKRWKHUVLVEHQHILFLDOIRUFKLOGUHQ¶V
cognitive growth ZKLFKPD\PHDQFKLOGUHQ¶VLQWHUDFWLYHJURXSSHUIRUPDQFHVLQ
brainstorming tasks may actually be better than that of nominal groups. Evidence supporting 
9\JRWVN\¶VWKHRU\FDQEHIRXQGE\ Wegerif, Mercer and Dawes (1999) who looked at the 
role of exploratory speaking (speaking style that emphasises joint reasoning) in groups of 
children. They found that just by training children to express themselves differently using 
language, their group reasoning scores improved which also impacted on their later 
individual scores. The study demonstrates the importance of language/dialogue and social 
UHDVRQLQJRQFKLOGUHQ¶VLQGLYLGXDOUHDVRQLQJGHYHORSPHQW 
Rumelhart and Norman (1978) suggested that through verbalising ideas, feedback 
from peers can be given which may highOLJKWYDULRXVSUREOHPVLQWKHFKLOG¶VRULJLQDO
solution. The highlighting of these shortcomings can lead to the child refining their 






that collaborating with peers undeUFHUWDLQFRQGLWLRQVFDQOHDGWRJDLQVLQFKLOGUHQ¶VSODQQLQJ
abilities. The theory and research suggest that, whereas adult literature on brainstorming 
highlights interaction as blocking production, this same interaction for the child facilitates 
their cognition.  
Other theories on collaborative learning, although different in the process by which it 
RFFXUVDOVRVXSSRUWWKHLGHDWKDWFROODERUDWLYHOHDUQLQJDLGVFKLOGUHQ¶VGHYHORSPHQW7KH
socio-constructivist approach, based on Piaget, suggests that conflict and coordination of 
points of view in interactions was important in collaborative learning (Dillenbourg, Baker, 
Blaye, 	2¶0DOOH\7KH\EHOLHYHGWKDWWKURXJKWKHVHLQWHUDFWLRQVFKLOGUHQEHFRPH
exposed to others¶ opinions and knowledge which allows them to develop and incorporate 
these new opinions and knowledge with their own (Doise, 1990).  
3HHULQWHUDFWLRQKDVEHHQVKRZQWROHDGWREHWWHUSHUIRUPDQFHVRQFKLOGUHQ¶VSRVW-tests 
than scores that are achieved by individual training (Doise & Mugny, 1984). It is thought that 
the conflict produced from children having different solutions to the same problem and a 
desire to remove this conflict, lead to an eventual resolution. Although Vygotsky (1962) 
stressed the importance of children working with more competent partners, Piaget (1932) did 
not believe that this mattered. Glachan and Light (1981) found that two children who initially 
had the wrong answer to a problem, have been able to reach the correct solution by working 
together and Mugny, Levy and Doise (1978) have demonstrated that children with the same 
cognitive development but different perspectives (due to spatial positioning) can also benefit 
from conflictual interactions. Collaborative learning has also been shown to enable students 
to retain information for longer periods of time than students who work alone (Johnson & 
Johnson, 1986) and is seen to be pivotal in cultural development (Tomasello, 1999).  






Despite the potential for children to be unaffected by production blocking, the 
problem of evaluation apprehension remains for this population. Research into social 
influence has found that children are sensitive to the criticisms of their peers and children as 
\RXQJDVKDYHEHHQVKRZQWRµSXQLVK¶RWKHUFKLldren for gender inappropriate behaviour 
(Lamb, Easterbrooks, & Holden, 1980). Those children who were punished ended the 
behaviour significantly sooner than those whose behaviours were reinforced by peers, 
demonstrating the importance of peer approval and their ability to influence children.  
Haun and Tomasello (2011) also demonstrated that children, when faced with a 
majority, will give knowingly wrong answers. When asking children to judge the relative size 
of pictures, children performed the task well until they had to share their answers publicly. 
This demonstrates conformity to an incorrect majority on tasks where the children knew the 
correct answer. Overall their studies showed children conform more in public than private 
settings suggesting that children conform for predominantly social reasons. If they conformed 
due to a desire to be correct, the same level of conformity would be found regardless of 
whether the answers given were public or private. Huan and Tomasello (2011) argued that 
children conformed to avoid conflict by going along with the rest of the group which suggests 
that peer relations are important to children and can influence their publicly expressed 
decisions.  
,Q9DVH\&UQLFDQG&DUWHU¶VVWXG\RQZRUU\LQJLQFKLOGUHQWKH\IRund that 
worrisome thoughts become more prevalent with age in particular from ages 8 and upwards. 
They also found an increase in concerns about social evaluation and their behavioural 
competence with age. The importance of social evaluation at later ages has even been 
incorporated into models of friendship, whereby it is argued that at ages 8 and upwards, 






(Parker & Gottman, 1989). This increase in concerns over social evaluation and competence 
may also impact on the potential for children to experience evaluation apprehension. As these 
studies imply that younger children are less concerned with social and competency 
evaluations from others, it would be expected that evaluation apprehension would increase 
with age as children become more concerned with what others think of them.  
Social comparisons and children  
Alongside an increased concern in others¶ evaluations of themselves, it could be 
expected that children would begin to use social comparisons to ensure that what they are 
doing is considered acceptable. This has been shown to be the case in several studies which 
have found that children from around the age of 8 not only start to compare themselves to 
others but also start to make use of this information (Ruble, Boggiano, Feldman, & Loebl, 
1980; Ruble, Feldman, & Boggiano, 1976). This may be of significance in interacting 
brainstorming groups given the theory put forward by Paulus and Dzindolet (1993) that social 
comparisons play a key role in interacting groups¶ productivity loss. Logically, it would be 
expected that children from the age of 8 would begin to compare their own performance to 
that of other group members and reduce their productivity to match that of the rest of the 
group.  
In the context of school however, where working hard and improving performance are 
implicitly and explicitly encouraged by both teachers and parents, children may be motivated 
to improve their own performance and therefore compare upwards. In two more recent 
studies, children have been shown to naturally compare themselves to students who perform 
slightly better than them and that this upward comparison improves their own performances 
over time (Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, & Kuyper, 1999; Huguet, Dumas, Monteil, & 






brainstorming groups, the level of group performance may be elevated to match that of the 
most competent member as other students upwardly compare and strive to match that of 
better performers.   
A different take on evaluation apprehension in children  
Whilst evaluation apprehension may exist for children, it may not be present in the 
same way in brainstorming tasks as it is for adults. Children often play with one another in 
quite abstract ways such as make-believe play which often involves pretending and creating 
imaginary scenarios (Gillibrand, Lam, 	2¶'RQQHOO%HLQJFUHDWLYHDQGWKLQNLQJRI
new ideas would not necessarily be as embarrassing for children as it would be for adults who 
may feel such notions are inappropriate. The norms of acceptable behaviour are very different 
for adults and children and so whilst they may be vulnerable to evaluation apprehension, it 
may occur in different domains and for different reasons. It would be unacceptable for an 
adult to talk into a banana as if it were a telephone, yet for children this behaviour would be 
seen as quite natural. To a certain extent, thinking of strange and unique ideas, using 
imagination and potentially coming up with silly ideas may be more acceptable to a child 
audience than an adult one, reducing levels of evaluation apprehension for children in this 
setting.   
Another point to make in relation to evaluation apprehension is that it stems from an 
anxiety of being negatively evaluated by other group members or being criticised for their 
ideas (Paulus, Larey, Putman, Leggett, & Roland, 1996). Whilst children may be concerned 
about others¶ evaluations of themselves, such criticism in brainstorming settings may not be 
such a problem for children as the socio-constructivist approach believes that conflict 
between children on tasks is part of their learning process (Dillenbourg, Baker, Blaye, & 






own ideas and improve them suggesting that such critique may even be beneficial for 
children.  Additionally, children are often instructed to work in groups as part of their school 
work due to the benefits of group work, so their anxiety about working together on a 
brainstorming task may be lower as it is a situation they are quite familiar with. Studies into 
the effectiveness of collaborative learning have led to some departments of education to make 
this type of learning method obligatory, so group work should be familiar to most children of 
school age (Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993; Webb, Troper, & Fall, 1995).  
The aim of the current study is to look at brainstorming in a sample of children to see 
whether the same patterns of superior nominal group performance will be found. It is 
hypothesised that there will be a significant difference between the number of unique ideas 
created in nominal and interacting brainstorming groups. Given the developmental literature 
cited with regard to improvement of cognitive ability when working with others, it was 
SUHGLFWHGWKDW\RXQJHUFKLOGUHQ¶VUHDOJURXSVZRXOGRXWSHUIRUPWKHLUQRPLQDOJURXS,WLVDOVR
predicted that with age, FKLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHLQLQWHUDFWLQJJURXSVZLOOGHFUHDVHDVVRFLDO

















Brainstorming in groups of children: A look at productivity 
 
Overview 
This chapter will present two empirical studies on brainstorming in groups using child 
participants. The aim of these studies was to examine the productivity of children in 
brainstorming groups and look at whether they suffer from the same production loss reported 
in the adult literature. First, an explanation of methodological changes will be discussed, 
outlining the reasons for any deviation from the methodology found in adult literature. Study 
4 focuses on children aged between 7- and 11-years and the differences between their 
individual performance and nominal group performance by age. Study 5 looks at children 
aged 6-8-years, 9-10-years and 12-14-years and compares their nominal group performance 
to their real group performance in terms of the number of ideas generated. The findings of 
both studies are discussed in the context of the literature and limitations of each highlighted.  
Introduction 
 
Given the vast amount of empirical research into the area of brainstorming with 
adults, it was felt best to keep the methodology of the current studies as similar as possible to 
existing ones. Due to the nature of the population, some changes did have to be made. In line 






Johnson, & Salas, 1991) and consistent with the definition of groups used in this thesis, 3-
person groups were used which also maximised the use of available participants.   
  
The aspect of methodology that is particularly important to note was the inclusion of 
WKHH[SHULPHQWHULQDOOSDUWVRIWKHH[SHULPHQW$V\RXQJHUFKLOGUHQ¶VZULWLQJDELOLW\FRXOGEH
considered a confound given that it would slow their idea production and may prevent them 
from saying certain ideas because they could not spell them, the experimenter acted as a 
scribe. In previous studies however, the presence of the experimenter has been seen to have a 
detrimental effect on idea productivity (although this has been debated; see Maginn & Harris, 
1980) because of an apparent increase in evaluation apprehension (Mullen, Johnson & Salas, 
1991). The experimenter was therefore present in both the alone and group condition so that 
DQ\HIIHFWVRIWKHH[SHULPHQWHU¶VSUHVHQFHZRXOGEHFRQVLVWHQWLQERWKFRQGLWLRQV therefore 
removing the confound.   
Additionally, when taking into consideration the social comparison literature in this 
area, it was vital that the experimenter did not say any positive or negative phrases during the 
experiment in order to avoid boosting/reducing group performance by implying they were 
doing well or badly. Research has shown that having feedback of any kind on performance 
motivates participants and leads to a change in behaviour (Dugosh & Paulus, 2005; Seta, Seta 
& Donaldson, 1991). The experimenters were instructed to remain as quiet as possible but 
were called upon to keep the children under control. When the children were being too loud 
the experimenter asked them to be quiet and if they spoke off topic for any length of time, the 
experimenter was instrucWHGWRVD\µGR\RXKDYHDQ\PRUHLGHDV¶LQRUGHUWRUHIRFXVWKH






The topic of the brainstorming task needed to be something that young children and 
adolescents alike would have ideas about. Adult brainstorming tasks use topics which were 
FRQVLGHUHGWRRKDUGIRUWKHDJHJURXSVLQWKHVWXG\µOLVWSRVVLEOHXVHVIRUDSDSHUFOLS¶DQG
µLPDJLQHWKDWHYHU\RQHDIWHUZRXOGKDYHDQH[WUDWKXPERQHDFKKDQG*HQHUDWHLGHDV
concerning the practical benefits and difficulties associated with the usHRIWKHVHQHZWKXPEV¶
as examples) Developmental differences in problem solving ability could dominate the age 
differences found rather than differences within the processes of the group. Therefore the 
WRSLFRIµWKLQJV\RXZRXOGQHHGLQVSDFH¶ZDVFKRVHQas it is something both young and older 
children would have an idea about. As it could be expected that the quality of ideas would 
improve with age, alongside cognitive development and increasing vocabulary, the quality of 
ideas was not considered. Instead the focus of the study was on productivity alone.  
It was also decided that groups would be single-sex at all age groups. Although no 
gender effects were expected nor were gender differences a particular focus of this thesis, 
research has suggested that girls and boys behave differently when interacting with members 
of the opposite sex (Leaper, 1991). Additionally, self-segregation along gender lines is 
commonplace in children, so making single-sex experimental groups more closely reflects the 
interactions children typically engage in (Maccoby, 2002). Using single-sex groups also 
removes gender as a confound in the results so any group interactions are the effects of the 
age of the children alone, rather than how many girls or boys make up each group.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the hypotheses of the study were that there 
would be a significant difference in the number of ideas generated between nominal and 
interacting brainstorming groups. The direction of this difference was specified for younger 







performance in interacting groups would decrease as social evaluations become more 
prevalent and children are less reliant on others to aid with their learning.  




  A total of 78 participants took part in the study forming 21 3-person and 4-person 
groups. There were 20 participants in year 3 (M=7.75, SD= 0.44), 21 in year 4 (M= 8.62, 
SD= 0.50), 13 in year 5 (M= 9.69, SD= 0.48) and 24 in year 6 (M= 10.88, SD= .34). In year 3, 
8 boys and 12 girls took part, year 4 had 13 males and 8 female, year 5 had 7 males and 6 
females and year 6 had 11 males and 13 females. Participants were recruited from a school in 
Leeds, Northern England who were initially approached by letter and then contacted by 
phone. Informed consent letters were given to all parents and a Loco Parentis was signed by 
the Head teacher as the school agreed to Opt-Out of the study.  
 7KHVHGDWDZHUHRULJLQDOO\FROOHFWHGDVSDUWRID0DVWHU¶VGHgree project by the 
author. The following analyses are both original and reflect a substantial piece of work. None 
RIWKHIROORZLQJDQDO\VHVZHUHFRQGXFWHGRUXVHGDVSDUWRIWKH0DVWHU¶VGHJUHH 
Design 
This was a 2 (Group type: nominal or interacting) x 4 (Age group: Year 3, year 4, 
year 5, year 6) mixed design. The dependent variable was the number of unique ideas the 







The experimenter was introduced to the children by the teacher. Children were 
informed of the nature of the study- that they would be taking part in a brainstorming session 
both individually and in groups and would be asked some questions about their group. They 
were told that if they did not want to take part they did not have to and only children who 
agreed to take part were spoken to. Children were initially seen individually by the 
experimenter and asked to do a brainstorming task. They were told to think of as many things 
DVWKH\FRXOGRQµ7KLQJV\RXQHHGLQVSDFH¶DQGWKHH[SHULPHQWHUZURWHGRZQDOOWKHLU
answers.  
Later on in the day, the children were taken out of the classroom in groups of 3 or 4 
and sat around a table. They were instructed that they would be doing a brainstorming task 
DJDLQEXWWKLVWLPHWRJHWKHU7KHWRSLFZDVNHSWWKHVDPHµWKLQJV\RXQHHGLQVSDFH¶DQGWKH
children were informed that they would be audio recorded to ensure that the experimenter did 
not miss any of their ideas. The experimenter again wrote down all their ideas for them and 
stopped groups after 4 minutes. The experimenter gave no negative or positive comments on 
the ideas the children put forward but simply wrote them all down. When the children spoke 
off topic, the experimenter prompted them by asking if they had any more ideas. Once this 
task was finished the children did some other work together for a different study before being 
thanked for their time and given a full debrief. All children received a sticker and certificate 
for taking part in the study.  
Results 
 
In order to be able to compare the productivity of interacting groups, nominal groups 
had to be created. Nominal groups were created post hoc by randomly sampling individual 






removing any repeating ideas. In order to increase the power of the study, the individual ideas 
were repeatedly randomly sampled until there were 50 nominal groups for every year group 
in the study. The mean of the nominal groups was then taken and compared to interacting 
groups (matching them by year group and group size). A univariate ANOVA was conducted 
on the data set with year group and group type (nominal or real) as independent variables and 
the number of ideas as the dependent variable. A between-subjects ANOVA was chosen 
because, as the nominal groups created did not match the real groups in terms of the 
individuals included, it was considered to be an independent condition (for descriptive 
statistics see Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1 
Descriptive Statistics for Nominal and Real Groups by Age 
Year group Group type Mean Standard deviation 
Year 3  Nominal 32.85 5.54 
 
Real (N=5) 28.80 6.83 
Year 4 Nominal 30.15 6.92 
 
Real (N=6) 33.00 6.90 
Year 5 Nominal 29.35 6.911 
 
Real (N=4) 30.50 3.69 
Year 6 Nominal 30.03 5.50 
 
Real (N=6) 34.50 6.09 
 
 No significant differences were found overall between nominal and real groups F(1, 
413)= .61, p=.44 or between year groups F(3, 413)= .48, p= .69. No interaction effect was 
found between group type (real or nominal) and age F(3, 413)= 1.76, p= .15. It was decided 
to look at nominal and real groups separately to see if there was an age effect occurring in 
either type of group. A univariate ANOVA was conducted again but this time nominal and 
real groups were separated (using the split file function in SPSS). Year group was entered as 
an independent variable and the number of unique ideas as the dependent variable. No 
significant effects were found for real groups F(3, 17)= .90, p= .46 (possibly due to the small 






Looking at pairwise comparisons, it was found that year 3s produced significantly more novel 
ideas in nominal groups than all other year groups (see Table 7.2 for mean differences) 
Table 7.2 
Pairwise Comparisons of Nominal Groups Ideas by Year Group 
Year group (i) Year group (j) Mean difference (i-
j) 
Significance 
3 4 2.70 p<.005 
3 5 3.50 p<. 001 
3 6 2.82 p< .005 
 
Given that nominal groups are formed using individual ideas, the results would seem 
to imply that year 3s come up with more novel ideas individually than their older 
counterparts. Looking at the means for the number of ideas each year group came up with 
year 3 had on average M= 32.85 ideas, year 4 M= 30.15, year 5 M= 29.35 and year 6 
M=30.03. To investigate this result further, another univariate ANOVA was conducted with 
individual unique ideas the dependent variable and year group as the independent variable. 
There was a significant effect of year group as expected F(3, 74)= 4.48, p< .01, however 
when looking at the pairwise comparisons year 6s came up with significantly more ideas 
individually than the other year groups (see Table 7.3) 
Table 7.3 
Pairwise Comparisons of Individual Ideas by Year Group 
Year group (i) Year group (j) Mean difference (i-
j) 
Significance 
6 3 2.62 p< .05 
6 4 3.57 p< .005 
6 5 3.67 p<. 01 
 
When looking at the mean number of ideas individuals produced by year group year 3 
had on average M= 11.05 ideas, year 4 M= 10.10 ideas, Year 5 M= 10.00 ideas and year 6 






unique ideas than other year groups, these ideas are the same as each other so that when they 
are put into nominal groups, the number of unique ideas is less.  
To compare these two scores directly, a univariate ANOVA was conducted using 
standardised scores of the number of unique ideas variable for both individuals and nominal 
groups across all age groups. This was done to ensure the results were accurate as the sets of 
scores from nominal groups would have been much higher than individuals overall as 
nominal groups consisted of three people instead of one. This means any significance found 
in the results could be due to this difference in number rather than actual differences in 
performance. By standardising the variable, all scores are given a mean of 0 and so can be 
compared across these two conditions. Year group and condition (nominal or individual) 
were entered as independent variables into the model. 
No main effect of condition was found F(1, 152)= 0.17, p=.68 suggesting that the 
number of unique ideas produced in both nominal and individual conditions were similar. A 
marginally significant main effect of year group was found F(3, 152)= 2.48, p=.064, which, 
when looking at the pairwise comparisons, represented significantly more ideas being 
produced in years 4 and 6 when compared to year 5s (MD= .48, p<.05, MD= .57, p<.01 
respectively). This could be due to the smaller sample size of year 5 participants compared to 
the other year groups, rather than a particular effect. Looking at Figure 1, a clear drop in the 
number of unique ideas year 5 nominal groups came up with may also explain this finding as 
this sizeable drop in nominal group performance would impact on the overall novel ideas 








Figure 7.1. Graph showing the relationship between year group and the number of ideas 
individuals and nominal groups produced using standardised scores  
 
A significant interaction was found between condition and year group F(3, 152)= 
5.37, p<.005 (see figure 1) Pairwise comparisons show that in year 4, nominal groups 
significantly outperform individuals in the number of unique ideas produced MD= .87, 
p<.005. In year 6 however, the opposite is found with individuals significantly outperforming 
nominal groups MD= .76, p<.01. Within nominal groups, year 4 significantly outperform 
year 5 and marginally outperform 6 in terms of the number of ideas produced (MD= .94, 




The findings of this study did not support any of the hypotheses. The first hypothesis 
was that there would be a significant difference in the number of ideas generated between 
nominal and interacting brainstorming groups; the findings however suggeset no such 






where nominal groups regularly outperform real groups (Diehl & Stroebe, 1991) however 
these data were unexpected when taking into account research on children.  
The interesting finding from this study is that the year 3 nominal groups significantly 
outperformed all other age groups, yet when looking at the results of individual performance, 
year 6 were significantly better. This would suggest that, with age, children converge on 
similar ideas meaning that although children in year 6 were much more productive, their 
ideas were the same as one another. When put into nominal groups, the repeating ideas were 
removed so the overall performance of nominal groups would have been poor for this age 
group. Year 3s however, have fewer ideas but much more varied ideas so that when entering 
them into nominal groups, fewer ideas are repeated and therefore removed.  
Another finding from the study is the apparent drop in the number of ideas produced 
E\\HDUV7KLVPD\EHDUHIOHFWLRQRIZKDWLVNQRZQDVWKHµIRXUWKJUDGHVOXPS¶LQ
creativity initially found by Torrance (1968). The precise developmental trajectory of 
FKLOGUHQ¶VLQGLYLGXDOFUHDWLYLW\LVGLVSXWHGZLWKLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHEXWVHYHUDOVtudies refer to a 
slump occurring at around this age (Charles & Runco, 2001). Some of the reasons put 
forward for this slump are that at this age conformity is encouraged in schools; following 
classroom etiquette is important and socialisation becomes more salient (Kim, 2011). 
Torrance (1968) argued that the classroom environment inhibits creative thought and 
discourages innovative thinking, preferring children to learn set facts and knowledge in a 
regimented manner. Once children get used to these demands of schooling, their curiosity is 
said to increase again, and improvements in creative thinking increase into adolescence (Kim, 
2011). 
Previous research also suggests that children benefit from working together in groups 






together performed no differently from children working alone. It could be that the 
participants in the study were suffering with evaluation apprehension as literature suggests 
that children as young as three both feel pressure from their peers and change their behaviour 
in accordance to their peers desires (Lamb, Easterbrooks, & Holden, 1980). The children may 
have been nervous about sharing all of their ideas because of a fear of ridicule, especially 
given the public nature of the sharing of ideas. Haun and Tomasello (2011) found that 
children will give knowingly wrong answers when faced with an incorrect majority, 
particularly if they have to give their answers publicly. This normative pressure as shown in 
WKLVVWXG\RXWZHLJKHGFKLOGUHQ¶VGHVLUHWREHFRUUHFWVXJJHVWLQJWKDWLQWKHFXUUHQWVWXG\
children may have rather withheld their ideas than risk being seen as silly.  
Another impact of implied or actual peer pressure might be that children reduced their 
performance to that of the lowest performing member, as shown in adult studies (Paulus & 
Dzindolet, 1993). This explanation seems unlikely however given the lack of significant 
improvement in nominal group performance and when considering the descriptive means for 
both nominal and real groups at each age. In all age groups with the exception of year 3, real 
groups had more ideas than their nominal counterparts. Although not significant, this finding 
and the lack of significant improvement in nominal groups suggests that children were not 
lowering performance.  
In fact, when looking at the descriptive statistics, the means are in the direction 
predicted by the hypothesis that real groups would outperform nominal groups. The means do 
not suggest that with age interacting group performance decreases, but this may be because 
the age range in the current study is not broad enough to capture this predicted decline. Using 
a larger age range may offer more of an insight into what happens developmentally on this 






An additional problem to note is the small sample size. Due to time constraints and 
the complex nature of the testing, it was hard to get access to children as schools were not 
keen to take part with such a disruptive methodology. It was not possible to counterbalance 
the order of brainstorming, so all participants brainstormed first individually and then as a 
group. This means any differences found in the real group stage could be due to practise 
effects and children remembering their ideas from the previous session. Also, no measures 
were taken of phenomena such as production blocking or evaluation apprehension which 
would have given an interesting insight into the group processes occurring for these age 
groups.  
 Further research is needed to replicate these findings and ensure that non-significant 
findings are due to psychological phenomena rather than methodological issues. A study, not 
only with a larger sample size but with additional variables in an attempt to assess what 
mechanisms are occurring in interacting groups of children would improve the research into 
this topic. To rectify the problems in this study, a further study was conducted.  
Study 5: Brainstorming in middle childhood and adolescence 
 
The second study conducted aimed to further the findings in the first study. Group and 
individual brainstorming was counterbalanced so that order effects would no longer be an 
issue. In study 4 any improvement found in the group phase of the experiment could be due 
to practise effects, rather than group processes. It was also decided that the sample size 
should be much larger than in Study 4 to improve the power of the analyses and thus the 
reliability of the results. Specific age groups were also selected that were three years apart 
(year 2, year 5 and year 8) rather than one year (as in the previous study), so that the 






Additional information was also gathered on the individuals and groups to be used in later 
analyses including evaluations and predictions of group performance, measures of evaluation 
apprehension and measures of group experience.  
$GGLWLRQDOO\LQWKHFXUUHQWVWXG\H[SHULPHQWHUVZHUHLQVWUXFWHGWRVD\µVKDOOZe stop 
WKHUHWKHQ"¶ZKHQHYHUSDUWLFLSDQWVVSRNHRIIWRSLFRWKHUZLVHWKHFKLOGUHQZRXOGQRWJREDFN
to class). This phrase was used as Nijstad, van Vianen, Stroebe and Lodewijkx (2004) found 
that adults tend to stop their brainstorming when they felt they KDGGRQHHQRXJKRUFRXOGQ¶W
think of more ideas. Asking children if they wanted to stop therefore reflected their feeling of 
FRPSOHWLRQUDWKHUWKDQDVNLQJIRUµDQ\PRUHLGHDV"¶ZKLFKZRXOGSHUKDSVLPSO\WRWKH
children there were more ideas to guess or that they had not done enough. 
The hypotheses for this study remained the same as the initial study; that there would 
be a significant difference in the number of ideas generated between nominal and interacting 
JURXSVDQGWKDWZLWKDJHFKLOGUHQ¶VUHDOJURXS performance would decrease and their 
nominal performance increase. As an extension to this hypothesis, it was predicted that real 
group performance would decrease with age due to an increase in production blocking and 
evaluation apprehension.  
Participants 
A total of 321 children took part in the full experiment forming 107 3-person groups 
in total. 105 6-8 year olds (M= 6.71, SD= .57), 117 9-10 year olds (M= 9.64, SD= .48) and 99 
12-14 year olds (M= 13.07, SD= .43) were recruited from primary and secondary schools 
across the South East of England, Kent as this area was local to the researcher. There were 
162 boys and 159 girls in total with 57 boys and 48 girls in ages 6-8 years, 69 boys and 48 






Schools were approached by letter and then contacted by phone. Meetings were set up 
with the relevant teachers at the school and the experimenter explained the study and what 
the children would be required to do. Once the teachers (always the Head teachers but 
sometimes the teachers in charge of the classes we would be working with were spoken to) 
agreed to work with us, informed consent letters were given to all parents. In schools where 
Opt-Out was chosen as a method, a Loco Parentis was signed by the Head teacher. The 
testing for this experiment took a year and a half in order to get the sample size obtained. Due 
to the nature of the study, schools did not always have the space or inclination to be able to 
accommodate the research.  
Design 
The experiment was a 2(Order: individual first/group first) x 2 (Condition: 
alone/group) x 3 (Age: 6-8, 9-10, 12-14 years) design. The dependent variable was the 
number of unique ideas produced. The study was a mixed design with condition being 
within-subjects factors and age and order between a between-subjects factor.   
Materials 
3DUWLFLSDQWV¶EUDLQVWRUPLQJLGHDVZHUHUHFRUGHGE\WKHUHVHDUFKHURQDVLQJOHVKHHWRI
paper (both in the group and alone condition). Interview questions were also given to the 
pupils during the individual phase of the experiment. These were either spoken to the 
participants (in year 2 and for some of year 5 participants) or in questionnaire format (for 
some year 5 and all year 8 participants) depending on their age (and therefore reading 
ability). Questions were µ:KHQ\RXZHUHSXWLQWRDJURXSZLWKRWKHUVWXGHQWVWRGRWKH
brainstorming task, do you think you worked harder in the group, worked harder on your own 
RUZRUNHGMXVWDVKDUGLQERWKDQGZK\"¶µ'R\Ru think you were embarrassed and did not 







you to think of more LGHDVRUGR\RXWKLQN\RX¶GZRUNEHWWHURQ\RXURZQDQGZK\"¶DQGµ'R
\RXWKLQNWKDWWKHVWXGHQWVLQ\RXUJURXSKDGWKHVDPHLGHDVDV\RXRUYHU\GLIIHUHQWLGHDV"¶ 
The first two questions were repeated, asking the participants about what they thought 
their group members did during the group phase. This was done to avoid self-presentational 
ELDVDVLWZDVIHOWWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWVPD\EHOHVVOLNHO\WRDGPLWWKDWWKH\GLGQ¶WWU\KDUGRUZHUH
embarrassed. Assigning these negative traits to others however, if they felt these issues 
existed in the group, may yield more truthful responses. It was hoped that participants¶ 
answers would shed light on any production blocking, evaluation apprehension or social 
loafing that they may have observed within their groups. In the group stage of the 
experiment, the participants were asked to do an additional task as part of a different 
experiment. Participants were given a sheet of paper with a scenario on it, in which they had 
to decide how to share sweets out amongst other fictional children. 
Procedure 
On the mornings of the experiment, the researcher met with the teacher whose class 
would be involved in the research. Each teacher was fully informed of the procedure and 
asked for the best way to conduct the research whilst causing minimal impact to their lessons. 
Children were introduced to the researcher by the classroom teacher. They were told that the 
experimenter had been given permission by the school to come in and talk to them and to do 
some brainstorming tasks. The children were all asked if they would be willing to take part in 
the study and it was explained that if they wished they could leave at any point. The children 
were also informed that their answers would remain a secret and that no one would be 






 The children were then tested in a separate room somewhere in the school, with up to 
four children being tested at once (depending on the number of research assistants available 
to help). This room was usually the library or a family room which was secured for us by the 
school for the full day. On the occasions where this was not possible, children were spoken to 
individually in school corridors to minimise the amount of time needed in the room. During 
the individual phase of the study, children were either interviewed or given a questionnaire 
(depending on their reading and writing ability) asking them some basic questions about their 
views on group work. It was during this part of the study that the children brainstormed 
individually. To try and keep the study comparable, children brainstorming by themselves on 
paper were made aware that the experimenters were present and would be looking at their 
ideas. Those being interviewed told the experimenter their ideas and the experimenter wrote 
them down for the child without making any evaluative comments. The instructions for all 
children during the individual brainstorming task were that they could stop at any point 
whether they felt they had enough ideas or could not think of any more.  
 The group part of the study involved taking children out of the classroom in same-sex 
groups of three. The children did a short decision task as part of another experiment and were 
WKHQDVNHGWREUDLQVWRUPRQWKHVDPHWRSLFµ7KLQJV\RXQHHGLQVSDFH¶7KH\ZHUHDJDLQ
instructed to stop when they felt they had enough ideas or could not think of any more. The 
experimenter was present for all groups and wrote down the ideas they had. The group 
brainstorm was also audio recorded so that further analysis could be done at a later date. 
When the children finished, they were fully debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
They were given a certificate and a sticker, or sweets to thank them for taking part. The order 









The data were entered into SPSS and any incomplete groups (groups with people 
missing from the alone condition of the experiment) removed as it would not be possible to 
calculate nominal group scores with a group member¶s individual brainstorm ideas missing. 
Nominal group scores were calculated for each group by adding up the number of unique 
ideas the individuals in the group had during the alone condition. The data were then 
aggregated to avoid triplicating the group data and a repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted with group type (nominal or real groups) as the within subjects variable and age 
and order (group first or alone first) as the between subjects variables. The dependent 
variable in the analysis was the number of novel ideas the group came up with. 
Table 7.4 
Table showing the means and standard deviations for the number of ideas nominal and real 
groups produced when brainstorming both overall and by age. 



































A main effect of group type F(1, 101)= 27.06, p<.001 was found demonstrating that 
real groups significantly outperformed nominal groups overall (for means and standard 






counterbalancing did indeed remove practise effects and there was no main effect of age 
overall. This was surprising given that it was hypothesised that older children generally 
would outperform younger children at the brainstorming task given their wider vocabulary 
and simplicity of the task. There was a significant interaction effect between age and group 
type F(2, 101)= 4.93, p< .01 with 6-8- and 9-10-year-old real groups performing significantly 
better than their nominal counterparts. This significant difference is not found in the oldest 
age group however as their real group performance decreased and their nominal performance 
increased. There was a significant interaction between group type and condition F(1, 101)= 
38.85, p < .001 however this interaction appeared to be driven by the significant interaction 
found between age, group type and condition. 
 
Figure 7.2: Line graph showing the number of ideas real and nominal groups came up with, 
by age, when real groups brainstormed first.  
 
As shown in Figure 7.2, when real brainstorming groups go first, no significant 






groups do not appear to benefit from the initial practise of brainstorming in groups. When 
individuals brainstorm first however (Figure 7.3), there is a significant difference in real 
group performance for the two younger age groups with real groups significantly 
outperforming nominal groups. This difference disappears for the older age group due to a 
significant increase in nominal group performance (compared to the younger age groups) and 
a significant decrease in real group performance (when compared to 9-10 year olds).  
 
Figure 7.3. Line graph showing the number of ideas real and nominal groups came up with, 
by age, when nominal groups brainstormed first.  
Interview Data 
Due to time constraints when testing children, a decision was made to interview only 
one child from each group in ages 6-8-years meaning the total number of participants for this 
part of the experiment was 30 in this age group. For age 9-10-years, 78 children were 
interviewed/given questionnaires and at ages 12-14-years, 144 children in total filled in 
questionnaires. This was done so that more data could be collected at each school in the time 






given. The interview/questionnaire answers given by the participants were coded into two 
new variables: production blocking and evaluation apprehension. Production blocking was 
defined as any comments relating to the issue of sharing speaking time with others, 
concentration problems, the forgetting of ideas and having to do two things at once (being 
part of the group discussion and coming up with novel ideas). Evaluation apprehension was 
coded for answers relating to feeling worried/anxious about sharing ideas, negative comments 
about their own/others ideas and mentioning possible negative reactions of others because of 
their ideas. Each answer was given a score of 1 for either variable if those topics were 
mentioned. The overall interview therefore had a cumulative score for each variable.  
Overall, 15.8% of participants reported production blocking issues and 36.8% 
reported evaluation apprehension within their groups. As there were so few scores for each 
YDULDEOHWKHWZRYDULDEOHVZHUHFROODSVHGLQWRRQHRYHUDOOYDULDEOHODEHOOHGµSURGXFWLRQORVV¶
which overall was reported by 45.3% of participants (see Table 7.5 for a breakdown of 
percentages by age group). This was then put into a weighted regression (to reflect the 
difference in sample sizes) using the total number of group ideas as the dependent variable. 
The final model showed that production loss significantly predicted the total number of group 
ideas for 12-14 years only F(1, 135)= 3.92, p = .05, beta= -.17. The year 2 model was not 
significant F(1, 28)= 2.98, p= .10, beta= -.310 nor was the model for year 5 F(1, 76)= .42, p= 











Table showing the percentages of participants reporting production blocking, evaluation 
apprehension and production loss by age range.  






Years 2-3 13.3% 33.3% 43.3% 
Year 5 12.8% 34.6% 42.3% 




The first hypothesis for the study was that there would be a significant difference in 
the number of ideas generated between nominal and interacting groups which were supported 
by the findings. Real groups of brainstorming participants significantly outperformed 
nominal groups in the number of novel ideas they produced. Additional support was found 
IRUWKHSUHGLFWHGGLUHFWLRQRIWKLVGLIIHUHQFHZLWKSDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHDOJURXSSHUIRUPDQFH
decreasing with age and nominal group performance increasing with age.  
 Whilst this finding is at odds with Study 4 (which found no significant differences) it 
GRHVPDNHWKHRUHWLFDOVHQVH<RXQJHUFKLOGUHQ¶VFRJQLWLYHDELOLW\LVLPSURYHGZKHQZRUNLQJ
with others whether it be a more experienced peer (Vygotsky, 1978) or another peer with a 
different viewpoint (Doise, 1990). When in a brainstorming group, two different factors 
FRXOGEHDWSOD\DOOJURXSPHPEHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFHVPLJKWLPSURYHWRPDWFKPRUHFORVHO\WKDW
of the highest performing member via the zone of proximal development. An additional more 
Piagetian explanation is that, through exposure of different ideas and opinions from other 
group members, a different way of thinking/set of ideas is triggered in the child that without 






 Although there is no real way to distinguish the precise method from the data, the 
Piagetian explanation fits well with current literature on adult populations as Dugosh, Paulus, 
Roland and Yang (2000) argued that exposure to ideas can stimulate idea generation. They 
posited that concepts and ideas are stored in a semantic network with similar concepts/ideas 
having stronger connections. When a particular idea (node) is activated, surrounding ideas 
(nodes) are also triggered lHDGLQJWRDµWUDLQRIWKRXJKW¶([SRVXUHWRRWKHUSHRSOH¶s ideas 
may trigger nodes that, without the initial stimulation, would not have been thought of.  
Results from the current study lend themselves to the idea of children benefitting from 
group interaction as opposed to being inhibited by it. This supports previous research which 
has found that through verbalising ideas children can refine their knowledge of a problem, 
improve their planning abilities, improve later post-test scores than individual training and 
enables children to retain information for longer periods of time (Rumelhart & Norman, 
1978; Rogoff & Gauvain, 1989; Doise & Mugny, 1984; Johnson & Johnson, 1986).  
An explanation for the increasing productivity of nominal groups (therefore 
LQGLYLGXDOVZLWKDJHFRXOGOLHLQFKLOGUHQ¶VYRFDEXODU\DELOLW\%LHPLOOHUILQGWKDWRQ
average, a child learns 2.2 new root words (words that must be learned) per day between the 
ages of 1- and 8-years. Between the ages of 9- and 12-years, this increases to 2.4 words a day 
(Biemiller & Slonim, 2001). Although the precise numbers are contested in the literature, 
taking these numbers as guidance, 12-year-olds on average would have approximately 1,800 
more words available to them than 9-10-year-olds. This increase in vocabulary would aid in 
brainstorming tasks given that the task itself requires participants to think of words and name 
appropriate items related to the brainstorming topic.  
 This idea of increased competence in children as they age may also explain the loss of 







development (Tomasello, 1999; Doise, 1990; Vygotsky, 1962; Piaget, 1932) but if the child 
is already in the final stages of development, there may be little benefit left to gain. Instead, 
what may happen for these older children (and what the findings suggest) is production 
blocking, something that is seen in adult populations. Rather than aiding or stimulating their 
own thought, being in a group may prevent them from sharing their ideas or distract them 
from thinking of their own ideas (Diehl & Stroebe, 1991).  
 In a similar vein, it was noted by the researchers that younger children tended to 
interrupt each other and talk over each other in order to share their ideas in a group setting. 
As well as these interruptions, ideas in the groups were often repeated by different group 
members which could suggest a ODFNRIOLVWHQLQJWRHDFKRWKHU¶VLGHDV7KHVHWZRWKLQJV
directly impact upon production blocking as turn taking and being distracted are two of the 
features of this phenomena (Diehl & Stroebe, 1991). This may suggest then, that the way 
children behave in groups could reduce production blocking where as similar behaviour by 
adults would be frowned upon. Unfortunately, it is not possible to test these observations with 
using the current data set. Future studies should take note of the amount of interruptions that 
take place and the number of times ideas are repeated in groups and compare this with adult 
populations to investigate this further.  
In an attempt to test production blocking and evaluation apprehension in the current 
study, self reported measures of both variables were recorded. The prediction that real group 
performance would decrease with age due to an increase in production blocking and 
evaluation apprehension was partially supported by the data. Although, when looking at the 
percentage of participants who reported both production blocking and evaluation 






collapsed variables (production loss) only significantly predicted performance for the oldest 
age group. This suggests that, by age 12, children are beginning to resemble their adult 
FRXQWHUSDUWVLQEUDLQVWRUPLQJJURXSVDQGDOVRLPSOLHVWKDW\RXQJHUFKLOGUHQ¶VLPSURYHment 
in performance in real groups is due to a lack of these factors.  
A problem with the study is the way in which production blocking and evaluation 
apprehension were recorded. Paulus, Dzindolet, Poletes and Camacho (1993) found that 
participants failed to report evaluation apprehension or production blocking despite its being 
evident during their studies. They concluded that these effects may occur without people 
being consciously aware of them or being able to explain them fully. Although children in 
this study did report both evaluation apprehension and production blocking, suggesting that 
this may not be an issue, the actual presence of both may be much higher due to a similar 
failure to be consciously aware of them. Given that the performance of real groups was high, 
the lower levels of reporting may actually reflect a lack of either effect on this population 
however it is important to be aware of these limitations when interpreting results and 
designing future studies.  
Another point to consider from the findings is that groups seem to provide little 
EHQHILWWRFKLOGUHQ¶VSURGXFWLYLW\ZKHQchildren are asked to brainstorm in groups first and 
then alone. The main benefits found in this study where when children first brainstormed 
alone and then in groups. There could be a motivational explanation for this occurrence; 
when brainstorming in a group first, the group comes up with more ideas and (as reported in 
adult literature) is probably experienced as more fun. When it then comes to brainstorming 
alone, children may feel like they are unable to produce a similar number of ideas as they did 
previously and so are unmotivated to try as hard. When brainstorming alone first however, 







excited and trigger ideas in themselves they did not have previously. Paulus, Dixon, Korde, 
Cohen-Meitar and Carmeli (unpublished) have suggested similar benefits in adult 
brainstorming groups, when the type of brainstorming (alone and in groups) is varied.  
 Another issue to resolve are the different findings from the two studies. The first 
study found no significant differences between real and nominal group performance overall 
or in any specific age group. The current study however did, even when testing children that 
were the same age as present in the initial study (year 5s were sampled in both). Given the 
theoretical support for the findings of Study 5 and the more robust nature of the sample size 
and methodology (counterbalancing and additional variables) it would seem that Study 5 
provides more accurate findings although additional studies should be carried out to confirm 
this.  
7KHWRSLFXVHGIRUWKHVWXG\µWKLQJV\RXQHHGLQVSDFH¶PD\KDYHEHHQDFRQIRXQGDV
older children may have found it more embarrassing to talk about as it could be seen as a 
µ\RXQJ¶WDVN,WZDVNHSWWKHVDPHDVWKHSUHYLRXVVWXG\LQRUGHUWRPDLQWDLQFRQVistency 
however older children may have found this subject too simple or silly and so were 
demotivated to work hard at it and reach their full potential. Older children may have also 
understood the purpose of the task differently from young children; when young children are 
asked to do something by an adult they may work harder at it whereas older children may 
have recognised that the task did not have any ramifications for them and so they did not 
need to try.  
 An additional limitation of the current study was a lack of an adult sample for direct 
comparison. This would enable researchers to compare directly adult performance and child 






adult sample was beyond the scope of the current research due to time constraints and the 
problematic data collection (trying to get multiple participants to turn up at the same time). 
Future studies should include an adult sample to ensure that differences found between 
current findings and adult literature are due to psychological phenomena rather than 
methodological reasons.  
Conclusion 
 
Taken together, both studies demonstrate an interesting new area of research for 
group processes and developmental psychology. Additional research needs to be done to 
further strengthen the findings reported here and the chapter itself offers more questions than 
answers at this stage. Focussing on the second study, the results seem to suggest that group 
work yields the best results when children are initially instructed to do the task alone first. 
This could have important implications in classroom settings where group work is a common 
feature. In terms of the adult literature, the chapter lends support to certain arguments in the 
field. It would seem that productivity loss is not an intrinsic part of being in a group as 















The purpose of this thesis was to attempt to address a gap in the literature that 
FXUUHQWO\H[LVWVRQFKLOGUHQ¶VLQWUDJURXSSURFHVVHV7KLVDUHDRIUHVHDUFKLVLPSRUWDQWEHFDXVH
it can aid our understanding of adult group processes, support or refute current models of 
group behaviour and help explain a significant portion oIFKLOGUHQ¶VVRFLDOH[SHULHQFHV
Children often work in groups, play in groups and belong to several different types of groups 
and understanding the processes involved in how these groups work can give us a fuller 
SLFWXUHRIFKLOGUHQ¶VSV\FKRORJ\ 
The thesis focused particularly on group decision making and group productivity in 
the form of brainstorming for several reasons, the first being that these two literatures are 
well developed in social psychology (for reviews see Isaksen, 1998; Kerr & Tindale, 2004). 
This provided a framework to apply this research to children; the methodologies of both areas 
are established as are the theoretical considerations and findings for the behaviour when 
expressed in adults. This meant that there was an established base to work from in terms of 
developing a methodology that would work with children and clear pattern of what to expect, 
if children behaved as adults in these scenarios.  
Additionally, children have to make decisions all the time; who to play with, what 
games to play, whether to share their toys and with whom, whether to follow an adult¶s 
instruction or whether they like broccoli or not. Several of these decisions often occur in 
social environments such as the school playground or the classroom and the outcomes of 







situation can provide the groundwork for better understanding ostracism, bullying and other 
negative social behaviours.  
The assumption that working in groups will be productive is embedded in the national 
curriculum in the UK (National Curriculum, 2013). Work on collaborative learning suggested 
that children EHQHILWIURPZRUNLQJLQDJURXS'LOOHQERXUJ%DNHU%OD\H	2¶0DOOH\
Doise,1990; Glachan & Light, 1981; Piaget, 1932; Vygotsky, 1978) but since this initial work 
was conducted, little has been done to investigate exactly how and why this happens, at what 
age, if any, this stops happening and whether or not different methods of working could 
increase the benefit of group work for children further. Alongside this consideration is 
research in social psychology that suggests adults are actually better off working alone than 
in groups (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Steiner, 1972). By attempting to empirically test the same 
types of behaviour in children, further explanation and insight into the patterns of behaviour 
found in adults could be gained.  
Key Findings  
The first study presented in Chapter 4 LQWUDJURXSFRQWH[WVDQGFKLOGUHQ¶VUHVRXUFH
allocation) looked at how children decided to share resources (in this case sweets) amongst 
three target children, first individually and then in groups of three. The findings showed that 
the oldest children (12 to 14-year-olds) gave the target described as smart significantly more 
resources and the target who was described as being ill significantly less resources compared 
to the two younger age groups. The middle age group (9 to 10-year-olds) gave significantly 
more resources to the target who worked the hardest despite the implication that this targets 
work would not have been to the same standard as the smart target. The youngest children 
gave significantly more resources to the ill target than any other age group suggesting a 






overall, children gave significantly more resources to the target who worked the hardest than 
when they decided individually. Groups did not give any less resources to the smart target 
compared to individuals which suggests an increase in liking of the target who worked the 
hardest rather than a decrease in liking for the target who was smartest.  
 The second study in this Chapter LQWHUJURXSFRQWH[WDQGFKLOGUHQ¶VUHVRXUFH
allocation) ORRNHGDWWKHHIIHFWVRILQWHUJURXSFRQWH[WVRQFKLOGUHQ¶VVKDULQJRIUHVRXUFHV
Children were exposed to either an interpersonal scenario or intergroup scenario and asked to 
share sweets out between themselves and another pupil, an ingroup member or an outgroup 
member. It was found that the eldest age group (12 to 13-year-olds) gave significantly fewer 
sweets to the other person whether that was another pupil, an ingroup member or an outgroup 
member than any other age group. The middle age group (9 to 10-year-olds) gave 
significantly more sweets out to others (regardless of context) than both the youngest and 
eldest age groups. When looking at the impact of intergroup contexts on the participants 
sharing behaviour, it was found that the presence of an outgroup led to fewer sweets being 
given to another pupil (ingroup or outgroup) than all other conditions. When comparing to a 
baseline condition, it was found that the results reflected a negative outgroup bias (giving 
fewer sweets to the outgroup) rather than a positive ingroup bias (giving more sweets to the 
ingroup).  
 In chapter 5, another decision making task was given to children (Individual and 
group vigilance in children) both individually and in groups of five but this time, the task 
used was a cumulative frequency task rather than a resource allocation task. The aim of the 
study was to see how children dealt with group members whose initial guesses were much 
higher or lower than other group members. It was found that the oldest children (12 to 13-






Judgment Scheme (SJS; which would have taken into account outlying positions) or the 
median of the initial answers. The youngest age group (5 to 6-year-olds) were significantly 
more likely than the other age groups to use the SJS and use an individual group member¶s 
answer as the final group¶s answer. The factor demonstrated to influence whose answer they 
chose was the popularity of the child rather than their ability.  
 In chapter 7, two more studies were presented looking at brainstorming and group 
productivity. The first study (Brainstorming in primary age children) attempted to compare 
nominal and real groups¶ performances and found no significant difference between the two 
types of groups¶ performance. The youngest age groups (7 to 8-year-olds) nominal groups 
outperformed all other nominal groups and the eldest age group (10 to 11-year-olds) had the 
best individual performance in terms of number of novel ideas. These findings suggested that 
although older children are better at developing ideas than other age groups, their ideas are 
similar to one another so that, when put into nominal groups, there are fewer novel ideas 
between them.  
 The second study in the chapter (Brainstorming in middle childhood and adolescence) 
also looked at real and nominal group brainstorming performance but this time using a 
broader age range and larger sample size. The study found that real groups significantly 
outperformed nominal groups and that, with age, real group performance decreased and 
nominal group performance increased. Additionally, it was found that real groups of children 
performed much better having brainstormed on a topic individually first but that this benefit 
did not significantly enhance the performance of the eldest age group (12 to 13-year-olds).  
Discussion of findings 
Across the two brainstorming studies there appeared to be different effects of group 






it did affect performance in Study 5. Although both studies demonstrate different findings 
than those typically found in adult populations the lack of significant difference found in the 
first study between nominal and real group performance is thought to be due to sample size. 
In the initial study individuals always brainstormed before groups and no counter balancing 
was enforced, however the findings from the second study suggest that this should increase 
the difference found between nominal and real group performance rather than hinder it. In the 
second study, the three-way interaction found between age, group type and condition showed 
that when individuals brainstorm alone first, their subsequent real group performance 
significantly differed in all but one of the age groups.  
Distinct age differences and also similarities have been found throughout the thesis 
and it would appear that the group affects children differently depending on their age. Older 
children were not more sensitive to intergroup scenarios as all age groups were similarly 
affected in their resource allocation by the presence of an outgroup member. In terms of their 
intragroup behaviour however, older children (12 to 14-years-old) did not experience the 
same benefits of group work on their productivity than younger children, failing to show the 
same significant difference between their nominal and real group scores as both 6-7-year-olds 
and 9-10-year-olds did. Older children were more likely to use the mean when trying to 
decide on a final answer in the cumulative frequency estimation task where as the younger 
age group decided in a manner consistent with the SJS model. This may be due to less 
obvious outliers or because of an increased pressure to include all group members in the 
decision.  
The findings from the thesis overall (both decision making studies and productivity 
VWXGLHVGHPRQVWUDWHWKHLPSDFWWKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VVRFLDOHQYLURQPHQWVFDQKDYHRQERWKWKHLU






the focus from intrinsic ability to more socially beneficial behaviour (working hard for the 
benefit of the group) resulting in a shift of resource allocation to reward those who engage in 
such behaviour. These intragroup processes also wRUNWRLPSURYHSURGXFWLYLW\LQFKLOGUHQ¶V
LGHDSURGXFWLRQDQGLQFUHDVHFKLOGUHQ¶VOHYHOVRIPRUDOUHDVRQLQJWRUHIOHFWWKDWRIDQROGHU
child. In intergroup scenarios, children have been shown to be less generous in terms of the 
amount of resources they are willing to share with another child, especially when that child 
belongs to a different group (in this case a different school). Again a difference was 
demonstrated between the conditions where the intergroup was present and when the decision 
to be made was at an interpersonal level.  
 *URXSVGRVHHPWRKDYHDQLQIOXHQFHRQFKLOGUHQ¶VEHKDYLRXUDQGWKHWKHVLVGRHV
provide some explanation as to the mechanisms occurring within these groups although it is 
recognised more research needs to be conducted on this area. First, children seem to suffer 
less evaluation apprehension and production blocking which enables them to perform better 
when working in groups. These two phenomena have been shown with adults to prevent their 
brainstorming groups reaching the potential of their nominal groups (Camacho & Paulus, 
1995; Nijstad, Stroebe, & Lodewijkx, 2003) and here, reportedly in absence of these 
SKHQRPHQDFKLOGUHQ¶VJURXSVSHUIRUPEHWWHU)XUWKHUPRUHWKHILQGLQJVLQWKLVWKHVLVVKRZ
that young children appear to be more influenced by a single group member and therefore 
accept their decision as the final group decision. The influence a group member has over the 
group appears to be dependent on their popularity rather than any ability other children 
perceive them to have. Older children however have not been shown to do this and rather 









The empirical chapter on brainstorming raises some interesting points when 
considering current literature both in developmental and social psychology. The first being 
that these studies demonstrate support for the collaborative learning literature, showing that 
ZRUNLQJLQJURXSVFDQLPSURYHFKLOGUHQ¶VSURGXFWLYLW\7KLVKDVEHHQGHPRQVWUDWHGLQJURups 
of three rather than dyads which are often used when attempting to measure collaboration 
DPRQJVWFKLOGUHQ'LOOHQERXUJ%DNHU%OD\H	2¶0DOOH\,QWHUHVWLQJO\WKHEHQHILWV
RIZRUNLQJWRJHWKHUZHUHVKRZQWRµZHDURII¶ZLWKDJHDVFKLOGUHQLQWKe eldest age group 
(12-14-years) no longer showing significant benefits to working in groups. If we are to 
assume that collaboration in children improves their level of cognitive development, this 
finding may suggest that, in terms of the demands of the task given, the eldest age group 
already possessed the necessary skills to complete the task competently alone. Therefore, no 
additional benefit to the task was gained by being with other students. If the complexity of 
the task were to increase however, there may still be a benefit for this age group working 
together.  
 This is certainly a point to consider when thinking about the educational benefits of 
group work for children. Whilst exposure to others¶ ideas and problem solving strategies is 
beneficial, group work may not always aid older age groups in the same way it can for 
younger children. It is important to consider the complexity of the task carefully before 
deciding whether group work is the best method of learning for that age group. The study 
also demonstrated additional explanations for why older children benefit less from group 
work than younger children. Self-report ratings of production blocking and evaluation 
apprehension predicted the number of ideas produced in groups for this age group. This 
would imply that not only could there be no potential cognitive benefit for a task of this 






 It has certainly been demonstrated that the importance of peers increases throughout 
childhood and into adolescence and this may be reflected in an increase in evaluation 
apprehension (Kuttler, Parker, & LaGreca, 2002). Although there was no correct or incorrect 
DQVZHUSHUVHIRUWKHWDVNVD\LQJVRPHWKLQJFRQVLGHUHGWREHDµVLOO\¶LGHa by others was 
quite possible. This may lead older children to vet their ideas before sharing, slowing the 
process of idea sharing down but potentially leading to a higher quality of ideas. Quality was 
not measured in this thesis but it is certainly something that should be looked at in future 
studies. The increase in the number of participants reporting production blocking is also an 
interesting factor to consider; what is qualitatively different about children of this age or 
groups of this age that lead to more production blocking? One of the things noted by the 
experimenters was that young children did not tend to take turns in sharing their ideas but 
rather shouted them out as they had them. It could be that by ignoring group behaviour 
norms, they spare themselves some cognitive load which can then be used to focus on idea 
generation. Older children may be more aware of appropriate group behaviour however and 
focus more on ensuring they behave in a good way. Again, this is an avenue for future 
research- the number of times interruptions occur and turn taking occurs could be indicative 
of these processes taking place. 
 In terms of the adult social psychology literature these studies offer a completely new 
look at brainstorming processes as well as production loss. Steiner (1972) argued that 
production loss was an inherent part of being in a group but if that claim is true, then groups 
of children should have also demonstrated this same loss. The lack of self reported 
production blocking and evaluation apprehension in groups where real groups outperformed 
the nominal counterparts adds support to the literature that looks to these phenomena as 
explaining the production loss seen in adults (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987). It is important to 






pattern of productivity between real and nominal groups changes and to try and pinpoint what 
factors may be the cause at that age.  
 What these studies demonstrate to social psychologists is the importance of 
considering developmental trends and patterns in intragroup behaviour to better understand 
these same behaviours shown in adults. If it is possible to pin point the exact age at which 
nominal groups outperform real groups, further research can be done with that age group to 
work out exactly what occurs at this age that is not present at earlier ages. Interventions can 
also be introduced to counter any potential causes of negative intragroup behaviour to make 
people more effective at group work in the future. Additionally developmental studies can 
provide support for existing theories as these studies have done for the ideas that production 
blocking and evaluation apprehension are two things involved in brainstorming groups.  
 The brainstorming studies also provide support for the 4th grade slump, an effect that 
has been recorded previously in other studies (Charles & Runco, 2001). Interestingly, there 
was no evidence of this slump in the second study of the chapter that focussed on nominal 
and real groups. Some of the theorised explanations for this slump include an increase in 
FRQIRUPLQJEHKDYLRXUUHGXFLQJFKLOGUHQ¶VFUHDWLYHWHQGHQFLHV.LP,WFRXOGEHWKDW
because they were instructed to work together in the group, the conforming behaviour in that 
context would be to create more ideas if they were to conform with the group they were in. 
 The decision making studies provide more information on intragroup processes in 
FKLOGUHQ¶s decision making to the existing literature. The literature on intragroup processes is 
limited as discussed in chapter 2 and the studies in this thesis provide further demonstration 
of the ways in which researchers can apply and make use of decision making models 
typically seen in adult literature. Unlike Gummerum and colleagues studies (2006, 2008), 






and other decision making options developmentally to see if children of different ages had 
different preferences in terms of how they came to a decision. It was shown that older 
children prefer to use the mean when making decisions on cumulative tasks suggesting that 
when testing baseline models on adolescents an averaging model might be more appropriate.  
 Another finding that requires further consideration is the way that groups impacted 
DQGFKDQJHGFKLOGUHQ¶VLQGLYLGXDOGHFLVLRQVSDUWLFXODUO\RQZKRWRLQFOXGHRUUHMHFWZKHQ
sharing sweets. Groups were still shown to reject targets (by giving them one sweet rather 
than two) suggesting that exclusion type behaviours do also occur in group scenarios, but the 
target of rejection changed. Individuals were more likely to reject targets who tried their best 
compared to groups and groups were more likely to reject the ill target than individuals. 
Similar changes can be seen in the inclusion model presented in chapter 4 where groups were 
more likely to include the tried best target and less likely to include the smart target compared 
to individuals. This suggests that when considering literature on bullying or exclusion in 
children, group behaviour should be considered as it may change the target of exclusion 
although not necessarily the proclivity of exclusion.  
 The resource allocation study also demonstrates support for the developmental trends 
in moral reasoning; all age groups were shown to make choices that reflected social 
conventional reasoning (preferring the smart target and rejecting the sick target) but the eldest 
age group did this significantly more than the other two age groups. This supports the Social 
Domain Theory of moral reasoning (Smetana, 2006) that different types of moral reasoning 
are available at an earlier age but that the emphasis on which type of reasoning to use 
changes with age.  
 Introducing the intergroup context into distributive justice attempted to bring together 






ingroup bias with no age differences. The intergroup study presented in this thesis attempted 
to further this work, introducing a wider range of ages and scenarios. Similarly to Vaughan et 
DO¶VVWXG\LQWHUJURXSFRQWH[WVVHHPHGWRLPSDFWRQDOODJHJURXSVLQWKHVDPHZD\
suggesting a sensitivity toward intergroup scenarios from as young as 6-years-old. The eldest 
age group however were most affected giving fewer sweets to others than the other age 
groups.  
Strengths and Limitations 
The studies presented in the thesis are some of the first looking at intragroup 
processes in children with the view of using the findings to further research and understand 
group processes in adults. Due to the novelty of the research, there was limited methodology 
to use as a reference when conducting these studies so a lot of methodology used was 
developed from scratch. This involved using innovative ways of including multiple studies 
within a single testing session, for example using brainstorming tasks to strengthen group 
identity before asking children to make a group decision. This enabled me to improve the 
quality of data I collected and also meant I was able to collect the large amounts of data 
needed for the group analysis of the data.  





and group productivity. It has also demonstrated that there may be a need for specific 
intragroup theories depending on the behaviour being studied. Overall, no clear 






productivity studies. Whilst intragroup processes still seemed to affect oldHUFKLOGUHQ¶V
decision making, it had no impact on their productivity in groups. This suggests that rather 
WKDQGHYHORSLQJDQRYHUDUFKLQJWKHRU\RIFKLOGUHQ¶VLQWUDJURXSSURFHVVHVVHSDUDWHWKHRULHV
IRFXVVLQJRQVSHFLILFDUHDVPD\EHVWFDSWXUHFKLOGUHQ¶VEehaviour.  
As studies using groups of children are relatively rare and the areas studied in this 
thesis are some of the first of their kind, some methodological flaws did arise throughout 
when attempt to collect and analyse the data. When attempting to run an SDS analysis on the 
decision making data collected for Study 1 for example, it was noted that the type of decision 
making scenario used did not have enough variability to be able to tell apart different 
decision rules. Additionally, the use of three-person groups meant that the full explanatory 
power of the model was not used. Another problem to address is the disruptive nature of the 
data collection. As children needed to be spoken to both in a group and then individually, the 
time taken out of the classroom was significant. Added to that the disruption of losing at 
times single children and then multiple children at once, the impact of conducting this 
research on the school day was significant despite actions taken to reduce this impact. These 
actions additionally impacted on the amount and type of data that could be collected. 
 Due to the difficult nature of accessing children on a large scale to conduct research, 
the studies were designed in such a way that data for multiple studies could be collected at 
once. This meant that the larger numbers needed for group data could be more easily obtained 
in the period of time given to complete this work. As lowering the disruption for the schools 
was key in the researcher¶s mind, some variables that would have been interesting to include 
were removed in an attempt to shorten the procedure and encourage more schools to get 
involved. Variables such as a measure of cognitive development, working memory, and so 






power directly. A compromise had to be made however, and it was decided to cut these 
measures given the strong literature already in place on these aspects of child development 
and so their application to the current studies were only inferred.  
 As there is hardly any previous research to build upon, this thesis chose to look at two 
different types of decision making tasks, as well as a task looking into the productivity of 
groups which may be considered a little broad. Although there were strong theoretical 
arguments for the predictions and ideas put forward, I could not be certain what we would 
find, so decided to follow a more exploratory approach with the intention on building more 
detailed pictures as part of later post doctorial work. The studies presented here do not hold a 
complete picture of the processes detailed and nor was its intention; instead, what was hoped 
was to establish methodology in these areas and elicit an interest in the topic more broadly by 
demonstrating what could be done and found.   
 Another limitation of the thesis is that a lot of the methodology was developed for the 
purpose of these studies as adult measures typically used in social psychology were 
considered too advanced for children. This means that the measures do not have the same 
kind of reliability or validity seen in more established measures that can be gained through 
repeat testing. This also poses a problem when attempting to compare these findings to the 
adult literature; are the decision and brainstorming scenarios presented to children here really 
WKHHTXLYDOHQWRIWKHW\SHVRIVFHQDULRVWKDWDUHSUHVHQWHGWRDGXOWSRSXODWLRQV",WZRXOGQ¶WEH
suitable to give children adult scenarios or adults children scenarios as these would produce 
ceiling and floor effects so any measures taken from social psychology do have to be adapted.  
 It should also be noted that in the decision making studies, the decisions children were 
involved in did not directly impact them. At no point were they going to be receiving the 






cumulative estimation task. As there were no ramifications for the children, they could have 
been more generous with their sharing behaviour or less vigilant when attempting to decide a 
final answer in the estimation task meaning the behaviour recorded here may not be an 
accurate reflection of what would happen in real world situations. Due to the financial 
restraints of the thesis and problems in giving children sweets (allergies, healthy eating and 
so on) no real rewards were given to the children which is something that would be changed 
in future studies. Anyone attempting to look into this topic should consider adding this to 
their research budget to make their studies more applicable.  
 It is also important to consider including adult samples when carrying out this type of 
data collection. By including adult groups, direct comparisons can be made in the findings 
ruling out any bias the individual researcher may have imposed on participants or through the 
methodology. Although materials would need to be adjusted to reflect the participants¶ age, 
the way the study is introduced and the procedure enacted would be the same controlling for 
as many potential differences as possible when comparing across different research. 
 At times it was hard to get schools on board, especially with the nature of the data 
collection this thesis undertook and this is a problem that should be addressed by all 
developmental psychologists. For schools to take the time to allow us to work with their 
children and use their facilities, more standardised forms of reciprocation should be 
introduced across departments not just for members of staff but also student researchers. 
Universities have access to a lot of resources that could be of use to schools, such as up-to-
date knowledge on child development and educational literature which may be of benefit to 
teachers, expertise in specific areas of science which could be worked into sessions and given 






sessions could be offered or expert talks given to young people to educate them on subject 
and career choices.  
Future research  
&KLOGUHQ¶V intragroup decision making processes need to be investigated further using 
a wider variety of decision making scenarios to give clearer understanding about what 
happens in groups. Recordings of group discussions would be important to look at to gain an 
idea of the content of discussion rather than simply focussing on the outcome. In addition to 
this more developmental variables should be tested within each experiment so that direct 
relationships between observed behaviour and developmental factors can be explained.  
 Further attempts to use SDS models on groups of children should also be considered 
as the potential data from this research could be invaluable. To ensure a methodological 
design that would work with a SDS analysis, the scenario given to children could be similar 
to jury decision making, an area SDS has been used extensively in (Davis, 1973; Stasser, 
1999). Children could be presented with an ambiguous scenario where X may have stolen 
cookies for example and then be asked whether they think X is guilty or not guilty. Using 
such a similar paradigm to those used with adults again lends the data to more direct 
comparisons across these two groups.  
Research may also want to look at using a task that is cognitively harder than 
brainstorming for children to see if benefits of group work still drop off at 12-14-years or 
whether, by increasing the complexity of the task, the older age groups still have cognitive 
benefits. This may also help pick apart social and cognitive processes- if eldest age group do 
still benefit, it suggests social factors are less of an issue. If they do not, it would seem that 
despite the potential cognitive gains, social factors too are important. Alternatively, a 






experiments in the thesis to maintain consistency but by changing the topic to one with more 
of a problem solving nature might be more applicable to the research conducted with adults 
ZKLFKXVXDOO\KDYHDSUREOHPVROYLQJHOHPHQWWRWKHP$VNLQJFKLOGUHQIRUH[DPSOHRIµZD\V
WKDW\RXFRXOGLPSURYH\RXUVFKRRO¶KDYHSUREOHPVROYLQJHOHPHQWVWRLWEXWLVDWRSLFWKDWLV
relevant to children of any age group.  
Future studies on brainstorming should also develop a scale that measures aspects of 
evaluation apprehension and production blocking. The development of a scale that 
thoroughly measures all of the theorised aspects of both phenomena would lead to a more 
reliable and valid measure of these constructs that could be applied to both adults and 
children alike. Being able to compare these two populations directly would mean that 
researchers could be more confident in their findings on any differences found across adults 
and children rather than the differences potentially being explained by methodology.  
In the thesis intragroup and intergroup effects were studied separately from one 
another but it would be interesting to look at how intragroup scenarios affect the decisions 
children make on intergroup contexts. The thesis has already demonstrated the impact both 
LQWUDDQGLQWHUJURXSVFHQDULRVKDYHLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIHDFKRWKHURQFKLOGUHQ¶VGHFLVLRQ
making but looking at how they work together could prove both useful and interesting. Using 
scenarios that look at exclusion more directly would also be an important development from 
the work presented here. Although rejection and inclusion were looked at when analysing the 
data, the scenarios the children were asked to consider were not overtly about these 
behaviours. Investigating exclusion more explicitly in these circumstances could provide 
useful insight into how intragroups effect exclusion decisions which could further inform 






The application of developmental studies to other areas of social psychology is also 
important; the hidden profile effect was recently studied by Gummerum et al. (2014), but the 
study and ones presented in the thesis could be improved. Gummerum and colleagues only 
considered children at ages 7- and 9-years meaning a clear developmental pattern as to how 
the hidden profile changes could not be investigated thoroughly. Other areas for potential 
investigation include leadership and leadership deviance, production loss using different 
tasks, research looking at extremity in groups (aspects such as group polarisation and risky 
decision making) or at individual motivation in group tasks. Given the vast amount of 
literature in social psychology on intragroup processes, the potential for new research is 
ubiquitous and given initial findings presented so far in the thesis and in the literature, 
potentially very fruitful.  
Final Thoughts 
 The aim of this thesis was to investigate the intragroup effects on children in decision 
making and brainstorming tasks and to highlight the value of researching intragroup 
processes in children. Intragroup research can not only inform developmental literature but 
also provide supporting or contrasting evidence for theories of group behaviour in social 
SV\FKRORJ\(QVXULQJWKDWSV\FKRORJLVWVIXOO\XQGHUVWDQGFKLOGUHQ¶VVRFLDOH[SHULHQFHVPHDQV
that researchers must consider the impact of intragroup processes and how these can affect 
children.  
The empirical work in the thesis has demonstrated both intergroup and intragroup 
HIIHFWVRQFKLOGUHQ¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJDQGSHUIRUPDQFH:KHQSXWLQWRJURXSVFKLOGUHQ
choose different targets to include and exclude using resource allocation, opting to include 
targets who demonstrate more socially beneficial behaviour than individuals. Groups are also 






the target in question has no control over their predicament. Intergroup contexts also affect 
the resource allocation of children, with children giving less to others who belong to an 
outgroup. Older children (12- to 13-years) are more affected by these scenarios giving fewer 
resources to others than any other age group.  
When making decisions involving estimation tasks, intragroup processes again have 
DQHIIHFWRQFKLOGUHQ¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ:KHQDWWHPSWLQJWRFRPHWRDILQDOJURXSDQVZHU
12- to 13-year-olds use the mean of the group members¶ initial guesses whereas 6- to 7-year-
olds used the SJS model when selecting their final group answer. This youngest group were 
also more likely to copy an individuals initial guess and selected the most popular group 
PHPEHU¶VDQVZHUUDWKHUWKDQWKHPRVWFDSDEOH7KLVVHHPVWRVXJJHVWWKDW\RXQJFKLOGUHQDUH





group work however seems to reduce for older children (12- to 14-years-old) who also report 




 Taken together, the findings from this thesis demonstrate the importance of 
investigating developmental intragroup processes both for developmental and social 
psychology literatures. Social psychology often assumes group processes are the same for all 






demonstrated that, when using methodology and analysis taken from social psychological 
OLWHUDWXUHFKLOGUHQ¶VLQWUDJURXSSURFHVVHVZRUNGLIIHUHQWO\IURPWKRVHRIDGXOWV,WFDQQRWEH
assumed therefore, that by simply testing participants of University age and above, social 
psychology has a clear and full picture of intragroup processes as a whole.  
 With regards to the developmental literature, this thesis offers new questions and 
areas to be further investigated within this topic. Looking at how groups of children work 
within themselves can further knowledge on intergroup behaviour, bullying and exclusion, 
KRZJURXSVLPSURYHFRJQLWLYHGHYHORSPHQWDQGKRZVRFLDOFRQWH[WVLPSDFWRQFKLOGUHQ¶V
decision making. As yet, no theoretical framework exists tying together developmental 
factors and intragroup processes nor are there any theories as to how this behaviour may 
develop. It is hoped that from the work presented here, new research and theoretical 
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